Russia Does Not Consider Its Relations with Iran 'Strategic'

One of the components of power for any country is having as many 'strategic allies' as possible. The more strategic allies a country has, the greater its power in the international arena. With this introduction and aside from Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon (which can be considered strategic allies of Tehran), does the Islamic Republic have any other strategic allies? Can the Russian Federation under Putin be considered a strategic ally of the Islamic Republic? This question is important and significant because we see that with Russian air support and the presence of Iranian ground forces, the situation of the war in Syria has changed significantly in favor of Bashar al-Assad, to the extent that in the latest developments, the Syrian army has been able to gain complete control of the city of Aleppo. With this victory, it is believed that the way has been paved for further victories for Bashar al-Assad. Considering this, is Russia a strategic ally for Tehran? If we ask senior officials of the Islamic Republic, numerous instances can be cited where they have assessed the Tehran-Moscow relations as strategic. Here, two examples are mentioned. On August 17 of this year, in response to the controversy surrounding the flight of Russian fighter jets from the Nojeh base to Syria, Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, confirmed the decision to grant the base to Russian fighter jets, stating: 'Our cooperation with Russia is strategic, and we have an exchange of capacities and capabilities in this regard.' One day after this statement, on August 18, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, also described the overarching foreign policy view of the Islamic Republic towards Russia as 'a new look to the East' and noted that: 'Looking to the East necessitates...strategic and strategic relations with countries like Russia and China.' To support such speculation that Tehran-Moscow relations have now reached the level of strategic relations, some domestic analysts cite the frequent meetings of senior officials from both countries, whether at the level of presidents or ministers (including the foreign and defense ministers), the signing of major contracts between the two countries, and Russia's close cooperation with Tehran in the JCPOA and similar examples as evidence of strategic cooperation between Tehran and Moscow. However, can evidence be found from Russia's perspective that indicates the relations between the two countries are now at a strategic level? Unlike the Islamic Republic, which lacks a documented foreign policy, Moscow publishes a document titled the Foreign Policy Doctrine every few years. Every word of this document is chosen with great care and reflects the overall direction of the country's foreign policy. The latest version of this document, titled 'The New Foreign Policy Doctrine of the Russian Federation,' was signed by Vladimir Putin in November 2016. Studying this document shows where the weight and position of the Islamic Republic and, at the same time, Iran's regional rivals stand in Russia's foreign policy. For example, while this document places India and China among the countries with which Russia has 'strategic partnerships,' it describes the European Union as 'an important economic-trade partner' and not a strategic partner for Russia. Considering this example, we examine the position of the Islamic Republic in Russia's foreign policy. In Article 94 of this document concerning Iran, it states: 'Russia pursues a policy of comprehensive cooperation development with the Islamic Republic of Iran and also strives to continuously implement the comprehensive nuclear agreement of Iran based on UN Security Council Resolution 2231 adopted on July 20, 2015, in accordance with the decisions of the Board of Governors of the Atomic Energy Agency and provides comprehensive assistance to this process.' As can be seen, this short clause only emphasizes the development of 'comprehensive cooperation with Iran.' A more important point is that Russia has defined the scope of its cooperation as 'in accordance with the decisions of the Agency and limited to Resolution 2231 of the Security Council.' It is clear that neither in the text nor inferred from the text can it be concluded that Russia's cooperation with Iran is strategic. However, this point becomes more significant when we know that in the next clause of the document (Clause 95), it refers to 'strategic dialogues with the Cooperation Council of the Persian Gulf countries.' The difference between these two clauses is not hidden from anyone, as Russia is inclined towards strategic dialogues with the Cooperation Council while the members of this council, especially Saudi Arabia, are considered regional rivals of the Islamic Republic. Assuming that Russia's strategic dialogue with these countries yields positive results, the council's condition for developing relations with Moscow is the weakening of the Tehran-Moscow relationship. Such a condition from the Cooperation Council is by no means unlikely when we know that in this same document, Russia's presence in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is mentioned as an observer member 'to further expand partnership and interaction with the Islamic world.' It is enough to look at Saudi Arabia's maneuvering power in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in recent years, where in one case, it suspended Syria's membership in this organization and in another case, classified Hezbollah (another ally of the Islamic Republic) among terrorist organizations and listed the Islamic Republic among the countries supporting terrorism. (Refer to the article: The Islamic Republic and Diplomatic Defeat in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) To describe the disruptive role that Saudi Arabia has played within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation against the Islamic Republic so far, it is enough to mention that Jaberi Ansari, the former spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, stated: 'The Organization of Islamic Cooperation has become a part of the Saudi Foreign Ministry and acts like an office of this ministry.' If, as stated by the former spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, Saudi Arabia has now gained such power within the organization that it dictates its will to this organization, it is not unlikely that Saudi Arabia will use this power to create distance between Tehran and Moscow in order to achieve a strategic relationship with Russia and facilitate Russia's relations with the Islamic world. In either case, the development of Russia's cooperation with the Cooperation Council of the Persian Gulf and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation could be detrimental to the Islamic Republic. Conclusion: As explained, the perception of the Islamic Republic's officials that they have reached a level of strategic cooperation with Russia is rooted in reality. Not only do none of the Russian officials acknowledge such a thing, but the strategic foreign policy doctrine document of Russia also does not testify to such a thing. In contrast, there is ample evidence that Russia views the Islamic Republic as a card in its gamble with the West. Among these evidences are the delays in the launch of the Bushehr power plant, the years-long procrastination in transferring the S-300 missile system, and, worst of all, the affirmative votes on each of the Security Council's sanctions resolutions against Iran that Russia signed. It can be inferred from such behavior that Tehran and Moscow do not have strategic relations with each other.