Rouhani's Key and the Lock of Salary Scandals

For several weeks now, the media arms and propaganda networks of the conservatives have focused on the extraordinary salary slips of some senior government officials. The motivation of those who have engaged in this disclosure is clear enough: to undermine Rouhani's government. Opponents of Rouhani are trying by any means and tools to prevent his continued presence at the top of the executive branch for another four years. Spreading a cloud of distrust and negative perception of the moderate government, and reducing the social base of Rouhani's supporters, has not been ineffective. As Abdullah Naseri, a reformist political activist, has warned, opponents of the government have gathered about 3,000 maneuverable salary slips through 'security apparatuses' and plan to gradually publish them until the upcoming presidential elections. His report has been indirectly confirmed by the spokesperson for the Cyber Crime Combat Center of the IRGC, who announced the arrest of a 'hacker' who infiltrated the databases of government organizations and accessed information on about 3,000 salary slips. This information seems to have emerged from the media platforms of the government's opponents and has become controversial to the extent of eliciting a response from the highest authority in the system. The widespread backlash from the publication of salary slips amounting to tens of millions and even hundreds of millions has sufficiently encouraged the authoritarian elements to pursue their project. It is no coincidence that in the past month, the propaganda and media arms of the government's opponents (from Kayhan and Vatan-e-Emruz to Tasnim and Fars) have continuously addressed this issue and pursued their project. Limited abuse or systemic corruption? In the face of embezzlement and financial corruption cases and astronomical abuses during Ahmadinejad's era (such as the 3,000 billion tomans corruption case or the 10,000 billion tomans case of Babak Zanjani), the story of salary slips amounting to tens of millions appears insignificant at first glance — numerically speaking — but the astronomical salaries and bonuses are so far removed from the minimum wage of workers and most employees that they cannot be overlooked. Eshaq Jahangiri, Rouhani's first vice president, has emphasized the need to pursue the issue of salary slips and has also referred to the strange corruptions and 'secret' actions of the previous government, stating: 'Unfortunately, this tradition (of unconventional payments) was established when in the tenth government, they sat around and decided to give themselves medals and coins. From a group of 30 government members, 27 of them were awarded second and first-class medals with 75 and 100 coins.' However, it is unlikely that such criticisms and jabs at Ahmadinejad's government can justify and convince the social layers protesting against the strange salaries. Jahangiri, however, has mentioned another important point: 'A systemic corruption has taken hold of the system.' Although Rouhani's first vice president considers this systemic corruption to be limited to Ahmadinejad's government and influenced by its establishment, he — as is predictable — makes no reference to the emergence of systemic corruption influenced by the establishment of authoritarianism; he ignores the ideological and rent-seeking nature of the government and the power relations in the Islamic Republic. This situation, after establishment, increasingly divided citizens into 'insiders' and 'outsiders'; ignored the prerequisites of democracy; and refrained from providing equal opportunities to all citizens. The 'insiders' of the government increasingly benefited from the rents of power, wealth, information, and status, while the 'outsiders' were marginalized. The result of this situation was the deepening of divides and the intensification of inequalities in Iran. Ahmadinejad's government was, of course, a mixture of incompetence and inefficiency and abuse built on a $600 billion oil revenue; a government that, within a system steeped in authoritarianism and injustice, squandered national resources and assets. However, the public's discontent with the economic situation does not overlook the unpleasantness of astronomical salary slips simply due to bad memories of Ahmadinejad's government. Rouhani, pleased with the achievement of the JCPOA, and amid post-JCPOA economic disruptions and efforts to deepen trade relations with the West, has suddenly faced unprecedented disclosures. Among these disclosures, not only have some figures from the reformist camp (such as Safdar Hosseini) been mentioned, but even the names of the president's brother (Hosseini Fereydoun) and the brother of the vice president (Mahdi Jahangiri) have also come up. In a society where class divides are increasingly widening under the shadow of the established authoritarian and oil-based regime, the negative reaction and backlash from the majority of citizens is not unexpected. Although in the initial reactions, the CEOs of several banks (including Refah, Tose'e Saderat, and Mellat) have been dismissed or forced to resign, and although both Rouhani and his first vice president have explicitly taken a stance on this important issue, it seems that their response has not been proportionate to the widespread reflection of the issue or at least has not been able to establish a reasonable relationship from a media perspective. In a society where class divides are increasingly widening under the shadow of the established authoritarian and oil-based regime, the negative reaction and backlash from the majority of citizens is not unexpected. It seems that the moderate government has been unable to show a decisive and acceptable response to the effective attacks of its opponents and to disseminate and clarify it using its media capabilities. The lack of alignment between state media and the judiciary and aligned institutions (such as the General Inspection Organization, the Administrative Justice Court, and the Court of Accounts) has also diminished the government's ability to respond or take decisive action. This is assuming that a serious determination and necessary motivation to pursue the issue by the government is presumed. But is such determination present and manifested? Rouhani and the electoral disturbances of 1396 Since the early 1360s, the heads of the executive branch in the Islamic Republic have not been single-term; however, this does not guarantee the necessary assurance and certainty of Rouhani's continued government for another four years. The ongoing suspension and crisis in the economy despite the achievement of the JCPOA, and the increasing discontent with the economic recession and its dire consequences on livelihoods, is not the only problem for the moderate government to garner renewed support from the majority of citizens present at the ballot boxes. Rouhani is compelled, in a situation where poverty and unemployment and social harms and issues are increasing side by side and class divides are deepening, to adopt diverse and effective solutions in the face of the massive propaganda of his opponents regarding the tens of millions of salary slips. Increased support for independent and critical media and the freedom and security of journalists will make him more successful in continuing his government. However, there are indeed many real threats and obstacles; one is the non-independent judiciary, where revolutionary court judges act as subordinates to security institutions and have set aside fairness and impartiality. It seems unlikely that repeated references to the mismanagements, corruptions, and abuses of Ahmadinejad's government can prevent the erosion of Rouhani's supporters and the dissatisfaction and anger of the unemployed masses. The 'moderate' president, of course, does not have very open hands. The judiciary is not aligned with Rouhani's government. The Islamic Republic's state media also prefers to highlight the positions of critics and opponents of the government. The security forces in the IRGC and the IRGC Intelligence Organization do not favor the continuation of his government either. All of this is independent of the authoritarian elements that are seeking to regain control of the executive branch by any means. This situation means the continuation of serious disturbances and obstructions against Rouhani, especially until the presidential elections of 1396. If Rouhani does not boldly confront the financial abuses and strange salaries across all institutions and if he does not publicly and boldly take advantage of the opportunity to inform about the abuse of power and position, he will see a not insignificant portion of his votes from 1392 lost in the 1396 elections. Increased support for independent and critical media and the freedom and security of journalists will make him more successful in continuing his government. However, there are indeed many real threats and obstacles; one is the non-independent judiciary, where revolutionary court judges act as subordinates to security institutions and have set aside fairness and impartiality. If Rouhani does not provide a practical and effective 'key' for the 'lock' of astronomical salary slips, he will find his opponents emboldened and his supporters more disheartened.