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🔴 Breaking ❓ Unknown

Salehi: If All Issues Progress Well, We Will Accept the Additional Protocol

Jun 1, 2026 June 1, 2026 3 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, stated that Iran might accept the Additional Protocol of the NPT if all issues are resolved satisfactorily. This statement reflects ongoing negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program and the conditions under which international inspections would occur. The acceptance of the protocol is significant as it could impact Iran's nuclear transparency and relations with the international community.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: Iran's acceptance of the Additional Protocol is contingent on broader negotiations.

👥 Key Players

Ali Akbar Salehi (علی اکبر صالحی) QUOTED
Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization
""if all issues progress well, we will accept the Additional Protocol""
Marzieh Afkham QUOTED
Foreign Ministry spokesperson
""Iran might sign the Additional Protocol 'under certain conditions'""
Ali Saeedi QUOTED
Representative of the Supreme Leader in IRGC
""we have fully accepted the agency's oversight""
Aladdin Boroujerdi QUOTED
Head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission
""the Parliament will definitely intervene""
Hossein Salami QUOTED
Deputy Commander of the IRGC
""we will not allow inspections of Iran's military sites""

⚡ Actions

Ali Akbar Salehi ANNOUNCE International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
""if all issues progress well, we will accept the Additional Protocol""
Confidence: 90%
Iran NEGOTIATE IAEA, 1+5 countries
""The condition for this to happen is an agreement on all issues""
Confidence: 90%
220 members of the Iranian Parliament PROTEST IAEA
""oversight of Iran's nuclear facilities should not include military centers""
Confidence: 80%

📰 What Happened

Iran's Salehi states acceptance of Additional Protocol hinges on agreement on all issues.

  • Ali Akbar Salehi announce International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
  • Iran negotiate IAEA, 1+5 countries
  • 220 members of the Iranian Parliament protest IAEA

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: Because acceptance of the Additional Protocol could enhance Iran's international legitimacy.
🌍 Regional: Because it may affect regional security dynamics and Iran's nuclear capabilities.
🌐 International: Because it relates to global non-proliferation efforts and U.S. relations with Iran.

📚 Background

Iran's acceptance of the Additional Protocol is contingent on broader negotiations.

📝 Key Evidence

""if all issues progress well, we will accept the Additional Protocol""
→ Iran's potential acceptance of the Additional Protocol.
""oversight of Iran's nuclear facilities should not include military centers""
→ Parliament's stance against military site inspections.
""we will not allow inspections of Iran's military sites""
→ Military's firm stance on site inspections.
📡 Source: NEUTRAL
📊 Confidence: 80%
Radio Farda is known for reporting on Iranian affairs with a focus on transparency.

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization stated that "if all issues progress well," Iran will accept the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Based on the Additional Protocol, which was signed during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami but never ratified by the Iranian Parliament, inspectors from the agency would be allowed to conduct surprise inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities whenever deemed necessary. In an interview with China's CCTV, published on Monday, April 26, Salehi added: "The condition for this to happen is an agreement on all issues, and as long as there is no agreement on all issues, it means that no agreement has been reached." According to Salehi, if approved by the Iranian Parliament, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could visit "some" non-nuclear sites in Iran "under specific conditions." Under the Lausanne nuclear agreement, Iran has agreed to voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol. Some officials of the Islamic Republic, including Foreign Ministry spokesperson Marzieh Afkham, have stated that Iran might sign the Additional Protocol "under certain conditions," but the final decision lies with the Iranian Parliament. Meanwhile, Ali Saeedi, representative of the Supreme Leader in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, also stated on December 3, 2014, that "we have fully accepted the agency's oversight. If they accept our rights, the Parliament may also accept and ratify the Protocol." However, Aladdin Boroujerdi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament, stated on November 13, 2014, that if part of the final agreement between Iran and the 1+5 countries involves accepting the Additional Protocol, "the Parliament will definitely intervene." According to the fact sheet from the U.S. State Department regarding the Lausanne agreement, Iran has agreed to provide much greater access and information about its nuclear program to the agency, including both declared and undeclared facilities. However, Salehi emphasized that visits to "some sites" in Iran "depend on mutual understanding and agreement." He noted Iran's opposition to IAEA inspectors visiting non-nuclear facilities, adding: "Inspectors can sample areas around non-nuclear centers based on the Additional Protocol." On April 21, 2015, 220 members of the Iranian Parliament issued a statement emphasizing that oversight of Iran's nuclear facilities should not include military centers and industries that "would break national pride and humiliate the Iranian people." Meanwhile, military officials of the Islamic Republic have repeatedly emphasized that they will not allow inspections of Iran's military sites. For instance, Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the IRGC, warned on April 18, 2015, that the Islamic Republic would respond to visits of military sites with "molten lead." This comes as U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter emphasized that any agreement with Iran would include oversight of Iran's military facilities. In his interview, Salehi responded to a question stating that there is "no agreement" to increase Iran's "nuclear breakout time" to one year. He added: "However, there is an understanding that the time for achieving this should be about one year, and we believe this is reasonable and not unreasonable at all. We have... voluntarily accepted the one-year standard for achieving the nuclear breakout time." According to the U.S. State Department's fact sheet from the Lausanne agreement, the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon will be increased to at least one year for a period of at least ten years. The U.S. State Department currently estimates this time to be two to three months.

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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