Rohani and Referendum in the Islamic Republic

"The Constitution has removed deadlocks and has great capacity, and if we have a discussion on an issue, we must refer to Article 59, which states that we should refer to the people's votes." This part of Rohani's speech at the commemoration of the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on February 11 has sparked a wave of controversy and new reactions. Opponents of the moderate government within the political system have organized a new round of criticism and attacks against Rohani, evaluating it as contrary to the interests of the system. Meanwhile, it seems that the President is merely considering a legal possibility and capacity to overcome some deadlocks or to reform certain processes and respond to some demands (mainly social and economic). Rohani's recent emphasis on the possibility of referring to public opinion and a referendum is not unprecedented—even regarding himself. Independent of similar demands made by some key political actors in the Islamic Republic over the past four decades, Rohani also mentioned a similar opinion three winters ago at an economic conference: "For once, on a very important issue that may have differences, an issue that is important for everyone and affects everyone’s life, the direct opinion of the people should be asked." The fear of the government’s opponents and authoritarian figures of fundamental changes following a potential referendum has no relation to the legal reality of the referendum issue and its process. Especially considering the realities of the political power structure and the supreme oversight of the leader of the Islamic Republic and the interference of institutions such as the Guardian Council, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and the judiciary should not be forgotten. At that time, Rohani also emphasized that the emphasis and possibility of the Constitution for referring to public votes and a referendum "has never been executed or acted upon." This reality, now coinciding with the Islamic Republic entering its fourth decade of existence, has become forty years old. When discussing a referendum and referring to the people's vote within the framework of the Islamic Republic's Constitution, the limitations and framework of action are largely defined. According to Article 59 of the Constitution: "In very important economic, political, social, and cultural matters, the legislative power may be exercised through a referendum and direct reference to the people's votes. The request for a public vote must be approved by two-thirds of the total representatives of the parliament." In other words, the referendum is emphasized as one of the tools for exercising the authority of the legislative power in the Constitution. Moreover, two-thirds of the representatives who have passed through the Guardian Council's vetting filter and have entered the parliament must reach a consensus and decision regarding the referendum issue. Such a referendum—contrary to the fears of the government’s opponents and the authoritarian camp—is not supposed to threaten the fundamental framework of the system or its foundational axes. Article 177 of the Constitution, which refers to the revision and change of the Constitution through a referendum, states that "the content of the principles related to the Islamic nature of the system and the basis of all laws and regulations based on Islamic standards and the fundamental goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the republican nature of the government and the leadership of the community and the administration of the country based on public votes and the official religion and sect of Iran is unchangeable." In other words, the fear of the government’s opponents and authoritarian figures of fundamental changes following a potential referendum has no relation to the legal reality of the referendum issue and its process. Especially considering the realities of the political power structure and the supreme oversight of the leader of the Islamic Republic and the interference of institutions such as the Guardian Council, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and the judiciary should not be forgotten. After the protests in December 2017, it seems that what Rohani has raised again, and the fear expressed by authoritarian figures in response to the referendum issue, are both related to the protests of the previous December and the events that followed (including protests against compulsory hijab) and, of course, the socio-economic realities of the country. Rohani seeks to utilize the legal and political capacity of the Constitution and the potential of the Islamic Republic for endogenous reform. Thus, he refers to the referendum, which can encompass important economic, social, cultural, and even political axes. Three years ago, when Rohani spoke of a referendum, he raised the issue in the context of political economy; he emphasized at that time: "A certain institution cannot engage in economic work and not pay taxes, but when you say that another institution should also pay taxes, see what chaos ensues." In other words, the referendum could be about taxing all institutions and economic entities (especially significant cases like Astan Quds Razavi, the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, the Executive Headquarters of Imam's Directive, and Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters). The referendum could also include other issues such as energy carrier prices, how subsidies are paid, the quality of relations with the West, aspects of supervisory oversight, judicial reform, media censorship, online social network filtering, and the extent of dress code restrictions and hijab regulations. The mentioned axes could—if realized—alleviate existing protests and discontent. However, the reality is that the ruling authoritarian figures at the core of power in the Islamic Republic and the main governmental institutions have a different view on all these issues than the majority of Iranian society. The different approach and perspective of the authoritarian figures predictably provoke their strong and negative reaction to the referendum on these matters and even the proposal to refer to public votes. Moreover, the totalitarian camp is unwilling to face the risk of a tsunami of increasing demands and its potential political consequences by stepping into a realm of change and reform. Thus, they strive to oppose the referendum from the outset. The gap between what Rohani or the moderates and reformists in the government want or say and what can be realized and operationalized within the political power structure of the Islamic Republic is significant. This considerable gap has resulted in no referendum being held even once in the four decades of the clerical regime's existence. Rohani and the bureaucrats and moderates and reformists sympathetic to him are trying to take effective steps "before it is too late" with reforms and also by reducing the gap between the nation and the government (relying on the referendum and referring to public votes); however, the strong reaction of the authoritarian figures indicates that they continue to rely on intimidation, censorship, and repression when there is no real parliament among them, and representatives pass through the Guardian Council's vetting filter (directly and indirectly elected by the leader of the Islamic Republic); when a very significant majority of representatives cannot comply with or remain indifferent to the demands and perspectives of the system's top figure and the security-military camp surrounding him; when stepping into certain issues (like hijab or relations with America or state media, and even taxing the leader's subordinates) is entirely detached from the current realities of political governance in Iran today; predictably, the gap between the dream of an effective referendum and its realization is significantly meaningful. Rohani and the bureaucrats and moderates and reformists sympathetic to him are trying to take effective steps "before it is too late" with reforms and also by reducing the gap between the nation and the government (relying on the referendum and referring to public votes); however, the strong reaction of the authoritarian figures indicates that they continue to rely on intimidation, censorship, and repression; and finally, it cannot be overlooked that part of the dispute and disagreement surrounding the referendum is related to the issue of the third leadership in the Islamic Republic. Rohani, as one of the candidates for the future leadership of the system, is trying to find a way for reconciliation amid the government-nation divide and to play a role as an option for reconciling the main social and political forces. However, Rohani's opponents and those pursuing other leadership options (from Raisi and Larijani to Mojtaba Khamenei) are not only pursuing their authoritarian projects but also trying to prevent Rohani's emergence and effective role.