Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Red Sea; Strengthening Military Presence, Erasing Iran's Footprint

Recently, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the Navy of the Army, highlighted the establishment of security in the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as one of the main objectives of the Velayat 95 military exercise. The deployment of naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb, as military commanders in Iran have repeatedly emphasized in recent years, aims to keep maritime communication lines open in the region and combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia. In this context, Habibollah Sayyari stated in May 2015: "The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is an international waterway... and the Islamic Republic is present in this strait with authority and protects commercial vessels." Bab el-Mandeb, as one of the most important maritime transit passages, connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and thus holds significant geographical, economic, and strategic importance. Nearly 3.8 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through this waterway daily. Iran's efforts to establish a foothold in the Red Sea have been ongoing in recent years, as the Islamic Republic has sought to maintain its presence in the aforementioned waters and expand the operational scope of the Navy (as described by Ayatollah Khamenei, transforming the current navy into a strategic navy) by establishing strong diplomatic and military relations with countries located on the western shore of the Red Sea and Somalia. In 2011, Iran and Somalia opened an embassy, and then-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi visited the country twice, marking the beginning of Iranian investment there. Regarding Djibouti, the Islamic Republic has sought to establish a foothold in this country as well. In May 2014, several naval vessels of the Army docked in Djibouti, and that same year, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, attended the inauguration of the new parliament building in Djibouti, which was built with Iranian funding. The primary reason for the interest of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in the northeastern Africa region is clear. These countries need to establish close relations with northeastern African countries to help secure their safety and keep the Islamic Republic of Iran out of the region. Similarly, efforts were made to expand relations with Eritrea, and in May 2008, Isaias Afwerki, the president of Eritrea, met in Tehran with then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei. Iran's relations with Sudan under Omar al-Bashir also expanded. In 2012 and 2014, several naval vessels of the Army visited Port Sudan. Moreover, the civil war in Yemen and the rise of the Houthis, which the Islamic Republic supports to expand its political influence, provided Iran with an opportunity to establish another foothold near Bab el-Mandeb and the Horn of Africa if the situation turned in favor of the Houthis. However, the course of events in the region, including the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition's attack on the Houthis and forces supporting Ali Abdullah Saleh on March 27, 2015, as well as the aftermath of the execution of Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr, a Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia, and the subsequent attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran, unraveled all of the Islamic Republic's threads, leading Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti to sever their political relations with Iran after Saudi Arabia. This action, alongside Egypt's long-standing severance of relations with Iran, effectively nullified the Islamic Republic's political and non-political investments to establish a foothold on the western shores of the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia's efforts to strengthen its military presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are not new; they are considered one of the long-term objectives of the country, pursued mainly to counter the clear challenges posed by Iran and its advances in the region. In this regard, the United Arab Emirates has also joined Saudi Arabia in practice over the past two years. The efforts of these two countries, given the increased focus of the United States on East Asia and China and the reduction of U.S. military commitments to protect and secure the Gulf states, have now accelerated to prevent the Islamic Republic from asserting itself as the dominant regional power. Furthermore, the finalization of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 countries, which occurred within the framework of the JCPOA, has exacerbated the situation, leading the leaders of most Gulf Cooperation Council countries to conclude that the balance of power in the Middle East has dangerously and irreversibly shifted against them. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are considered the heavyweight members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, have proactively established or are in the process of establishing three bases in strategic locations along the western shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On Friday, February 11 of this year, the Somaliland parliament overwhelmingly approved the establishment of a naval base at the port of Berbera, located 260 kilometers south of Aden, by the UAE. Somaliland, which was formed from five provinces of Somalia and has its capital in Hargeisa, seceded from Somalia in 1991, although no country has recognized it, and it is only regarded internationally as an autonomous region of Somalia. In addition to its desire to expand its military presence in northeastern Africa, Saudi Arabia has another goal in Somalia: to curb threats posed by Al-Shabaab, which has close ties to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and is considered one of the most dangerous terrorist groups. Additionally, the UAE is establishing a major airbase and a naval base close to each other at the port of Assab in Eritrea in the Red Sea. The UAE continues the construction of these bases based on a contract signed with Eritrea in 2015 and has conducted several military operations from this port, located 60 kilometers west of Yemen, against positions of the opponents of the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Recently, the U.S. Strategic Forecasting and Intelligence Institute, known as Stratfor, reported on the military installations being constructed in the northwest of the port of Assab based on satellite images taken by the All Source Analysis Institute, indicating that construction work is nearing completion and the scale of the facilities suggests that the deployment of Emirati forces in Eritrea will be long-term. According to these images, the military facilities being established by the UAE around an abandoned airport in Assab include aircraft hangars, organizational housing for personnel, and a military port. Furthermore, these images show the deployment of several tanks and armored vehicles equivalent to a battalion alongside a number of fighter and transport aircraft, attack and transport helicopters, military trucks, and artillery at these facilities. Concurrently, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (a former French colony) signed a security pact last year, and Riyadh is currently finalizing a contract with the Djiboutian government to establish a military base in that country. Djibouti is a member of the Arab League and has also joined the 34-nation Islamic coalition against terrorism led by Saudi Arabia, which was formed in December 2015. Sudan, which had long-standing close relations with the Islamic Republic and was considered one of its allies, has clearly distanced itself from Tehran. Saudi Arabia has provided financial assistance to Sudan to commit to joining the coalition of Arab countries against the opponents of the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The U.S. also has a base in Djibouti, established after the September 11, 2001 incident, at Camp Lemonnier, in the former facilities of the French Foreign Legion. This base houses nearly 4,000 military personnel, and its main mission is related to counter-terrorism operations, including commando and drone strikes in the region. Currently, this base operates under U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). China, the strategic rival of the U.S., has also begun constructing a base in Djibouti, a few kilometers from Camp Lemonnier, intending to expand its naval presence towards the maritime routes of the Indian Ocean and Africa and transform its navy into a strategic force (or blue-water navy). This base is China's first overseas base. The challenges and the erasure of Iran's footprint seem to indicate that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and to some extent Qatar agree among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries on ensuring the security of the members of the council and achieving it through unity and strengthening their collective combat capabilities. However, despite these shared views, especially in some areas of foreign policy, these countries pursue different objectives and maintain their security and trade relations with other countries individually, lacking a unified policy and approach. This lack of consensus is evident regarding northeastern Africa. The main reason for the interest of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in northeastern Africa is clear. These countries need to establish close relations with northeastern African countries to help secure their safety and keep the Islamic Republic of Iran out of the region. By establishing bases and forming military relations with these countries, the members of the Cooperation Council will be able to create an effective protective layer against potential threats. The Yemen crisis and its consequences have further motivated the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to get closer to Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia, countries with shaky stability that could serve as sources for the supply of weapons or infiltration of terrorists into Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Aside from security concerns, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have taken steps to participate in the agricultural sector of the northeastern African region. Parts of this region have suitable agricultural lands and are rich in human resources. In this regard, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have invested in the agricultural sectors of Sudan and Ethiopia or have ongoing projects. Although the investments of these countries in northeastern Africa seem reasonable, the internal dynamics of the region will not be without challenges. Egypt has serious disputes with Ethiopia over the construction of a dam on the Blue Nile (one of the sources of the Nile). Eritrea, which separated from Ethiopia following a public uprising in the 1990s, does not have good relations with that country. Furthermore, the investments of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar in the agricultural sectors of Ethiopia and Sudan will not be well-received by the Egyptian government. Water and its scarcity have always been a point of contention among the countries of the region. The presence of the UAE in Eritrea and Saudi Arabia's investment in Ethiopia could create disputes or escalate tensions. Nevertheless, these actions by Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not imply that they will defend one country against another if needed, as this would contradict their interests and waste their efforts and investments. The obstacles that these internal dynamics may create are not insurmountable, but the overall situation in the region indicates that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will face several challenges in advancing their foreign policy. Despite these challenges, the overall approach of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in military and security domains in northeastern African countries has been relatively effective, and while unraveling Iran's threads in these countries, it has paved the way for their solid foothold on the western shores of the Red Sea.