Russia's Withdrawal and Increased Iranian Casualties; Strategic Discrepancies Between Tehran and Moscow in Syria

The release of images showing the deaths and injuries of several Iranian and Afghan forces in Khan Tuman (near Aleppo) and the news of their capture has garnered significant attention in both domestic and international media. Despite the human losses Iran has sustained in Syria so far, the number of Iranian casualties in one location and the media wave that ensued is unprecedented, if not rare. The response to this news prompted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Mazandaran (the dispatching unit of these forces) to issue a statement calling for 'calm in society, especially among the families of the defenders of the shrine.' Compared to the Iraq War, where Iran was engaged for eight years against Saddam, it has now been nearly five years that Iran has been involved in the Syrian civil war. Officially, Iran has not withheld financial, logistical, and military support for Bashar al-Assad. This raises the question: will incidents similar to what happened in Khan Tuman occur again? If so, why? The normalization of news regarding Iranian casualties in Syria is evident when we consider that until about two years ago, the presence of even one Iranian soldier on the fronts in Syria was denied. The IRGC has since claimed only an advisory (not combat) presence in Syria. However, the high number of Iranian casualties and their capture is gradually becoming a normal topic. The death of Hussein Hamadani, a senior IRGC official, the killing of several Iranian Green Berets shortly after their deployment to Syria, and now the deaths of thirteen other IRGC members and the capture of some of them are clear evidence of Iran's quantitative and qualitative losses in Syria. Yet, why are these combat deaths not only not concealed but are also increasingly highlighted in ceremonies and memorials? The answer lies in the fact that, firstly, concealing the increasing number of these casualties is impossible, and secondly, the Islamic Republic sees itself in a long-term war alongside Assad that has lasted nearly five years so far. Therefore, preparing the psychological groundwork for the community for further costs is essential. The Islamic Republic has termed the defense of 'Assad' as the defense of the 'shrine' to encourage its combat forces in Syria. What has happened so far is as follows: First, Tehran admits that it has an advisory presence in Syria. Second, in addition to the IRGC, the army has also dispatched its special unit to Syria. Third, senior officials such as Hussein Hamadani from the IRGC have been killed among these Iranian advisors. Fourth, from the available statistics, it is known that the number of Iranian casualties in Syria is significantly increasing. Given these considerations, the question is: why are Iranian casualties on the rise? Regarding the casualties in Khan Tuman, two points are significant. First, there are no reports of Syrian soldiers being killed in these clashes; the news only indicates casualties among Iranian and Afghan forces in the area. Second, there are no reports of Russian air support for the ground forces. Herein lies the reason for the increase in Iranian casualties; had there been effective air support, perhaps this number of casualties would not have occurred. But why has Russia not provided air support for these forces? The answer must be sought in the fact that Moscow's effective intervention in the Syrian civil war began in September 2015 and lasted only for six months, until March 2016. In that month, unexpectedly, Vladimir Putin announced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Syrian territory. Although the news of the Russian withdrawal was surprising, it clearly conveyed a message: Bashar al-Assad is not Russia's red line. Lavrov, in an interview with the RIA Novosti news agency on May 5, clearly revealed this point, stating: 'Bashar al-Assad is not our ally. We support him in the fight against terrorism and to maintain the integrity of Syria, but he is not considered an ally of Russia to the extent that Turkey is a close ally of the United States.' This is precisely the point of divergence between Tehran and Moscow's strategies in the Syrian civil war. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei on international affairs, has repeatedly stated that 'the person of Bashar al-Assad' is the red line for the Islamic Republic. In other words, Tehran's strategy in Syria is based on maintaining Bashar al-Assad in power, while Russia's strategy is based on preserving its interests in relation to international powers. It is clear that these two strategies overlap to some extent, but importantly, they do not overlap in many cases. The effective but only six-month presence of Russian air power, which significantly aided the Syrian army, was a point of operational overlap between Tehran and Moscow in favor of Bashar al-Assad. Almost during that six-month period, news of high Iranian casualties in Khan Tuman was not heard. Reports of significant casualties in Khan Tuman coincide exactly with the absence of Russian air coverage. Given this, if the situation continues as it is, unfortunately, we should expect news similar to that of Khan Tuman. What strengthens this pessimism is that Tehran and Damascus have based their strategy on Assad's survival, and secondly, Assad has declared that he will not cease fighting until all of Syria is retaken. With these calculations, if the plan is for Assad's survival and the retaking of all of Syria in the absence of Russia, this pessimism is not unfounded that incidents like Khan Tuman may repeat.