Sale of Heavy Water to the U.S.; Political Agreement or Commercial Deal?

The announcement of the vote by 251 members of the U.S. House of Representatives opposing the purchase of heavy water from Iran, against 168 votes in favor, will present a new obstacle to President Obama's administration's efforts to implement the nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA). Although it is expected that the House's vote will not achieve a two-thirds majority in the Senate, similar to a previous action by Republican Senator Tom Cotton, the continued opposition from lawmakers could gradually weaken the government's position in defending the agreement. Under the nuclear deal, the Iranian government is committed to limiting its stockpile of enriched uranium and heavy water. In a parallel move, Russia received Iran's enriched uranium and provided it for use in Kazakhstan. To assist Iran, the U.S. government signed a document on Friday, April 22, in Vienna regarding the purchase of 32 tons of heavy water produced in Arak, based on a contract that was agreed upon months ago. The main reason for the U.S. accepting to buy Iran's heavy water is the Islamic Republic's inability to find a buyer for the product and the lack of a justifiable use for it within Iran. Heavy water is a coolant for heavy water reactors, and with the shutdown of the 40-megawatt reactor in Arak and Iran's commitment to remove all related components, Iran's heavy water stockpile must first be reduced to 130 tons and then to 90 tons. Before the U.S. announced its readiness to buy Iran's heavy water, which is more a political decision than a commercial move, no other buyers (including India, Russia, and China) had shown willingness to pay for Iran's heavy water. If the U.S. had not agreed to the proposal and recommendation from Yemen to receive Iran's heavy water and make payment, the Islamic Republic would have been forced to dump its heavy water stockpile into the sea under international supervision due to the lack of buyers. The U.S. hopes that this symbolic action might lead to another buyer for the Arak heavy water plant's product in the future. The relatively low quality of Iran's heavy water, along with doubts about potential conflicts with banking and commercial regulations regarding such transactions, has deterred other buyers from engaging in trade with Iran. The U.S. does not produce heavy water, and its annual requirement of 70 tons for its laboratories is usually supplied by Canada. Ernest Moniz, the U.S. Secretary of Energy and a key figure in the technical discussions with Ali Akbar Salehi during the nuclear negotiations, confirmed during an interview with the American publication Wall Street Journal that 'the quality of Iran's heavy water is not bad, and we hope to find another buyer for it.' The 32 tons of Iran's heavy water is set to be transported to a laboratory in Tennessee in the coming weeks for neutron testing. Heavy water, which is a type of water, can also be used in industrial applications, including the production of fiber optic equipment, which Iran currently lacks the technical capability to utilize. The $8 million deal has sparked unrest and opposition in Congress, similar to other aspects of the nuclear negotiations and agreement. Regarding the recent heavy water deal, Ed Royce, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed concerns in a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Energy on April 18, highlighting Congress's dissatisfaction with the deal, including: how the money for this transaction will be paid to Iran (due to legal restrictions on dollar transactions for Iran), and what guarantees have been taken that Iran will not use this money to purchase weapons or support 'terrorists' or engage in destabilizing actions in Iraq and elsewhere. It is certainly arguable that if the U.S. needed to buy heavy water, Canada, with more experience and higher quality production, was right next door. The recent vote by the House of Representatives to ban the purchase of heavy water produced in Iran, while it will not prevent the aforementioned 'political-commercial' deal, will once again compel the Obama administration to bear a new cost in defending the nuclear agreement with Iran, which it presents as a legacy of its foreign policy; in an election year, the U.S. government's capacity to withstand Congressional pressures will not be limitless.