Russia's Entry into the Syrian War: Reasons and Possible Consequences

Part One - As Russia's military presence in Syria has significantly increased, concerns and speculations regarding Moscow's political and military objectives have also risen. The deployment of Russian troops to Syria could be an effort to bolster the Assad regime's forces, which have suffered heavy defeats in recent months, or it may be aimed at exerting pressure on the ongoing crucial negotiations regarding the Syrian crisis. Some Western observers attribute this Russian action to Vladimir Putin's revisionist perspective, seeking to revive Soviet-era influence in the Middle East. Others, particularly in the U.S., believe that the shipment of weapons and equipment to Syria could plunge the country into further violence and that the current Russian military mission could evolve into a 'creeping mission'—one that, after initial successes, gradually escalates beyond its original objectives and only halts when faced with a significant defeat. Moscow views its military assistance to Syria as a fight against 'terrorism and extremism' and has simultaneously offered proposals to the U.S. for military and political dialogues regarding Syria. Washington is reviewing these proposals, but given the conflicting interests of the U.S. and Russia in Syria, responding to these proposals does not seem straightforward. Russia is the main supporter of Bashar al-Assad's regime, while the U.S. considers Assad's removal from power and a political transition in Syria vital. The extent of Russia's military presence, according to the 'Strategic Forecasting Center' in the U.S. known as 'Stratfor', is illustrated by satellite images showing military aircraft movements at the 'Basil al-Assad International Airport' in Latakia, where the Russians have established their operational base. These images indicate that the Russians have recently erected a control tower at this airport and have transferred hundreds of prefabricated housing units to accommodate over 1,000 soldiers. Concurrently, Russia has expanded the eastern runway of this airport for heavy transport aircraft operations. The development of the Latakia airport and other Russian actions indicate that the country intends to initially create a secure air bridge between the two countries for logistical and operational support to Russian soldiers and Bashar al-Assad's forces, deploying some of its fighter jets, helicopters, and transport planes at this airport. According to American officials, Russia has dispatched two military transport aircraft daily to the aforementioned airport over the past week. The protection of this airport is being handled by 200 Russian marines. In the past, Moscow's military assistance to Damascus was limited to arms sales, equipment, spare parts, and providing limited intelligence, but now this assistance has taken on broader dimensions. Recently, Russia has sent two amphibious ships from its Black Sea fleet, carrying armored personnel carriers, T-90 tanks, and self-propelled artillery, through the Bosporus to Syria. Simultaneously, images of some soldiers affiliated with the 810th and 336th Russian marine brigades, indicating their presence in Syrian cities, towns, and villages, have appeared on social media. Additionally, some Russian soldiers have been seen in the cities of Latakia, Tartus, Homs, and Damascus, with some assigned to the Syrian Naval Academy in Latakia. Reuters has reported, citing American officials, that Russia plans to deploy MiG-31 interceptor jets, Su-22 attack aircraft, and 'Pantsir-S1' air defense systems (NATO designation SA-22) in Syria. The declining effectiveness of Assad's forces and their gradual retreat in recent months have raised concerns in Russia. While maintaining Assad's presidency and the survival of his regime are priorities for Russia, changes in the battlefield have compelled Russia to enter the field with new tools to pursue the same goals. One of Assad's fundamental problems in continuing the fight is a shortage of manpower. The Syrian army faces a narrow field for recruiting personnel to confront Sunni opposition groups that have attracted a significant number of the 60% Sunni population of Syria, along with some foreign fighters. The ruling Alawite Shiites, who make up about 20% of the country's population, hold key positions in the security, police, and administrative sectors. More than two-thirds of the personnel and officers in the Syrian army are from the Alawite minority, while the majority of the army's personnel, namely soldiers and non-commissioned officers, lack motivation to support Assad's sectarian regime. The Alawites, primarily residing in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus, are considered Assad's immediate support base and the foundation of his regime's survival. The erosion of military units and the shortage of human and non-human resources have forced Assad to abandon large parts of the country and concentrate his forces in strategic areas and cities. Aside from the problem of recruiting personnel for the army, the capabilities of Syrian military units have severely diminished over four and a half years of civil war due to human casualties, personnel desertion, and loss of weapons and equipment. In August of this year, Assad issued a decree granting amnesty to hundreds of those who had evaded military service or had deserted, allowing them to report to military authorities. On August 5 of this year, Assad stated explicitly: 'In some cases, we have had to lose areas to deploy our forces to maintain more important regions... and given the extent of the campaign we are engaged in, we are facing a manpower shortage.' Four and a half years ago, when the spark of the Syrian civil war ignited, the personnel strength of the Syrian army was 220,000, with the number of reserve soldiers and officers reaching 280,000, but now only a shadow of that past strength remains. The erosion of military units and the shortage of human and non-human resources have forced Assad to abandon large parts of the country and concentrate his forces in strategic areas and cities. Due to these fundamental problems, the Syrian army has lost control of eastern and northern regions of the country, which are under the control of Kurds, ISIS, and Sunni groups, focusing its attention on populous cities such as Damascus, Homs, Hama, and the Alawite coastal provinces. In terms of area, Damascus controls only 25% of the country's territory. Given the aforementioned military problems, Assad has increasingly turned to his supporters, namely Russia and Iran, and has taken actions to mitigate his deficiencies on the battlefield, including forming the Shabiha militia, which predominantly consists of Alawite and other minority communities such as the Druze. In this context, Iran has also provided significant assistance to Assad's regime by bringing in Hezbollah from Lebanon and Iraqi Shiite militias to the battlefield, as well as organizing and training the 'National Defense Force of Syria.' In recent months, the dispatch of volunteers from the Hazara community of Afghanistan to Syria has been considered one of Iran's latest actions to assist Damascus. The crippled economy and the disintegrated social fabric of Syria have resulted in the deaths of 250,000 people in the civil war, and according to the United Nations, out of a population of 23 million, eight million have been displaced internally, and at least four million have fled to foreign countries. According to the 'Royal Institute of International Affairs' known as 'Chatham House' in London, published in June of this year, Syria's economic output has declined by 60% since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. The mining and construction sectors have been severely damaged, and the country's exports have dropped from $12 million to $2 million. The average price of goods and services increased by 51% from January 2012 to March 2015, while the Syrian pound has lost 80% of its value against the dollar. The country's oil production has also plummeted from 387,000 barrels per day in 2011 to less than 10,000 barrels. Damage to the infrastructure of Syria's water and electricity sectors, the cessation of oil exports, capital flight, bankruptcy of production and commercial sectors, along with severe damage to the country's agricultural sector and its need for food imports, have paralyzed the Syrian economy. The collapse of the Syrian pound, combined with 48% unemployment and declining living standards, has left 4.4 million citizens of the country below the poverty line. Refineries, educational facilities, and hospitals have been severely damaged, and the social and ethnic fabric of the country has been disrupted. The numerous military, economic, and social problems in Syria are pushing it toward the brink, and Damascus seeks to find a way out of these problems through the assistance of its supporters and military options. Walid al-Muallem, Syria's foreign minister, stated in an interview with the country's state television on Thursday, September 17, that 'Russia has provided new weapons to the Syrian army and has trained Syrian soldiers in their use... and that he is prepared to go further and, if necessary, ask Russian forces to fight alongside Syrian soldiers, although currently there is no need for joint operations with Russian forces.'