Ross: If Iran's behavior is outside the JCPOA, then our response is unrelated to it

Given the developments that have occurred in Tehran-Washington relations since Donald Trump's presidency began, Radio Farda intends to conduct a series of interviews with analysts and political experts from various factions and perspectives in the U.S. In the upcoming interview, Radio Farda speaks with Dennis Ross, a senior analyst at the Washington Institute, about the outlook for Iran-U.S. relations, the future of the nuclear agreement, and Iran's role in the region. Mr. Ross was previously the Middle East coordinator during Bill Clinton's presidency and a special advisor to Hillary Clinton on Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian affairs. Dennis Ross was among the first American diplomats to receive Oman’s mediation message regarding Iran's readiness for secret nuclear negotiations. Mr. Ross, I would like to start this conversation by discussing an article you co-wrote with Jeb Bush, a former Republican presidential candidate, in which you suggested that the new U.S. government should isolate Iran instead of isolating itself. You wrote this in the context of statements made during Trump's campaign regarding a desire for isolationist policies in international relations. My question is, why should Iran be isolated after several years in which the previous U.S. administration was trying to engage in dialogue with Iran? When I talk about isolating Iran, I mean that we should not adopt policies that make us the target instead of Iran being the subject of discussion. My suggestion has been that we should not abandon the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), because if we did, instead of Iran's aggressive behavior in the region being the focus, it would be our behavior that would come under scrutiny. We want the focus to be on Iran's behavior in the region and to raise the costs for such actions by this country. Given the approach of the new U.S. administration over the past month, do you think the White House is considering abandoning the nuclear agreement? No, I don't think so. At one point, it seemed that people who were connected to Trump during the campaign and Trump himself as a candidate had contradictory approaches. They said they would tear up the JCPOA and then that they would implement it. It is clear that some of his associates wanted to disrupt the agreement. However, I believe we should maintain the agreement and fully implement it while focusing on Iran's behavior in the region. So, the U.S. government should adhere to the agreement and then what should it do? First, it should fully implement the agreement. Then, for example, if missile issues arise, sanctions should be imposed. Because the Security Council has asked Iran not to test ballistic missiles based on Resolution 2231. Iran claims that the resolution speaks about ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and that is not our aim, so we can test. However, the truth is that they are testing ballistic missiles that have the range and capability to potentially carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, since the resolution has asked them not to do this, we should work with the other countries of the P5+1 that negotiated the nuclear agreement with Iran to impose sanctions for this behavior. But Iran says that the resolution has 'requested' this from us and has not prohibited such testing. Yes, that is what they say. But since the resolution has made this request and they are doing this without regard to it, they should know that there are consequences. Mr. Ross, let's return to the nuclear agreement itself. In your writings, I read that one of your suggestions is that, for example, the U.S. should not issue permits for the sale of passenger planes to Iran until Iran changes its behavior. This is an issue that the U.S. and other countries have agreed with Iran on and is mentioned in the text of the agreement. Do you think this would not be a violation of the agreement? No, I don't think so. Because Iran uses these planes to send weapons to Hezbollah and other groups. And again, according to Resolution 2231, they are prohibited from exporting weapons. Therefore, since these planes are used for an illegitimate purpose, we should refrain from issuing permits until we see that Iran is not supplying weapons to these groups. If it were clear that they were not supplying weapons to Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen, there would be no problem, and the permit could be issued. However, since this issue is explicitly mentioned in the JCPOA, do you not think that not doing it could be interpreted by Iran as a kind of breach of commitment? Look, Iran cannot have both things. They cannot say we can do whatever we want in the region because there is no prohibition in the JCPOA, but you cannot respond to me because you are prohibited from doing so in the JCPOA. If their behavior is outside the scope of the JCPOA, then our response to that behavior is also unrelated to the JCPOA. In recent days, Federica Mogherini, the head of foreign policy for the European Union, after meetings in Washington, said she received assurances that the U.S. would adhere to the JCPOA. At the same time, we have heard from some White House officials that they are reviewing this agreement. Do you think at some point the government could consider renegotiating some elements of it instead of tearing it up? I don't know. Naturally, this option is more desirable than completely tearing up the agreement. I think the government has come to the conclusion that it should not tear up this agreement. But see, for example, one of the issues that the Israeli Prime Minister raised in his meetings in Washington is how after 15 years, Iran can have a massive nuclear program as it wishes, without any limitations on its quality and scale. One option that I can imagine is that the U.S. and the other P5+1 countries try to extend this 15-year limitation. My guess is that the other P5+1 countries are not ready to renegotiate just as the Iranians do not want to. But sometimes we need to consider alternative situations. If it becomes clear what the situation will be if Iran has no limitations after the fifteenth year, perhaps the other P5+1 countries will conclude that it is worth considering renegotiation. Speaking of the other P5+1 countries, you mentioned in one of your writings that the U.S. should not cooperate with Russia in the fight against ISIS unless it limits Iran. Given the complex situation in the region and Iran's significant presence in countries like Iraq and Syria and its relationship with the governments of these two countries, how do you think Iran should be limited? Should Iran not be invited to the negotiating table in international negotiations on this matter? Look, the situation in Iraq is much more complicated than in Syria; the weight that the Iranians have regarding Shiite militias and their influence over the Iraqi government is significant. Therefore, Iraq is a different story, and we should work to strengthen the Iraqi army and ensure that the Iraqi government is in a position to resist Iranian pressures. However, in Syria, the situation should be such that Russia does not allow Iran to gain power in that country, and if it does, it is hard to imagine how it will be an ally in the fight against ISIS. Because if it allows Iran to have influence, it means allowing Shiite militias to have influence, which are in the process of displacing some areas from Sunnis, and if they play a role in liberating Raqqa (ISIS's main base), they create conditions for the removal of Sunnis and ethnic nationalism, which is a situation that previously led to the emergence and growth of ISIS. What I am saying is that Russia should distance itself from Iran and work more closely with Turkey and look at Turkey as a means to liberate Raqqa. Russia is currently somewhat engaged in this. Alongside Iran, Turkey is now the third country at the negotiating table regarding Syria. That's right. And I think in the initial ceasefire, the Russians played a more important role with Turkey than with Iran. But I think the Iranians are pushing for the Assad regime and Shiite militias to have an active role in liberating Raqqa. And if they do this, it will create an environment where ISIS grew again. And such a group will be reproduced, and this is not a smart way to defeat ISIS. Mr. Ross, my other question for you is about the issue in which you played a significant role, which is the secret talks between Iran and the U.S. You were among the first American diplomats to initiate these talks in Oman. In the current era, do you think such secret talks could take shape again to resolve differences, or do you see any benefit in such talks? I have never been opposed to negotiation and reaching a mutual understanding. I think reaching a mutual understanding is important, and being able to talk to the Iranians through a reliable channel where both sides can be straightforward with each other is valuable. And I think it is important to define fundamental rules that are understandable for both sides. Given the nature of the Iranian government and their deep suspicion of the U.S. and the notion that the U.S. has no place in the region, a concept arises that there is a fundamental disagreement between us. But I still think the ability to create communication is valuable; we should strive to reach a kind of mutual understanding. I do not oppose the principle of this issue. If we return to our discussion at the beginning of this interview, wouldn’t such an effort contradict the idea of isolating Iran? No, it wouldn’t. Because I think increasing pressure was what led to negotiations with Iran. The Iranians said they would not negotiate as long as they were under sanctions. And we significantly increased the level of sanctions, and they negotiated. When I talk about isolating Iran, I mean isolating Iran for its bad behavior. If that behavior changes, they should not be isolated. If they are ready not to threaten other countries in the region and not to try to dominate the region and not to attempt to dismantle regional governments, then our behavior towards them can be very different. Such behaviors are destabilizing, and Iran should know that there will be a cost for it. And if their behavior changes because of this cost, then we can also change our behavior. Given what you saw in the first month of Donald Trump's administration, do you think we will witness increased pressure and sanctions against Iran or efforts to promote mutual understanding? I think what is more likely is the first option, not the second. It is clear that other countries will also play a role in this and can help alleviate the tensions between Iran and the U.S. One of the reasons I support maintaining the ability to communicate is that neither we nor they should make mistakes in our calculations. If there is no communication, the potential for miscalculations increases. And these mistakes will not benefit either side. Therefore, the possibility of dialogue with each other should exist. However, Iran's goals in the region are currently exactly the opposite of what the U.S. wants. And those who say we have ISIS as a common enemy, I would say yes, the Iranians want to defeat ISIS and replace it with regimes under Iranian control. This will not defeat ISIS and will be somewhat pleasing to groups like ISIS. Therefore, even if there are areas of common interest between us and Iran, such policies from Iran create disagreements. I would like to see us in a position where a communication channel helps us reduce the sources of such disagreements and if there are disagreements, they do not escalate unnecessarily due to each side having made a mistake in its calculations about the other.