Secret Negotiations Between Iran and the U.S.; From Sadegh Qotbzadeh to Elon Musk

The news of Elon Musk's meeting with Amir Saeed Iravani, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, and advisers close to Donald Trump, the 47th President-elect of the United States, received widespread attention in Iran and the world. After five days from the initial report in the New York Times, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied it. Then, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi elaborated in an interview with state television about the 'inaccuracy' of this claim. However, the unusual delay in denying the news and the ambiguities and contradictions in Araghchi's statements rendered this denial ineffective. At the same time, the denial diminished the significance of the mentioned meeting. There are reasons to doubt the validity of this denial. Araghchi's claim of downplaying the importance of the Musk-Iravani meeting is not acceptable. This meeting held high political significance, and it was expected that if it did not occur, it would be immediately denied by the parties involved. Even if an official stance was not deemed prudent, the Islamic Republic could have utilized the common method of 'denial by an informed source.' On the other hand, neither Iravani nor Musk has denied the occurrence of this meeting so far. Even the initial ambiguous stance of the Islamic Republic's representation at the UN was more confirmatory of this meeting than a rejection. Since the news was disseminated by American media, it is difficult to consider it as media manipulation by the Islamic Republic. Is Iran sending 'signals' to Trump? The historical record of secret meetings between Iranian officials and American counterparts throughout the life of the Islamic Republic, which were initially officially denied but later proved to be true, is long. First, Sadegh Qotbzadeh, the then Foreign Minister of Iran from 1979 to 1980, had secret negotiations with Hamilton Jordan, President Jimmy Carter's chief of staff, to resolve the hostage crisis of American diplomats during the November 4, 1979, takeover of the U.S. embassy by students known as 'followers of the Imam.' Qotbzadeh claimed that Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, was aware of this negotiation and that it took place with his consent. Since this issue was not raised in Qotbzadeh's legal case and accusations during his trial, one can conclude the validity of this claim. A similar claim was made by Sadegh Tabatabai, the second spokesperson of the provisional government during the hostage crisis. He wrote in his memoirs that after speaking with and obtaining Ayatollah Khomeini's consent, he contacted the White House through German officials, opening the path for negotiations with Carter. He even claims that the American negotiators at the time requested evidence of Ayatollah Khomeini's support for these negotiations. Mr. Tabatabai also coordinated with Ayatollah Khomeini through Seyyed Ahmad, the son of the then leader of the Islamic Republic, to express words regarding the hostage crisis in a public speech unrelated to the subject. This event occurred, and the center for publishing and works of Ayatollah Khomeini has not denied this claim to date. Unconfirmed reports also exist regarding negotiations between some close associates of Ayatollah Khomeini and members of Ronald Reagan's campaign. John Connally, the then Governor of Texas and a close associate of Ronald Reagan, requested through leaders of Lebanon and Syria that the hostages not be released until after the 1980 elections; a request that was positively responded to. However, a more significant issue is the negotiations with the Reagan administration in the 'Iran-Contra' affair, which revealed the truth of news that had previously been denied after the unsuccessful visit of National Security Advisor McFarlane to Iran. During Ali Khamenei's leadership, several important secret negotiations took place. The first instance was the meeting of Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State in George W. Bush's first administration, with representatives affiliated with the Islamic Republic. Following these negotiations, Mohammad Javad Zarif was authorized to conduct secret discussions with former and current American politicians through the Rockefeller Foundation. These meetings allowed Mr. Zarif to gain limited influence in Washington and New York, which later helped in gaining the trust of Obama administration officials for reaching the nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA in July 2015. Another significant case was the secret negotiations in Oman, managed by Ali Akbar Salehi, the then Foreign Minister of Iran, with William Burns and Jake Sullivan, representatives of the U.S. government at the time. These negotiations became public during Rouhani's administration but returned to secrecy under Ibrahim Raisi's government. In the latest instance, the Financial Times reported on March 13, 2023, about a new round of 'secret negotiations' between Ali Bagheri Kani, the representative of the Islamic Republic, and Brett McGurk, the White House advisor on Middle Eastern affairs, along with Abram Paley, the Deputy Special Representative for Iran. Is Trump's return a sign of the fall of the Islamic Republic? There has been a duality in the Islamic Republic's stance towards the U.S. from the beginning until now. Both Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei have made many negative statements regarding the U.S. in public and have strategically positioned enmity with the U.S. in the foreign policy of the regime by likening relations between the two countries to a 'wolf and sheep' relationship. They have publicly appeared as staunch anti-Americans and behaved in a way that suggests they do not believe in reconciliation and peace with the U.S. They have also criticized those who openly sought relations with the U.S. and prepared the ground for security confrontations with them, yet they have repeatedly authorized direct and secret negotiations with American officials. The goals and motivations of these meetings can vary and contradict, ultimately aligning with the 'tactical interests' of the Islamic Republic. The difference between this dual approach and the behavior of engineer Mehdi Bazargan in his public meeting with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, during the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution in Algiers is enlightening. Now, considering the conditional green light given by Mohammad Javad Zarif, Abbas Araghchi, and Ali Larijani to Donald Trump for new negotiations, and the silence of the Velayat-e Faqih institution, one can conclude that the leader of the Islamic Republic has disregarded his previous claim of not negotiating with Trump's administration and is thinking of overcoming the difficult conditions ahead. If the meeting between Iravani and Musk occurred, it could serve as a low-cost assessment to gauge the potential future engagement of Trump with Iran.