Roots and Consequences of the Deterioration of Relations between Iran and the Arab World

After more than a week of protests from the leader and officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the execution of Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr, a Shia cleric and opponent of the Saudi government, attacks on the consulate and embassy of this country in Mashhad and Tehran, respectively, the severing of relations between Saudi Arabia and several Arab countries with Iran, the lowering of the level of relations between several neighboring countries and Iran, and the judiciary's punishment of those who attacked the embassy and consulate, as well as condemning the actions of the attackers in statements by Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran. However, the silence of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran after these attacks is notable. On Friday, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, wrote in a letter to Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, that Tehran has no desire or interest in tensions in its neighborhood. According to him, Saudi Arabia must make a critical choice between stability in the region and supporting extremist groups. On the other hand, Arab countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned what they called Iran's interference in Saudi internal affairs on Saturday. This week's program will discuss the consequences of the deterioration of relations between Tehran and Riyadh with three guests: Reza Qasemi, the last ambassador of the Pahlavi regime in Kuwait, Shirin Tahmasbi Hunter, a researcher in Islamic studies at Georgetown University, and Hossein Alizadeh, a former diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Helsinki. Mr. Qasemi noted that Saudi Arabia has dealt with Shia leaders and dissidents for years, detaining and imprisoning them, but had never crossed the red line of execution. What factors could be involved in Riyadh's decision last Saturday to execute Sheikh Baqr al-Nimr and three other Shia dissidents alongside over 40 Wahhabi, Salafi, and Sunni dissidents? Reza Qasemi: First of all, let me say that this diplomatic break between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not the first in the 85 years of political relations we have had since 1930. Each time has its specific reasons. The first break occurred in 1943 following the brutal execution of an innocent Iranian pilgrim named Abutaleb Yazdi, which the Pahlavi government decisively responded to, leading to the severing of relations. It took four years for King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia, to send a goodwill delegation and restore relations. During those four years, the issue of Hajj was also suspended. The second break occurred in 1990 for reasons that go beyond your question, and this is the third time that this ongoing tension between the two countries has led to this situation. In my opinion, the severity of the action taken by the Saudis against this Shia cleric was influenced by the experience they took from Iran, which showed that if they did not cut ties, the situation could escalate to what happened in Iran in 1979. Part of this was also to provide a cover for their internal problems, to tell the Saudi people that they were facing a great enemy. Saudi Arabia sees itself as the godfather of the small sheikhdoms and slightly larger countries in the Persian Gulf region. They do not take any action without Saudi approval. I remember at the Islamic Summit Conference in Pakistan when King Faisal stormed out because Mr. Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, was presiding over the meeting, none of the representatives from the Gulf countries spoke. The calculation was that Sheikh Nimr could not reach the status of the leader of the Iranian Revolution because the leader of the Iranian Revolution was a religious figure. The religious figure of Shia, especially the 35 million Shia in Iran, had rallied around Mr. Khomeini, responding to his call. In Saudi Arabia, Shia are not a significant number. There are some in the eastern parts of the country who have never been able to assert power and have always faced pressure and lacked a voice. Therefore, Sheikh Nimr could not play the role that Mr. Khomeini played. Thus, they showed this severity of action to eliminate the threat. They executed this cleric, which caused a huge uproar, and the Islamic Republic naturally reacted due to its Shia identity, and now they are pulling all the countries in the region towards themselves to isolate the ruling regime in Iran, which they have somewhat succeeded in doing. Ms. Tahmasbi, according to some Western observers, the execution of Sheikh Nimr and three Shia dissidents in Saudi Arabia was calculated so that it would not be acceptable to the Wahhabi majority in Saudi Arabia for 43 Wahhabi, Salafi, and Al-Qaeda supporters to be executed without Sheikh Nimr, the leader of the protesting Shia in Qatif and in eastern Saudi Arabia near the border with Yemen, being among those executed. What is your opinion on this analysis? Shirin Tahmasbi Hunter: I believe this may have a minor effect on Saudi Arabia's decision. However, I have previously stated that the actions Saudi Arabia takes result from two things. One is that Saudi Arabia fears its own shadow. The reason is that the name Saudi Arabia indicates that it is a country controlled by a family. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about national issues concerning Saudi Arabia. All of this depends on the determination of the Al Saud family to continue their rule. Internal issues may have an impact. However, I believe one of the biggest reasons for the execution of Nimr and other actions taken by Saudi Arabia is that it aims to disrupt the agreement recently reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries. Saudi Arabia wants to threaten Iran to take violent action and go to the Americans and others to say, 'Come and strike Iran.' This is their main goal, and they have been doing this for some time. What is important is that, in any case, we must state the realities. First of all, Arabs generally dislike Iranians. They all dislike them. However, in a situation where the international balance is such that they could not do anything, they were forced to manage their relations with Iran cautiously. But after the revolution, as Iran withdrew from the international scene, they gained the freedom to act as they wished. After the relative agreement that has emerged and Mr. Rouhani's desire to interact with the world, whether he can or cannot is another matter, Saudi Arabia fears and wants to create a situation that ends Iran's influence. Other Gulf countries, some of which, like Oman, have better relations with Iran and dislike Saudi Arabia, if left to their own devices, would have good relations with Iran. Kuwait would have good relations with Iran if left alone. Qatar was closer to Iran until recently. The problem, as Mr. Qasemi also mentioned, is the same problem for Saudi Arabia, and the issue is that this abnormal situation that had arisen, with Iran being out of regional and international policies, benefited countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. They do not want Iran to re-enter the international scene. They do not want Iran to moderate because a moderate Iran would eliminate all the excuses they have for claiming Iran is bad. Therefore, it cannot be said that a single factor caused Saudi Arabia's decision. Of course, in this situation, it must be said that unfortunately, Iran did not adequately protect the Saudi embassy and that some individuals who wanted to exacerbate the situation acted in a way that gave Saudi Arabia a very good excuse, and in many places, for example, in the Security Council, Iran was condemned, not Saudi Arabia. However, most importantly, Saudi Arabia, due to its wealth, has become overly ambitious. They genuinely want not only to control Arab countries but also to consider themselves, as Mr. Qasemi said, the godfathers of the Islamic world. Therefore, I believe there is fear, but more than fear, it is a matter of ambition. Iran wants to be whatever it is, whether a royal Iran, an Islamic Iran, or a democratic Iran; the problem for them is Iran itself. The regime's issue does have an impact, but it does not have a significant effect. I will stop here. Mr. Alizadeh, except for the resignation of the provisional government following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979, for the first time, the Iranian judiciary promised to arrest and punish those who attacked the Saudi consulate and embassy in Iran, and Hassan Rouhani, in his capacity as president, called for the punishment of the attackers and condemned the attack on foreign embassies as akin to attacking individuals' homes. Does this action now place the initiative in determining foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia and the Arab world in the hands of the president and the foreign ministry? Hossein Alizadeh: Since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, there have been five attacks on foreign embassies in Iran. This means that on average, every seven and a half years, an embassy has been attacked and destroyed. Especially regarding the recent attack on the British embassy, the most brazen action was taken, which not only targeted the embassy building but also the residences of the diplomats living there with their families in Qaleh Kola. It can be said that no country in the world has witnessed such a poor record in the history of diplomacy as Iran has during the period of the Islamic Republic. The consequences of these events are clear. Britain had stated that we must be compensated for our costs. In addition to imposing political costs on Iran, this action, which occurred against the Saudi embassy, fortunately, we have people like Mr. Zarif and Mr. Rouhani who are aware of international norms and considered this against international conventions. However, this lesson was learned after 35 years. But I am not too optimistic that if this reprimand and punishment had been issued by the Supreme Leader, it would have had a higher meaning and significance. Now only the President of Iran has spoken, and you know that the president does not hold supreme power in Iran. Nevertheless, a correct stance has been taken. Will this position of the Iranian government pour cold water on the flames that Saudi Arabia is watching, or is it not at that level to extinguish this fire? No, it cannot extinguish this fire. Although if they had not taken this position, there would have been severe international condemnation. Now Arab countries have reacted in protest to the attack on the Saudi embassy. In that case, it was possible that individual non-Arab and non-Islamic countries would have also taken action and adopted strong international positions. This action will not reduce the pressures that Saudi Arabia is exerting on Iran. It only removes the legal excuse from Saudi Arabia, and we can say that we condemned it in Iran as well. However, Saudi Arabia still has sufficient excuses, the same excuse that you have intervened in our internal affairs. Saudi Arabia's main objection is that you have interfered in our internal matters, and you have no right to intervene in these issues. I can only imagine a situation where relations between Tehran and Riyadh might moderate a bit if Saudi Arabia conditions that Iran does not protest at all regarding issues like the execution of Nimr and the Shia in the future. Mr. Qasemi, Saudi Arabia, followed by Bahrain, Sudan, and Djibouti, severed their relations with Iran, the UAE lowered its level of relations with Iran, and Kuwait recalled its ambassador from Iran, where you were the ambassador nearly 38 years ago. On Thursday, reports indicated that Saudi Arabia has begun heavy airstrikes in Yemen, which, according to Iran, has resulted in damage to the Iranian embassy in Yemen. Is this increase in tension merely a verbal dispute following the deaths a few months ago during the Hajj pilgrimage, or has the tension between Riyadh and Tehran entered another phase? Reza Qasemi: Let me point out something that Mr. Alizadeh mentioned, which is very correct: there have been several attacks on embassies, and the first was during the second revolution, meaning the leader approved it. Of course, Mr. Yazdi writes in his memoirs that when he was asked why this happened, he said to stand there and not move. For various reasons, of course. The second case was a few years ago when the British embassy was attacked, and there was no dissenting voice from the leader of the revolution. This case, as he mentioned, would have taken on a different meaning if the leader had said that this action was incorrect. But the gentlemen went to protest at the Saudi embassy and were destroying it, and some were saying, 'Well done, well done, keep going.' This indicates that there are significant differences within the country. The main power is in the hands of the leader, and the issues are ruled in one way, while another group that wants to act with moderation, like Mr. Rouhani and Zarif, has different views. None of them agree with each other. So we should not overlook this factor that there is no consensus or centrality in Iran. It is possible that something will happen again. However, regarding where these events are headed, I believe these events will not calm down anytime soon. Because Saudi Arabia does not mind that its relationship with Iran is cut. Firstly, financially, it does not have a significant impact. The Islamic world does not consist of 70 or 80 million Shia, more or less. The Islamic world is under the control and influence of the Sunni majority, and they do not want every year a group to go to Mecca and instead of performing Hajj rituals, do something else.