Shirin Ebadi: Khamenei's 'Fire at Will' Command is a Shot at the Law

Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, referred to the Iranian leader's 'Fire at Will' command as a 'shot at the law' and stated that this issue had previously existed 'in secrecy', including 'the chain murders, the killing of several Baha'is, the acid attacks in Isfahan, and the serial killings of women in Mashhad'. In an interview with the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, she described the 'Fire at Will' command as a 'shot at the law' and said that 'lawbreaking and undermining citizens' rights are among the first consequences of such a command'. The head of the Human Rights Defenders Center emphasized that 'the result of this action is the creation of chaos and disorder in society' and 'if some are fire at will, the opposing group can also declare their followers to be fire at will'. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, on June 7, used the military term 'fire at will' to ask 'soft war officers' to take action and make decisions when there is 'disruption and shutdown' in the central intellectual, cultural, and political apparatus of the country. Khamenei's remarks received significant attention, and some analysts interpreted them as a license for his supporters to confront opponents and the policies of Hassan Rouhani's government without authorization, deeming the consequence to be the creation of 'chaos'. In contrast, media outlets close to the leader, including the newspaper 'Javan' and the news agency 'Tasnim', announced that Khamenei's remarks meant a recommendation for intellectual and cultural actions and a 'serious and comprehensive effort to promote the discourse of the revolution'. However, the head of the Human Rights Defenders Center stated that even before Khamenei's remarks about the 'fire at will' status of 'soft war officers', such a command had practically existed, and 'some individuals considered themselves above the law and acted based on the religious duty they assigned to themselves'. According to Ebadi, the perpetrators of the chain murders in 1998 claimed that they had 'orders from Gholamali Darvish Abadi, the Minister of Intelligence', and 'through one of the clerics whose name is also in the file and has a familial relationship with the leader, they were informed of these actions'. She mentioned the acid attacks on women in October 2014 in Isfahan and the serial killings in Mashhad as examples. A man named Saeed Hanaei killed 16 women in Mashhad from 2000 to 2001, claiming after his arrest that these women were 'prostitutes' and did not consider himself deserving of punishment for their murders. He was eventually executed. Dariush Forouhar, the leader of the Iran Nation Party, and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari, known as Forouhar, along with Mohammad Mokhtari, a writer, poet, and member of the board of directors of the Iranian Writers' Association, and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, a translator and member of the Iranian Writers' Association, were killed in the fall of 1998. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence announced that 'rogue elements' within the ministry were responsible for these murders, which became known as the chain murders. According to media close to the critics of the Iranian government, all those accused of the chain murders were released from prison after a few years without serving their full sentences. Meanwhile, critical groups and some Iranian writers believe that the killing of dissidents by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence was not limited to 1998, and dozens of writers and critics of the Islamic Republic were killed by the forces of this ministry before that. In 1998, also, Pirouz Davani, Hamid Hajizadeh, Karoun Hajizadeh, and Majid Sharif were murdered, but their cases were not addressed in the chain murder trials. In this interview, Ebadi also stated that the Islamic Penal Code has, in some cases, provided 'permission' for arbitrary actions, including that if someone kills another person and can prove in court that the victim was 'mohdar al-dam' (a person whose blood can be shed), for example, if they have 'left Islam', 'become an apostate', or insulted the Prophet of Islam, they are 'exempt from any punishment, retaliation, and blood money'. According to Clause 2 of Article 295 of the Islamic Penal Code, 'if a person kills someone believing in retaliation or believing the victim to be mohdar al-dam and this is proven in court, and it later becomes clear that the victim was not subject to retaliation or was not mohdar al-dam, the killing is considered akin to unintentional homicide, and if the killer proves their claim regarding the victim's status, retaliation and blood money are waived'. The head of the Human Rights Defenders Center emphasized that this law 'has been abused, as the killing of several Baha'i compatriots has taken place under this pretext, such as the murder of a Baha'i citizen in Yazd'. The Bahá'í International Community reported in November 2016 that Farhang Amiri, a Baha'i citizen in Yazd, was stabbed to death by two individuals, one of whom stated that the attack was carried out because of his beliefs and religion. The global Bahá'í community announced in June that the 'two murderers' of Farhang Amiri had been 'released'.