Several Possibilities for Raisi's Candidacy

A note by Morteza Kazemian--Increasingly, in the days of Esfand 1395 (March 2017), the name of Ebrahim Raisi emerged as one of the candidates for the 1396 presidential election (2017). The custodian of the Astan Quds Razavi and the prosecutor of the Special Clerical Court, who is an active member of the Assembly of Experts, benefits from extensive and substantial direct and indirect propaganda. This propaganda relies on the Islamic Republic's state media and also utilizes the extensive and specific resources of Astan Quds Razavi. The 'ifs' and 'possibilities' related to Raisi's candidacy are numerous; below, the main ones are discussed. 1. Raisi may not run for election. There is a serious possibility that despite all the recent propaganda, Raisi may ultimately not enter the electoral competition against Hassan Rouhani. Why might he not run for the presidency? a. The formation of a dangerous bipolarity. The competition between Raisi and Rouhani would fuel a bipolar election. An election that the majority of society would evaluate as a competition between two different candidates; one belonging to the leadership's inner circle and the central power, and the other, an undesirable candidate for the core of power. Such an election would remind one of the competition between Nategh Nouri and Khatami in 1376 (1997), where the majority of society said 'no' to the option favored by the system's first authority and the ruling clerics and conservatives (i.e., Nategh Nouri). Last September, when the Supreme Leader prohibited Ahmadinejad from running, his main reason, which he personally announced from the leadership podium, was: 'Sir, if you enter this issue, a bipolarity will be created in the country. Bipolarity is harmful to the country. I do not think it is advisable for you to enter.' From this perspective, it is very unlikely that the system's first authority does not know or read that Raisi's candidacy significantly contributes to the formation of a 'bipolarity' in the upcoming elections. A bipolarity whose consequences may not be predictable and whose management may not be easy. Raisi's failure in the elections would equal a new 'no' against the system's first authority and the military-security current surrounding the leadership. Raisi's victory through tampering with the election results would also mean the beginning of another crisis in Iran; especially during the time of economic crisis and challenges with the U.S. and post-JCPOA, in a specific regional context and amidst widespread dissatisfaction and ongoing protest movements in society. b. Patience for leadership in Mashhad. After days of direct and indirect propaganda for Raisi, he could express his reluctance for the presidency from a superior position and consider himself honored to continue 'serving' at Astan Quds Razavi. From this angle, he defines a 'spiritual' status for himself, humbly passing on power, while still waiting in the 'brine' of the leadership's succession for the 'moment of opportunity.' He can, relying on the spiritual position of the Astan Quds Razavi's custodianship and utilizing the expenditures made from its revenues, while simultaneously managing one of Iran's major economic enterprises, present and promote himself as a worthy individual for the position of the third leader of the Islamic Republic until the moment of selecting the system's first authority arrives. From this perspective, there is no reason or necessity for him to participate in the electoral competition. He has benefited from the extensive and direct and indirect propaganda of recent weeks; not only has he not paid any costs, but he has also accumulated political gains for 'tomorrow's future.' 2. Raisi may run for election. There is a serious possibility that the totalitarian current established in the political power structure may consider Raisi the best option to reclaim the executive power from the 'non-aligned' and to unify the governance. On a broader level, his candidacy and success in the elections could mean an increase in his potential and chances of sitting on the leadership throne after the death of the second leader of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the insistence on his candidacy may arise from this perspective and with the motivation to pursue such a goal. With such a starting point, Raisi will run for election riding the wave of economic problems and the demands of underprivileged social layers grappling with livelihood issues. However, will he be the certain winner of the elections? The first possibility; defeat. In the bipolarity formed between Raisi and the hardliners and the core of power on one side, and Rouhani and reformists and change-seeking citizens on the other, it is not far-fetched that Raisi may lose the elections. In other words, the people's surge and their widespread participation in the elections may result from the 'hatred' of one faction rather than the 'love' for another, leading to a result unfavorable to Raisi and the far-right. Raisi's defeat in such a scenario would likely mean the end of his leadership prospects as well. In other words, if the first authority of the system places special emphasis and insistence on Raisi's victory, the result must be his presidency by any means. Among these means, one could mention the disqualification of Rouhani by the Guardian Council or widespread fraud by the IRGC or tampering with the final election results. The problem for the far-right is that the election is organized by Rouhani's government, and if he runs, effective tampering with the election results or widespread fraud is not easily accessible. Disqualifying Rouhani is also not an easy action; although it may be possible, it would be very costly for the central power and the Supreme Leader. However, if the first authority of the system does not place special emphasis on Raisi becoming president, then the likelihood of his loss increases. The other possibility; victory. Raisi's success and that of the hardliners for any reason and arrangement is another possibility; an event that is not impossible. Mobilizing the hardline factions of the principlist camp—and not its moderate and pragmatic layers—along with the organizational actions of the security section governing the IRGC and Basij, in addition to other institutions under the control of the authoritarian forces (such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee) and the propaganda of state media, alongside common tampering and possible fraud, and if the Supreme Leader also prefers the change of the executive branch to continue, could lead to Raisi's victory in the upcoming elections. This event would also mean a significant increase in his chances of sitting in the position of the first authority of the system after the death of the second leader of the Islamic Republic. The Supreme Leader and Raisi. It seems that Raisi will not enter the electoral competition without fully securing the approval of the top of the political system; that is, from the perspective of 'political rationality,' he should not rely solely on the support of the security forces governing the IRGC and hardline principlists for his candidacy in the upcoming elections against Rouhani, but also secure the firm support of the Supreme Leader for himself. If such a situation (the leader's support for Raisi) occurs and the matter comes to light; the leader's view of his successor will become clear. An event that would mean the beginning of a controversial and dangerous game for the central power. However, if Ayatollah Khamenei, for any reason, does not align with the security forces of the IRGC and the far-right or does not want to express his position clearly; this would mean the first authority's favor towards another individual for the leadership of the third Islamic Republic. In this case, Raisi's candidacy could act as a 'melon peel' for his political maneuvering and keep him in the custodianship of Astan Quds Razavi. Waiting for the 'moment of opportunity.' Raisi, however, can withdraw his cloak from entering the challenging, questioning, and risky field of the presidential elections. If he does not run, he can benefit from the extensive propaganda in recent weeks without having to answer questions about his role in the mass execution of political opponents in 1988 or the tax issues related to Astan Quds Razavi; then, from a puritanical perspective and disinterested in power and status, he can insist on his non-candidacy and wait for the 'moment of opportunity' for the selection of the third leader of the Islamic Republic. A moment that perhaps, based on his record in the Islamic Republic and the publicity he has done relying on the unique resources of Astan Quds Razavi, he could become the Supreme Leader and the first person of the government. The finalization of Raisi's candidacy for the presidential election in the coming days will clarify the aforementioned possibilities.