Sheikh Nimr Street: A Lesson Not Learned from Khalid Islambouli

The execution of Sheikh Nimr, a prominent Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia, provided an opportunity for the Islamic Republic to exert pressure on the Saudi government. However, just one day after protests in Tehran, two hasty actions turned the tide in favor of Riyadh, placing the initiative not in Tehran's hands but in Riyadh's. The assault on Saudi diplomatic buildings in Tehran was just one of the two impulsive actions. The other was the renaming of a street from 'Boustan' to 'Sheikh Nimr', where the Saudi embassy is located. This action was taken less than 12 hours after the Tehran City Council's approval, and the new street sign was installed. Now, ten days after that hasty decision, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has called for the previous name to be restored and for Sheikh Nimr's name to be removed from the street. This rushed action by the City Council and the Foreign Ministry's request symbolize the duality in decision-making centers within the Islamic Republic. If the City Council's action was commendable, why should the Foreign Ministry request a reconsideration? And if the Foreign Ministry's request is justified, why did the City Council act without consulting the Foreign Ministry? If we consider this small example, it can be generalized to all decisions of the Islamic Republic, illustrating how decisions are made hastily and without consultation with the relevant institutions, leading to negative consequences that may persist for years and decades. An example of such ill-considered actions is the renaming of a street in Tehran to 'Martyr Khalid Islambouli', the assassin of Anwar Sadat. In the early months following the revolution, the founder of the Islamic Republic ordered the severance of relations with Egypt, a break that has lasted for about 37 years. The reason for this decision was Anwar Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel. Shortly after the signing, Sadat was assassinated by an Egyptian Islamist named Captain Khalid Islambouli. Following this incident, Islambouli was arrested, tried, and executed. He is referred to as a terrorist in the Arab world. However, his execution provided a suitable opportunity for Tehran to change the name of Vaziri Street in Tehran to 'Martyr Khalid Islambouli', citing Sadat's hosting of the Shah of Iran and signing of the peace treaty with Israel as justification. The name of a street can hinder the normalization of relations. The world of politics is one of ups and downs. Friendships and enmities are not meant to last forever. During the era of Hosni Mubarak's rule in Egypt, and with the rise of Mohammad Khatami, who based his foreign policy on de-escalation with the world, an opportunity arose for these two leaders to meet in Geneva in December 2003 after 24 years. Later, Mohamed Morsi, the Islamist president of Egypt, also made a five-hour visit to hand over the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement to Iran. In this context, the Islamic Cooperation Organization summit in Egypt also provided an excuse for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to make a three-day visit to Egypt. Interestingly, such meetings at the senior official level occurred while the two countries were in a state of severed political relations, and thus their relations were managed through interest protection offices. It is evident that in this context, significant interests, including economic, commercial, cultural, and political interests, have been lost due to the lack of relations between these two important regional countries. The author, based on his firsthand observations, including three years in Egypt, recalls that the Islamic Republic has repeatedly shown its willingness to normalize relations with Egypt. However, Egypt has refrained from establishing relations with Tehran for one simple reason, even during the moderate government of Mohammad Khatami: the request to remove the name of a 'terrorist' from a street; a person whom the Islamic Republic calls 'Martyr Khalid Islambouli'. In fact, Egypt's insistence on removing this street name in Tehran for several decades relates to a principled position of the country: how can Egypt establish normal relations with a regime that considers the assassin of its president a 'martyr'? From the perspective of Egyptian officials, the lineage of individuals like Ayman al-Zawahiri and hundreds of other Egyptian extremists in terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda and ISIS traces back to figures like Khalid Islambouli. The question for Egyptians is how the Islamic Republic can consider Ayman al-Zawahiri a terrorist while regarding Khalid Islambouli as a martyr? This question arises because the ideological lineage (Salafi political Islam) to which Khalid Islambouli belonged is the same as that of Ayman al-Zawahiri. This article does not judge whether the ideological lineage of Khalid Islambouli and Ayman al-Zawahiri is the same or different; rather, the point is that every regime has the right to define its friends and enemies based on its own criteria. Egypt's claim is that you can choose one between us and Khalid Islambouli, and that's it. It is enough to imagine that if a foreign country contacts the dissolved personalities and parties in the Islamic Republic, what Tehran's reaction would be. Now, let's assume that a country like Egypt names a street after one of the opposition figures of the Iranian regime. It is clear that the Islamic Republic would not accept that country to consider that opposition figure a martyr while simultaneously claiming normal relations with Tehran. This is precisely the blind spot that has frozen Tehran-Cairo relations for nearly four decades and could also freeze Tehran-Riyadh relations over just one name. Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, has stated that from his government's perspective, there is no difference between a terrorist named Baqir al-Nimr and another terrorist named Osama bin Laden. Whether the Saudi government is right or wrong in this judgment is not the criterion. The criterion is that Tehran cannot claim normal relations with Riyadh while calling the violator of that country's security a martyr and changing the name of a street in honor of him. The principled position of the Foreign Ministry is that if the Islamic Republic believes it has the right to be sensitive to its opposition, Saudi Arabia also believes it has the right to be sensitive to its opposition. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly tried to remove the name of Khalid Islambouli, which is a deadlock in Tehran-Cairo relations. However, the insistence of pressure groups has so far prevented this request from being realized. These pressure groups are unwilling to adhere to the norms governing relations between countries, just as they have repeatedly violated the diplomatic immunity of foreign embassies in Tehran. What is important is that the Foreign Ministry's request to remove Sheikh Nimr's name is a principled stance based on accepted norms in international relations. On the other hand, it should be noted that Tehran-Riyadh relations are by no means like relations with Cairo. Saudi Arabia is an oil-rich country, the birthplace of Islam, the host of the Hajj, an effective member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, an effective member of the Arab League, an effective member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and a member of the G20. With such a description, a long-term severance of relations between Tehran and Riyadh is never in Tehran's interest, just as with the rise of pragmatic government under Hashemi, the Islamic Republic moved beyond the words of its founder, who said, 'If we forgive Saddam, we will not forgive the Saudis.' From this point, it can be predicted that the Islamic Republic will also move beyond the execution of Sheikh Nimr. The execution of a Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia is never as bitter as the bloody Hajj of 1986, in which 275 Iranian pilgrims were killed by direct gunfire from Saudis. For such a future from today, the name of Sheikh Nimr street must be changed, especially since this name has been chosen for a street where the Saudi embassy is located. Will Saudi Arabia accept this humiliation that henceforth in its correspondence and communications, it must include a name that reads, 'Martyr Ayatollah Nimr Baqir al-Nimr'?