Russia's Betrayal of the Islamic Republic

On Friday, September 7, at the end of the summit of leaders from Iran, Russia, and Turkey in Tehran regarding Syria, the coordination and unity between Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin on Idlib and the execution of military operations aimed at expelling the anti-Assad rebel groups from this province was clearly evident. In contrast, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while opposing any attack on Idlib, emphasized that Turkey could distance the groups that concern Russia and Iran from the areas under their control, ensuring that Idlib remains in the hands of 'moderate forces.' Some Islamic Republic media, pleased with the unity of Hassan Rouhani with Putin, reported that the decisions made at the Tehran trilateral meeting indicated that the patience of Iran and Russia for returning Idlib to Assad's government had run out, and that these decisions, while sidelining Turkey's excuses, had made military operations in Idlib inevitable. Ten days later, at the Sochi meeting between Putin and Erdogan, where no Iranian officials were invited, the Russian president, with a clear shift in his previous position and overlooking the execution of military operations in Idlib, agreed to establish a buffer zone free of Syrian forces and Assad's opposing groups, extending 15 to 25 kilometers deep into the province starting from October 14. Russian and Turkish units will patrol this area. The Islamic Republic, with its strings being cut in the Tehran meeting and its insistence on military operations in Idlib becoming ineffective, was forced to endorse Putin and Erdogan's decision. Aside from the legitimate and justifiable reasons for stopping military operations in Idlib from a humanitarian and political perspective, a broader view shows that Russia's rapid shift in position, abandoning the Islamic Republic, indicates that countries pursue their priorities and goals based on their national interests in the international arena. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic's approach and foreign policy, especially in Syria, are based on ideology and the survival of Bashar al-Assad and enmity with Israel, which contradicts Iran's national interests. Regarding Syria, the Islamic Republic, at the cost of billions in this country and the deaths of thousands of its soldiers and militias, while bearing heavy political costs for Iran, still wishes to play the role of infantry for Russian forces in Syria as before. Recently, Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor on international affairs to Ayatollah Khamenei, quoted Putin after a meeting and conversation, stating: 'Russia stands by its powerful neighbor, Iran.' Some officials of the Islamic Republic consider Russia a strategic ally of Iran, while others have elevated the close relations between the two countries to the level of 'brotherhood.' In this regard, an analyst from the Islamic Republic told Sputnik news agency: 'The military cooperation between Iran and Russia in Syria has merged the blood of soldiers from both countries and created a blood brotherhood between the two nations.' Despite this optimism that borders on naivety, Russia's actions show that this country is not only not a strategic ally of the Islamic Republic but has tactically used Iran as a card at various times to advance its own national and strategic interests. Examples of this abandonment and betrayal of the Islamic Republic include the Al Gore agreement (the U.S. Vice President during Bill Clinton's presidency) and Viktor Chernomyrdin (the then Prime Minister of Russia) regarding the cessation of Russian arms sales to the Islamic Republic, the very long and deliberate delay by Russia in completing the Bushehr power plant project, the division of the northern Caspian Sea with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and the annulment of Iran's proposed plan for joint use of this sea, the violation of the contract for selling the S-300 air defense system to the Islamic Republic; and endorsing all UN Security Council resolutions against the Islamic Republic concerning its nuclear program despite apparent support for Tehran. Regarding Syria, despite having some common points with the Islamic Republic, Russia, contrary to Tehran's perceptions, is aligned with Israel and even the Trump administration, ultimately seeking the complete withdrawal of the Islamic Republic's forces from Syria and reducing its influence in the country; a point emphasized by John Bolton, the U.S. National Security Advisor, on August 22. On that day, during his meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, he stated that Putin is interested in the withdrawal of all Iranian forces from Syria but acknowledged that 'he cannot do this alone.' Russia has close relations with Israel and has effectively left Israel's hands free to attack the positions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and militias affiliated with the Islamic Republic in Syria. In the past 18 months, Israel has bombed the positions of the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah in Syrian territory more than 200 times, and Russia's S-400 and S-300 air defense systems in Syria have not defended against these Israeli attacks. Conversely, the Israeli army informs Russian forces in Syria of its aircraft presence around or over Syrian airspace before conducting attacks through a special hotline. Some of Putin's reasons for gradually distancing himself from the Islamic Republic can be sought in the context of Middle Eastern developments and Moscow's relations with the United States. One of the common points between Russia and the Islamic Republic in Syria, which was to solidify Assad's position, has almost been achieved. Therefore, Putin is looking to achieve another goal in the Middle East, which is to reduce the role of the United States as the most important player in the region and ideally replace it. Whether Russia has the capacity to do this is debatable, but Moscow aims to expand its relations with Egypt, especially with Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Sunni Arab countries by presenting itself as a reliable player, and simultaneously, through selling Russian weapons to them, pave the way for Russia's entry into the economic arenas of these countries, including energy. Putin is a realist who views issues from a cost-benefit perspective rather than an ideological one. Regarding Syria, he currently does not insist on the early withdrawal of the Islamic Republic's forces from Syria, but he knows that continuing support for the Islamic Republic's position in this country will not only be unbeneficial but will also create problems for Russia. He understands that Israel will make every effort to prevent Syria from becoming a military and missile base for the Islamic Republic, and thus, based on an unspoken agreement, has left Israel's hands free to attack the positions of the Islamic Republic, as this also serves Russia's interests. In the meantime, at times, Putin has tried to mediate between the Islamic Republic and Israel in line with his country's interests. On the one hand, he convinced Israel to refrain from inflicting heavy damage on the positions of the Islamic Republic's forces, and on the other hand, persuaded the Islamic Republic to refrain from conducting operations against Israel or being present in the border areas of Syria with Israel. Nevertheless, neither his influence on the IRGC and the Islamic Republic's forces was effective, nor could he gain Israel's full confidence. Russia's economy has been suffering due to U.S. and EU sanctions, and reducing or at least not increasing these sanctions is a priority for Putin. The Islamic Republic's economy is also being pushed to the brink due to heavy and increasing U.S. sanctions, and therefore, in such circumstances, Putin's support for the Islamic Republic's position in Syria and against the Assad government, while provoking the Trump administration, cannot have much benefit for Russia. Additionally, the unwritten pact among Sunni Arab countries and Israel and the U.S. against the Islamic Republic has compelled Putin to gradually distance himself from Tehran. To secure his country's interests and achieve his political, economic, and strategic goals in the Middle East and to reach some form of interaction with the United States, Putin is on track to once again abandon the Islamic Republic, given the clear signs present. Contrary to the perceptions of some high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic, including Ali Akbar Velayati, the increasing points of divergence between Tehran and Moscow have significantly diminished their commonalities, and the Islamic Republic holds little importance for Russia from a national interest perspective.