Seven Reasons Why Reformists Are Victorious

Why are reformists victorious in the two elections for the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts? Regardless of the judgment regarding the composition of the representatives elected to the two assemblies—especially concerning the very significant change in the majority composition of the Parliament—seven witnesses and reasons can be pointed out in response to the question: 1. Reformists competed in elections that faced widespread and bulk disqualifications by the Guardian Council from the very beginning. The reformists' list in almost all constituencies was not complete; it not only lacked well-known figures from the reformist camp but also included candidates from their second and third lists by necessity, and in many cases was completed with moderate and pragmatic conservatives (such as Ali Larijani in Qom and Kazem Jalali in Tehran). 2. Reformists did not have sufficient and necessary advertising opportunities, nor were they equal to conservatives. There were many speaking sessions and advertising programs that were canceled due to threats from pressure groups aligned with the core of power or opposition from security-judicial institutions. Preventing Mohammad Reza Khatami's program in Mashhad or blocking speeches by Ali Shakouri Rad in Hamedan, Faezah Hashemi in Shiraz, and Fatemeh Rakeei in Kermanshah are just some examples of this claim. Disruptions in advertising were not limited to this; for instance, Ali Najafi, a reformist candidate who sought to transfer his constituency from Tehran to Babol, only entered serious competition four days before the elections. This diplomat, aligned with Zarif and the JCPOA, ultimately won and made it to the next Parliament. 3. The publication of news and images of the most important and well-known figure of the reformist camp in Iran, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, remains banned in the media and publications inside Iran. Although Khatami and aligned reformists utilized communication technology and information technology (from websites and media free from the censorship of the Islamic Republic and outside Iran to Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) to convey their messages and views to the audience as much as necessary, undoubtedly, reformists did not have an open hand and sufficient opportunity to promote and benefit from Khatami's charisma. Additionally, the ongoing house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement must be noted. The affirmative opinion and announcement of participation by Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Zahra Rahnavard were published under the shadow of media limitations and censorship; a very important event that must be evaluated in an independent analysis, and in the last minute of the advertising opportunity, significantly strengthened social uprising against totalitarianism. 4. Two well-known reformist parties (the Participation Front and the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas) remain banned from organizational activities; the same applies to two important political groups belonging to the constitutional opposition: the Freedom Movement of Iran and the National-Religious Activists Council; as well as the position of the Unity of Islamic Students, an important student organization. All of these could not participate in the elections as would befit a free, healthy, and fair political competition, and even—as they should—could not announce their positions and promote their views and support for the lists. 5. On the other side of this situation, it should be noted that conservatives were adequately prepared to fully utilize the advertising time and the relevant temporal-spatial context, as well as to exploit governmental networks and military and paramilitary institutions (from the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation to the IRGC and Basij, and even state media). This element is certainly not new, but it has taken deeper roots in the political-social space of Iran. 6. Almost all of the preferred candidates of reformists and moderates for the Assembly of Experts were disqualified by six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader in the Guardian Council. In addition to two clerics sympathetic to the Green Movement (Ayatollah Dashtgheib and Ayatollah Amjad), clerics such as Mohammad Mousavi Bejnordi, Majid Ansari, Rasoul Montajebnia, Soroush Mohalati, and Mohsen Ghorviyan, and finally Seyyed Hassan Khomeini—who could have been a phenomenon and star of the Assembly of Experts elections—were all disqualified. In such a situation, Rafsanjani's success in the capital's elections (standing in first place), and the victory of the Hashemi allies' list in Tehran, the failure of Mesbah Yazdi (the most famous cleric advocating the Islamic government and opposing democracy), the removal of Mohammad Yazdi (the head of the Assembly of Experts and Rafsanjani's rival), the placement of Jannati, the authoritarian secretary of the Guardian Council and the trusted figure of the system's first leader, at the end of the list of Experts in the capital, and finally, the defeat of another cleric appointed by the Supreme Leader in the Guardian Council (Mohammad Reza Modarresi Yazdi), are all significantly important and noteworthy. 7. Finally, the intensified and doubled movement of civil society and social networks under pressure and repression, and the expansion of hope and political-social activity amid limitations and threats, itself constitutes an important success. This process, which emerged after enduring a period of heavy and chronic violence (from June 2009 to February 2011), and patience against economic and cultural pressures, took shape with the presidential elections of 2013 and found significant expansion in the last two elections. The Iranian civil society movement, with the establishment of Rouhani's moderate government and the change in the composition of the Parliament, can benefit from the reform of the political power structure (based on increasing the presence of democrats, semi-democrats, technocrats, bureaucrats, moderates, realists, and rationalists). The change in the composition of the two assemblies, the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, will not lead to a transition to democracy; however, it can strengthen civil society aligned with democratization and social movements supporting democratic transition.