Second Debate: Division of Labor Among Opponents and Limitations of Rouhani

The strategies and techniques of the candidates in the second debate were somewhat derived from the lessons they learned from the first debate. Particularly, Jahangiri's success in the first debate led the opposition candidates to reconsider their tactics and strategies. Both the government's opponents and its supporters appeared somewhat differently in the second debate compared to the first. The second debate was a more overt and confrontational arena for the opponents of the government and its supporters. How can the second debate be evaluated in terms of strategies, topics, and techniques? Qalibaf, Raisi, and Mir Salim: Against Rouhani. In the first debate, the government's opponents acted scattered and uncoordinated. In that debate, Mir Salim did not know what his role was, Raisi wanted to play a cross-factional role, and Qalibaf considered himself the spearhead of the attack. However, it seems that a kind of division of labor among the three candidates opposing the government was evident in the second debate. The strategy of the opposition candidates in the second debate was not to gain individual points but to collectively lower Rouhani's public approval ratings to push the election to a second round. With this strategy, the three candidates effectively addressed various aspects of the government's weaknesses and covered the problems, compensating for any missed topics in each other's criticisms. Raisi compensated for his lag behind Qalibaf from the first debate. Mir Salim also took a more aggressive stance and criticized the government more clearly. The opponents of the government focused on discrimination, corruption, and inefficiency: Raisi addressed embezzlement and misuse in the Cultural Fund for Teachers, the increase in government debts, the rising costs of the public sector, the minimal results of the JCPOA on people's livelihoods, and the weakness of the political apparatus regarding Mina. Qalibaf discussed smuggling, unemployment, and marginalization, while Mir Salim criticized Rouhani's derogatory remarks about his critics, the import of airplanes instead of manufacturing them domestically, dust storms and water rights of Hirmand, astronomical salaries, and the dishonesty of officials. Both Mir Salim and Raisi addressed the lack of passport credibility and the humiliation of Iranians abroad. Candidates aligned with the government: Defensive stance. Candidates aligned with the government considered four strategies: linking opposition candidates to Ahmadinejad's policies, reporting the government's record focusing on the chaotic state of the country in 2013, criticizing the achievements of the critics, and ignoring Raisi. In the first strategy, neither the topic was sufficiently elaborated nor did the opposition candidates (except Qalibaf) support Ahmadinejad's era. In the fourth strategy, responses were directed at Qalibaf, who has lost in presidential elections twice. Rouhani entered the second debate more aggressively than in the first but still faced limitations in political areas. On one hand, he had access to information regarding important national issues in foreign and domestic policy and was aware of the problems and obstacles, but considering the interests of the ruling class in withholding this information, he could not mention it. Instead of responding and presenting a program, he took an oppositional stance, criticizing the Basij, state television, the judiciary, and indirectly the IRGC. He only provided a realistic report on the government's performance in the last two minutes of his time in the debate. Jahangiri's reports on the government's performance and criticism of the candidates (especially Qalibaf) were weaker than in the first debate (reading from a previously written text). He spoke more clearly than Rouhani about the government's efforts for social freedoms and services but fell into the opponents' trap while defending the Minister of Education and his daughter. Rouhani's report on the JCPOA was among the more successful topics, especially his references to the IRGC's underground city display on television and writing 'Death to Israel' in Hebrew on one of the long-range missiles launched, which was clearly aimed at disrupting the fulfillment of commitments by both sides (in coordination with Khamenei). The opponents of the government were more successful in addressing the demands of the critics (the social base of the hardline faction) by presenting all the problems than the supporters of the government. The government's supporters were unable to refer to the obstacles the government faced that could convince opponents of the current cultural and political situation (voters for Rouhani in the first round) to participate. The coercive forces (IRGC, judiciary, and police) and the leadership apparatus, which are the main obstacles to development, freedom, and the rule of law, were naturally absent from the statements of the government's supporters. The only candidate who spoke directly to the people and addressed them was Jahangiri. His empathy with the people through identifying with the suffering (his father being a miner) is a technique that significantly impacts the audience. Rouhani and Qalibaf answered questions less and came to deliver their specific messages. Jahangiri did not speak as a cover or supportive candidate, and it was clear that he was not going to step aside for now. The state television demonstrated that this propaganda apparatus fundamentally lacks the capacity for such programs. The debate remained slow and boring while at least five candidates had come for a challenging discussion. The television showed that it did not even have a capable host for conducting such programs. The host did not even point out that the candidates were not answering questions. The host was not actually managing the debate. The duality of the government candidates. The major problem for the candidates in this debate and any debate in the Islamic Republic is that they must defend the 'system' against discrimination, corruption, inefficiency, and waste in society while simultaneously criticizing these very issues in detail and specifically. Rouhani spoke about inequality in rights and political freedoms and the second-class role of minorities in governing the country, but he himself had claimed in the 2013 election campaigns that there was equality in terms of political and social rights in the country. He rightly attributed this plague of corruption to the country's structures, namely the lack of transparency, but he could not say that corruption is not solely the Achilles' heel of the executive branch but rather the Achilles' heel of the government. The champion of censorship (Mir Salim) and the symbol of mass killings (Raisi) spoke about the right to be open to criticism. Mir Salim, without paying attention to which party and faction he belongs to, mentioned that the only government that gave credibility to criticism was Khatami's government, a government that he and his party had worked for eight years to undermine. Qalibaf, by mentioning 'Imam of Kindness', reminded the audience of the violence and repression during the 'golden' era. He also attributed the depoliticization of universities, which was an act of the coercive forces, to Rouhani's government. The hollow and empty promises of the government's opponents continued in this debate, just like in the first debate, without any practical and executable proposals or plans to achieve them. The only candidate who spoke about the two fundamental problems of the country, namely the large and growing size of the government and the necessity of delegating affairs to the people, and the existing environmental risks was Hashemi Taba. He also challenged the populist and socialist views of the government's opponents. This debate reinforces the view that Rouhani will not win in the first round. The ongoing discourses in society. The most interesting underlying aspect of this debate was that representatives of corruption, discrimination, waste, and concealment (the six existing candidates) promised transparency, openness to criticism, honesty, scientific management, and the rule of law. Regarding the 'Iranian-Islamic lifestyle', which is constructed by Khamenei's cultural engineering apparatus, all candidates evaded the artificial and fabricated question posed by state television that had no relevance to public problems and demands, and presented their other statements. The candidates were struggling with a serious gap between the government and the people.