Rouhani, the IRGC, and the Dichotomy of Moderation and Deviation

Recently, the attacks by commanders of the IRGC and aligned political forces against Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, have noticeably increased. An analysis of the statements by Ali Saidi, the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the IRGC commander, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of the Basij, Hossein Najat, the cultural deputy, Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, and individuals like Saeed Jalili, the representative of the leadership in the National Security Council, reveals that the confrontational approach of the IRGC and the hardline conservatives towards the moderate government has entered a new phase. In this phase, Rouhani has been explicitly accused of seeking to revise and deviate from the ideals of the revolution, interpreting the dominant power's views, diverging from the Supreme Leader's opinions, and being overly reliant on the U.S. and the West. Ali Saidi explicitly claimed that Rouhani, under the guise of nuclear negotiations, was seeking to establish relations with the U.S. government. He also believes that the U.S. government has a complex agenda in the JCPOA and aims to expand its influence to undermine the Islamic Republic. Saidi stated that the leadership has intervened and neutralized the U.S. conspiracy regarding the continuation of the JCPOA in its second and third phases. According to Saidi, who reflects the official views of the IRGC, Rouhani's conciliatory attitude and his miscalculation in what Saidi calls reliance on interaction with the 'world's hegemon' have created a potential basis for U.S. influence within Iran, and this vulnerability still exists. Jafari, Najat, Naqdi, and Qassem Soleimani have also openly criticized Rouhani and Zarif, questioning their revolutionary credentials due to their smiles towards the enemy, trying to show that the regional position of the Islamic Republic and the absence of war was not due to the rise of the moderate government, but rather the confrontational approach towards the U.S. in foreign policy and the military and defensive movements of the IRGC have strengthened the deterrent power of the system. Saeed Jalili's attacks have been more explicit, accusing Rouhani and other senior officials of the eleventh government of being the fifth column of the enemy, claiming that by providing misleading economic guidance, they have harmed the country more than the sanctions. The clear support of Ayatollah Khamenei for this approach indicates coordination within the hard core of power aimed at further delegitimizing Rouhani and the moderate government's programs in the target society. The sharp attacks against Rouhani and Zarif are no longer only issued from the Stability Front and the mid-level and lower forces known as the 'Velayatmadar', but generals have also entered the fray. However, a serious question in the Iranian political arena is the relationship between these orientations and the increased confrontation of the IRGC with Rouhani in the 2016 presidential election. Do these movements signify the IRGC's attempt to limit Rouhani to a single term, or is the main goal to tighten the siege around the 'moderate' government and completely neutralize it in its second term? Answering this question in the current conditions and the unclear political situation is difficult. The positions of senior IRGC commanders and the representative of the Supreme Leader clarify that they have a serious negative view of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's candidacy, and according to Saidi, this event would be a return to the past and is not worthy of the revolutionary nation. Another serious question in the Iranian political arena is the relationship between these orientations and the increased confrontation of the IRGC with Rouhani in the 2016 presidential election. Do these movements signify the IRGC's attempt to limit Rouhani to a single term, or is the main goal to tighten the siege around the 'moderate' government and completely neutralize it in its second term? On the other hand, there are no significant signs indicating the IRGC's program to strengthen and support a candidate. The point of contention between the IRGC and Rouhani lies in foreign policy and interaction with the West. The IRGC, aligned with the leadership, considers the JCPOA a specific nuclear deal with a defined expiration date that should not become a model. Furthermore, the confrontational foreign policy and the increase of the country's defensive and military capabilities should continue in a tension-inducing path with the West. Although Rouhani is not seeking reconciliation with the West, especially the U.S., he is pursuing a minimal and defensive approach to the ideological foreign policy, prioritizing de-escalation with the West. However, the IRGC views this perspective as a departure from the ideological and enemy-centric foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Another area of contention is the discursive aspect of the Islamic Republic. Rouhani has distanced himself from the classical perspective. The IRGC is concerned that this trend, along with the revisionist demands of reformists and the circle close to Rafsanjani, may expand the existing fissures within the system beyond the Supreme Leader's control. In this context, controlling and undermining Rouhani and his views within the social base of the system is strategically important for the IRGC. Therefore, the IRGC's platforms are more active than before in trying to show that the moderate government is not part of the system, but rather a deviant movement that must be controlled. During Rouhani's first term, especially before the JCPOA was concluded, the interests of the system required that Rouhani's position, particularly in the nuclear negotiations, not be weakened. However, now, not only is this consideration absent, but there is also a serious will observed to convey a message of weakness and Rouhani's fragile position to the outside. Additionally, the political positioning of IRGC commanders and the intensification of attacks on the government have further embroiled it in disputes, diminishing its capacity to advance its claimed programs. The purpose of the intensified attacks by the IRGC is not necessarily to prevent Rouhani's re-election. At the very least, it can be said that this desire is not decisive. Rouhani is not favorable to the IRGC, and they would prefer someone from their close ranks to head the executive branch if the conditions are favorable. Considering the above points, the hypothesis strengthens that the purpose of the intensified attacks by the IRGC is to further constrain Rouhani and does not necessarily have a subversive direction. However, since the electoral scene for the twelfth presidential election has not yet formed and some variables are still inactive, it cannot be definitively considered that this hypothesis is accurate.