Satellite and the Government's Defeat Against the People in the Streets

Finally, after 21 years of relentless government intrusion into people's homes to collect satellite dishes and other equipment for receiving satellite networks under the pretext of 'cultural invasion' and 'soft war of the enemy', the officials who insisted on this matter have both practically stopped this action and presented the government's unpleasant statistics themselves, declaring it futile. These behaviors indicate that both the pragmatic section and the security and military core of the government have accepted their defeat in the realm of satellite networks, which the government perceives as one of the fronts of the soft war. When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that 'in all audio, visual, and written productions of the opposing front against the Iranian nation, the purposes and objectives of the soft war are pursued and conveyed, mainly indirectly,' and that 'the state television and radio is the main and active headquarters for countering the soft war' (October 12, 2015), naturally, dishes should be collected from rooftops and jamming signals should be sent. If they are not sent, the government has effectively accepted defeat in this aspect of the soft war. A bit of realism has emerged. Military, security, and propaganda officials of the regime, who were instrumental in the approval of the law banning the use of satellite reception equipment (in 1994) and its implementation, have explicitly stated for several years that 40 to 70 percent of the people use satellite reception equipment (Ali Jannati, Tabnak December 18, 2013; Ezzatollah Zarghami, Mehr June 29, 2014); they also say, 'Dishes should not be forcibly removed from families.' (Mohammad Reza Naqdi, head of the Basij Organization, ISNA June 10, 2015); of course, later the Basij organization denied its commander's statement, but this issue does not matter much in the face of the actions of law enforcement agencies, as for months the sending of jamming signals has decreased or stopped. The collection of dishes has also significantly decreased. In the past six months, only a few limited collection cases have been reported. Of course, during the days when nuclear negotiations were ongoing, the sending of jamming signals resumed but was immediately stopped afterward. Apparently, the government has reserved the sending of jamming signals for days it considers sensitive. These statements and actions by officials actually signify a bit of realism from the government in the face of the demands of the people in the streets, who have forced the government to retreat through resistance and steadfastness. Whenever the government collected these dishes, the people immediately installed them on their balconies and rooftops. The use of this equipment spread so widely among the people, and the government's crackdown on it was so publicly hated that some presidential candidates approved by the Guardian Council explicitly opposed the government's actions, which were based on law, to attract public opinion. What does this defeat mean, and what consequences will it have on the government's cultural and media policies? What lessons can opponents of the government's totalitarianism learn from this defeat? This defeat was not the first defeat of the government against the people in the streets and markets. In the 1980s, the government openly and seriously fought against Xerox copiers, fax machines, music cassettes, recording and playback devices, and even cassettes, and those who wanted to use them had to obtain permits. Many people over 40 have faced the confiscation of their equipment by the Revolutionary Guards and Basij agents. In all these areas, the government failed within less than a decade. The government also retreated in preventing women from wearing jeans and sports shoes in the mid-1990s. Today, if the Islamic Republic is compared to ISIS in cultural and social policies, some may be surprised because they have forgotten the history of the government's defeats against the people in the social and cultural spheres. Of course, the government will not learn any lessons from this defeat, just as it has not from previous defeats, and it will cling to the strongholds it believes are necessary for suppressing the people. One example is the morality police, which has been operating for decades despite its failure. Ordinary people (without power and without access to officials) and citizens in the streets and markets have been alone in their struggle against the media monopoly and the totalitarianism of the religious government in most areas. Neither a government faction, nor some political parties, nor foreign governments or international organizations (except for launching radio and television networks and websites), nor even one of the civil institutions collaborated with them in this regard. Over the past 21 years, not a single campaign has been launched by political activists for the freedom to use satellite networks or to counter their collection. Foreign governments also did not take action to stop the jamming signals inside the country (some actions were taken to stop the direct sending of jamming signals to satellites). Forces within the government avoided opposing the law, and civil institutions did not want to stand up to the government on this issue and bear the costs. Only the severe decline in quality and the increasing repulsiveness of the political and religious programs of state radio and television on one hand, and the decreasing size and cost of satellite reception equipment on the other, helped the people. The lessons that can be drawn from the series of defeats of the government in the realm of totalitarianism are as follows: 1. Disagreements within the factions of the government in this regard do not help opponents of totalitarianism because the rival faction has always said that these issues are secondary and their impact on reforming the existing situation is minimal; reformists have never prioritized phenomena such as compulsory hijab, morality police, or the collection of dishes. The lack of follow-up in collecting dishes is not due to Rouhani's promises but rather the government's avoidance of confronting the epidemic of evasion from state networks. 2. In breaking the dam of media totalitarianism, cooperation between internal and external opponents has played a key role. Without Persian-language satellite radio and television networks, without the production of Iranian music in the United States, and without the activities of Iranian journalists and writers abroad, it would not have been possible to attract the attention of millions of Iranians to these networks. The people of Iran inside the country cannot alone and without the help of Iranians abroad weaken and undermine the government's totalitarianism. 3. The assistance of foreign governments in establishing radio and television networks has been key. Iranians abroad could not have created effective and significant alternatives to state networks without the help of such institutions.