Secret Diplomacies Against Nuclear Negotiations

Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal arrived at Vienna airport in the final days of the deadline for Iran's nuclear negotiations with six world powers, and without disembarking from his private plane, he discussed the negotiations with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The state news agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, IRNA, referred to this meeting as a "stick in the wheel" of the negotiations, and Aladdin Boroujerdi, head of the National Security Commission of the Iranian Parliament, told the Iranian website "Neday Iranians" that "Saudi Arabia obstructed the negotiations in Vienna" and that this country wants "serious challenges between Iran and the U.S. to remain." The extent of Saudi Arabia's influence among U.S. officials and negotiating parties and its ability to affect the outcome of the negotiations should be assessed alongside other factors, and it certainly cannot be seen as the only influencing factor. However, Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, wrote years ago in his memoir "The Age of Deception" about the pressure from Arab countries during the nuclear negotiations with Iran: "The Gulf countries and Egypt had asked the West to exert maximum pressure on Iran..." ElBaradei noted that Arab countries sought maximum pressure on Iran. He believes that "hearing that Arab countries had a contrary diplomacy instead of a mediating role in disputes was disappointing." He even quotes Javier Solana, then head of foreign policy for the European Union, stating that he was also "under pressure from Arab leaders not to give any concessions to Iran and to consider no incentives for that country." Iranian officials first learned about the obstruction by Arab countries in the nuclear negotiations with the West in 2005, just months before the end of Mohammad Khatami's presidency, and they attempted to enhance their regional diplomacy in this regard, an effort that did not yield the desired results. Hassan Rouhani, during his tenure as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and head of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, after "Europeans informed Iranian experts that regional countries were putting a lot of pressure on them and were constantly messaging the Americans that Iran's nuclear program is dangerous for us," visited several Arab countries in June 2005. In Rouhani's account of this trip in his book "National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy," he mentions that during his visit to Kuwait, they expressed concern about Iran's enrichment and the Russian technology used in the Bushehr power plant, fearing that if an attack occurred against Iran, the entire region would be contaminated. In a meeting with Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah, the Prime Minister of Kuwait, Rouhani asked him, "Why are you provoking the West?" and Sheikh Sabah "swore that they had taken no action in this regard." In the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Khalifa, the President of the Emirates, also told the then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, "We have not said anything to any Western country against you; perhaps one of our neighbors has said something." Rouhani states that Sheikh Khalifa was referring to "Kuwait." During his visit to Saudi Arabia, Rouhani, as he recounts in his book, told King Abdullah, "We need a nuclear power plant because oil resources will eventually run out. Let's enrich together and create a fuel bank for the region." However, in this meeting, King Abdullah not only refused but also clearly evaded further discussion, to the extent that he explicitly told Rouhani, "We are not ready for this." The current Emir of Kuwait, in his role as Prime Minister in 2005, had sworn to Rouhani that his country had not provoked the West against Iran. In the same regional trip in 2005, Rouhani visited Oman, which has a better relationship with Iran, and heard from Yusuf bin Alawi, the Omani Foreign Minister, "The Europeans are right; the regional countries are all putting pressure on the Europeans and Americans regarding your nuclear issue and are very active against you." In response to Rouhani's question about what the solution is, he answered, "The story is not that simple!" Rouhani also stated, "We did not expect these countries to be so active behind the scenes and play a destructive role." ElBaradei, in his memoir "The Age of Deception," notes the role of the U.S. in creating fear among Gulf countries and considers other factors effective as well, writing: "For me, the actions of Arab governments were a prominent sign of their weakness. For all of Tehran's significant shortcomings, Iranians were striving for greater scientific advancement, reforming educational standards, and declaring their leadership in the region in every front, it was clear that Arab governments were envious and fearful. Instead of striving to increase their knowledge and technology base and create a balance in the region, or even agreeing with common policies to deal with Iran, they collaborated with their Western allies to overthrow the Islamic Republic." The King of Saudi Arabia had rejected the proposal for joint enrichment during his meeting with Rouhani in 2005, stating that his country was not ready for this. After the extension of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in Vienna, Aladdin Boroujerdi, head of the National Security Commission of the Iranian Parliament, in an interview with the website "Neday Iranians," attributes the behavior of Riyadh officials to the fact that "they have clear and hidden interests from the outcomes of sanctions on Tehran, and their most important hidden interest is to weaken Tehran's geopolitical position," thus "they have made Tehran not a rival but a real enemy." After Rouhani's trip to Saudi Arabia in 2005 and the beginning of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, Iran-Saudi relations cooled, and the Iranian nuclear file became more complex. After that, the differing policies of the two countries in the region, especially in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, turned relations into a tangled mess. A mess that has yet to be unraveled even with the beginning of Hassan Rouhani's presidency. Some Iranian figures believe that the key to solving Iran-Saudi problems lies in using the personal influence of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In this context, the secret and effective role that Riyadh played behind the scenes of the Iranian nuclear file has even prompted some clerics in Qom to react. To the extent that Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani, a top cleric in Qom who generally does not engage in political issues, has stated that the "definitive way" to resolve this dispute is for Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Discernment Council, to travel to this country and convince them. Although Rafsanjani has repeatedly stated over the past year that he is willing to go to Saudi Arabia on the condition that first the "system" clarifies its relationship with Riyadh: "This task is primarily within the authority of the leadership and the general policies of the system and then the government. A plan like these negotiations must be prepared first, and red lines must be defined so that those who go for negotiations know what to say." This condition that Rafsanjani has specified months ago seems to still not have received a green light from the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and the lock on Tehran-Riyadh relations remains firmly shut.