Seven Points on Raisi's First Campaign Program

The first campaign program of Ebrahim Raisi, one of the main candidates for the upcoming presidential election, was broadcast last Wednesday night on the Islamic Republic's television; a program that can be considered Raisi's first serious appearance in the elections. This program is a serious opportunity to assess one of the important candidates in this stage of the electoral competition. The following seven points are noteworthy in the context of Raisi's first campaign program. First; bypassing the 1988 executions. Raisi's campaign program began with a brief introduction of him and a summary of his biography. However, the first important point occurred right here. The program's host, in explaining Raisi's life and career, suddenly jumped from his government position in 1981 (Prosecutor of Karaj and Hamedan) to 1989, deliberately skipping several important years in between. In this biography, which was prepared and broadcast with Raisi's coordination, there was no mention of his judicial-security activities between 1981 and 1989, the period during which he worked as the deputy prosecutor of the Tehran Revolutionary Court. During this time, Raisi was a member of the main four-person group involved in the mass execution of thousands of political opponents in the prisons of the Islamic Republic (alongside Mostafa Pourmohammadi, Morteza Eshraqi, and Hossein Ali Nouri). Now, as a presidential candidate, he speaks of the importance of respecting citizens' rights in practice—not just in writing and words—and shows no inclination to revisit his judicial-security record in the 'tunnel of terror' of contemporary Iranian political history. This is while Raisi played an effective role in the gross violation of human rights during the 1988 massacre; an event that Ayatollah Montazeri described in his famous audio file during a meeting with Raisi and other responsible committee members as a 'crime.' Predictably, it seems that Raisi has no desire to reopen this case or have it brought up in the electoral atmosphere. Second; a pure focus on unemployment, poverty, and corruption. Ebrahim Raisi's statements in his campaign program prominently focused on the issues of unemployment and poverty, as well as economic problems resulting from the ongoing recession and crisis in production and employment. By emphasizing this issue (work) and repeating the keyword that forms one of the two main pillars of his electoral slogan (work and dignity), he sought to attract unemployed audiences and those frustrated by livelihood issues. However, he limited himself to mere promises and generalizations, failing to explain how he would solve the unemployment problem for millions of citizens—especially young people and university graduates—within the context of current economic realities. In other words, Raisi has adopted a negative approach based on socio-economic conditions and seeks to define and blame Rouhani's government as the main culprit for the current situation. He deliberately overlooked the role of the central power in the imposition of sanctions and their horrific consequences for Iran's economy and society. Furthermore, he made no mention of the tax evasion by the Astan Quds Razavi or the role of this significant and special institution in Iran's macro-economy, only referring to some of his actions as the custodian of Astan Quds (including the construction of 600 houses). Third; a reinterpretation of Ahmadinejad with different rhetoric. Raisi's first campaign and television program indirectly reminded viewers of the fundamental policies and approaches of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Although Raisi has a different rhetoric from Ahmadinejad's famous language and tried to adhere to it in this program, he has clearly adopted the same populist policies of Ahmadinejad. He speaks of paying subsidies and even increasing them up to three times the current amount; promises to continue and complete the high-profile and costly Mehr Housing project of Ahmadinejad's government within a year; announces his solidarity with the 'underprivileged and the oppressed' and his intention to visit them, reminiscent of Ahmadinejad's provincial trips; and emphasizes the fight against 'elitism,' changing the situation in favor of the underprivileged, 'serving the nation,' and striving to achieve the 'dignity' of citizens, echoing Ahmadinejad's approaches and slogans in similar areas. Raisi can be seen as 'Ahmadinejad 1396'; someone whose political projects and ambitions extend beyond the executive branch and are designed for sitting in the leadership chair of the Islamic Republic following the loss of the first figure of the regime. Fourth; garnering votes with Qassem Soleimani. Raisi does not only seek support from the underprivileged and social layers dissatisfied with economic conditions. He attempted to further attract citizens who support the core of power in the Islamic Republic by praising Qassem Soleimani, the senior commander of the Quds Force, at the end of his speech. Although Ghalibaf will also adopt such an approach based on his long-standing relationship with Soleimani, it seems that Raisi is trying to introduce himself as the main candidate and the favored option of the central power in the Islamic Republic. It is evident that this alignment with Soleimani, as much as it makes Raisi popular among social layers supportive of the government or in favor of Iran's military presence in Syria, will also serve as a motivating factor for citizens opposed to Iran's military presence alongside the Assad regime and critical of spending for Hezbollah in Lebanon, leading to opposition against Raisi and campaigning against him. Fifth; an empty hand in culture and media. If Raisi limited himself to generalizations and slogans in the economic sphere, he had a severely empty hand in the cultural domain. He could not even succeed in passing through this area with generalizations. Raisi, who due to his affiliation with Alamolhoda, the hardline Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, should be accountable for certain issues (including preventing concerts from being held in Razavi Khorasan), did not even mention 'music' in his campaign program. His brief reference to 'art' and 'cinema' revealed his perspective and belief in the ideological government's intervention in these two areas. Raisi, who for a decade as the Deputy Chief Justice was one of the effective factors in suppressing journalists and restricting media in Iran, claimed to expand the online space and honor critics. These claims have no relation to Raisi's record and political-cultural outlook, nor will they convince and resonate with media professionals and ordinary citizens. He also claimed 'transparency' and placing the government 'in the showcase,' while his record in the judiciary is filled with documentation regarding the treatment of critical media and independent journalists. Sixth; a dangerous outlook on the 'enemy.' In foreign political affairs, Raisi also sought to emphasize the keyword 'enemy' as a concept favored by the top of the political system. Notably, he referred to confronting the United States as a means to increase the country's economic power while indirectly defending Iran's military intervention in regional countries (including Syria). He also mentioned the incident of the detention of several U.S. Navy personnel in the Persian Gulf, speaking of the 'humiliating' situation of the 'enemy's' military forces and praised it. This perspective sharply contrasts with the foreign policy of Rouhani's government and the diplomacy adopted in the past four years. Raisi also spoke of 'national cohesion' and the participation of 'all opinions' in governing the country while being one of the main initiators and supporters of the house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement and the continued illegal detention of them. Raisi also said nothing about 'political development' and related concepts (freedom and democracy and their requirements), which was not unexpected. Seventh; excitement whose dimensions are unclear. Ebrahim Raisi concluded his first campaign program with enthusiasm and excitement, and of course without sharp jabs and biting rhetoric, with a completely 'principlist' discourse. It seems that he is supported by certain currents and groups within the principlist camp as well as a significant portion of security-military forces aligned with the core of power in the Islamic Republic, and is optimistic about his slogans and claims being accepted by the underprivileged, unemployed, and poverty-stricken segments of society. Although Raisi spoke in a tangible way without a program and reasoning, his excitement and zeal indicated his determination and that of his companions to prevent the continuation of Rouhani's government for another four years. This excitement is unlikely to culminate in the presidency; Raisi is considered one of the candidates for succeeding the second leader of the Islamic Republic. His victory in the presidential election could be interpreted as a significant leap for Raisi to sit at the top of the political system's hierarchy.