Show of Force by IRGC Boats in the Persian Gulf

Recently, over the course of two days, U.S. Navy ships and fast boats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) confronted each other three times, each time narrowly avoiding conflict due to the calculated responses of U.S. commanders and the retreat of the IRGC boats. On Tuesday, August 23, four armed IRGC boats approached within 300 yards (270 meters) of the U.S. destroyer USS Nitze, which was transiting the Strait of Hormuz, without any radio communication. Following warning actions from the U.S. ship, including sounding the ship's horn and firing flares, the IRGC boats changed course. The next day, in the northern Persian Gulf, three IRGC boats approached the U.S. patrol ships USS Squal and USS Tempest, which were conducting military exercises with a Kuwaiti vessel, and passed in front of these ships three times at a distance of 600 yards (540 meters). An hour later, one fast IRGC boat approached the USS Tempest head-on to within 200 yards (180 meters), and after ignoring the flares and radio warnings, the USS Squal fired three warning shots from a .50 caliber machine gun, forcing the approaching boat to change course. U.S. officials described the actions of the IRGC vessels as 'unprofessional' and 'unsafe,' and according to Josh Earnest, White House spokesman, such behaviors could increase the 'risk of miscalculation.' In response, Hossein Dehghan, Iran's defense minister, implicitly accused U.S. ships of entering Iranian waters, stating that the monitoring of foreign vessels by Iranian naval units in the Persian Gulf 'naturally occurs in our territorial waters.' This is not the first time that IRGC boats have approached U.S. vessels and engaged in provocative maneuvers. On July 11 of this year, five armed IRGC boats approached to within 500 yards (450 meters) of the amphibious ship USS New Orleans, which was transiting the Strait of Hormuz. General Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Central Command, who was on that ship at the time, stated: 'We never have a lot of time to respond to these movements... [and] in this limited space, the chance of miscalculation is very high.' Given the historically provocative and dangerous actions of the IRGC Navy, several questions arise. Is the passage of foreign vessels, including U.S. ships, through the Strait of Hormuz permitted? Iran's territorial waters in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman extend 12 nautical miles (each mile is 1852 meters). According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the Islamic Republic has signed, Iran's sovereignty over the airspace above this water area and its seabed is undisputed. Waters beyond the territorial limits are referred to as international waters. The only exception to a country's sovereignty over its territorial waters is the right of innocent passage of ships or vessels belonging to other countries, which is considered one of the firm principles of maritime law. The passage of foreign vessels must be quick and continuous, as long as it does not pose a danger to navigation and does not threaten the security of the coastal state. If these points are respected, which assessments show is the case for U.S. ships and foreign vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, the IRGC boats should not obstruct the passage of vessels from other countries or engage in harassing operations. The passage of these vessels through the Strait of Hormuz is based on maritime law principles and is observed regarding Iranian naval and commercial vessels passing through straits and waterways worldwide. Does Iran have the right to monitor vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz? In order to protect its territorial waters and maritime borders, Iran can monitor the movements of vessels and even identify them. Entering Iranian territorial waters without prior permission may lead to the seizure of vessels and their crews, as occurred on January 11, 2016, regarding the entry of two U.S. military vessels into the waters near Farsi Island. Identifying vessels in transit should not be difficult for the IRGC boats. These boats can visually identify these vessels if visibility is adequate and also through Channel 16 (a public communication network at sea used by military, commercial, fishing, and non-fishing vessels to communicate with each other). In relation to the Strait of Hormuz, identifying vessels is simpler in some ways because the ships and vessels navigating this narrow waterway use predetermined and fixed entry and exit routes clearly marked on nautical charts. This route, established under the regulations of the International Maritime Organization to separate maritime traffic, is observed in most narrow waterways worldwide. Therefore, identifying vessels in transit should not be difficult for the IRGC boats. These boats can identify these vessels without resorting to provocative and challenging high-speed maneuvers while maintaining a safe distance from passing ships. All vessels, including U.S. ships, adhere to these common and recognized methods. In this regard, several Iranian military commanders, including Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, and Major General Mohammad Baqeri, chief of staff of the armed forces, in their interviews emphasizing cooperation with the Americans, have stated that in recent years 'U.S. ships humbly respond when asked [by the IRGC] about the reason for their presence in the Persian Gulf, saying they are from coalition forces and do not intend to engage and are navigating in international waters.' Can the high-speed approach of IRGC boats to U.S. ships lead to miscalculation? The provocative movements of IRGC boats, such as the maneuver of three high-speed boats in front of two U.S. patrol ships in international waters in the northern Persian Gulf that ultimately led to warning shots being fired, not only contradict the regulations of the International Maritime Organization and the principles governing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but can easily set the stage for military conflict. The execution of these IRGC boat movements, referred to in Iranian popular culture as 'artistry,' is far more dangerous in narrow waterways like the Strait of Hormuz. When four armed boats approach a ship at high speed without establishing radio communication, the ship, due to its physical limitations in a narrow waterway, has very limited options for maneuvering. The level of doubt in the ship's commander's mind about the ultimate intentions of the approaching units increases. In such a situation, the ship's commander resorts to options that allow for the quickest possible response in the event of an attack to protect the ship and its personnel from danger, including radio warnings via Channel 16, audible warnings by sounding the ship's horn, warning by firing flares, and before all these, declaring a 'combat station' on the ship to confront the impending threat. The ship's commander has little time for decision-making, and if his warnings to the approaching vessels go unanswered, he must assume that the vessels have aggressive or suicidal intentions, and he cannot afford to put his ship and personnel at risk with optimism, leaving him no choice but to react immediately. Nevertheless, the IRGC Navy justifies this action of its boats and considers the dissemination of news about these events by foreign media as an attempt to create a narrative of the 'assertive presence' of the IRGC units in Iranian territorial waters. In this context, the Tehran newspaper Kayhan, in an article on September 5 of this year, pointed out that tracking foreign ships in the Persian Gulf is one of the duties of the IRGC Navy and that U.S. ships always try to 'escape' this task, stating: 'Due to the rebellious nature and superiority complex of American military personnel, they have a strong desire not to be subject to intelligence tracking... They do not want IRGC vessels to approach them because they do not want their apparent dominance to be broken in front of them.' Why do IRGC boats engage in this dangerous behavior? The main reasons for these dangerous actions by the IRGC boats are closely related to the prevailing atmosphere within the IRGC Navy, which is born from the aggressive mindset of its commanders and their incorrect and naive assessments of U.S. naval capabilities and insistence on continuing hostility with this country. These commanders, by underestimating U.S. power, disregarding the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, along with boasting and exaggerating the capabilities and effectiveness of their own forces, instill false confidence and misleading messages to the personnel of this force and even to society. Ali Fadavi stated in 2013, 'In the IRGC, no one believes that the U.S. Navy's capabilities are greater than Iran's.' Some of his statements over the past few years include: 'U.S. aircraft carriers are completely under the control of the IRGC; we can sink a U.S. ship within 50 seconds; if the U.S. makes a mistake, we will sink their ships in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Sea of Oman; destroying the U.S. Navy is one of the operational objectives of the IRGC Navy; the main concern of the U.S. is how to deal with the IRGC Navy; we have forced U.S. ships to speak to us in Persian; if a U.S. ship does not respond to the IRGC's inquiries, our missiles will lock onto it; in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. submits to Iran; in all confrontations between Iran and the U.S., it is the Americans who are humiliated and passive; and finally, the Americans have asked three times to establish a line of communication with us, like the communication line during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S., but we did not accept, and I stated that I would consider it when we are near U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico.' Therefore, in an atmosphere where 'slogans' and 'bravado' replace realistic assessments and wise leadership, it is not surprising that the units of the IRGC Navy and its boats resort to 'artistry' in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Coercion and Possible Consequences Despite the JCPOA and the optimism that followed regarding the improvement of relations between Tehran and Washington, IRGC commanders consider the U.S. to be the main enemy of the Islamic Republic and have repeatedly expressed their desire for the U.S. to leave the region, especially the Persian Gulf. In May of this year, Ayatollah Khamenei stated: 'America should go to the Bay of Pigs; the Persian Gulf is our home.' The reality is that the U.S. has no plans to leave the region and the Persian Gulf, although it may adjust its presence in the near future. The U.S. has had a visible presence in the Persian Gulf except for a brief period during Nixon's presidency and, in addition to having multiple bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, its Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain. According to U.S. military officials, U.S. ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz at least 250 times a year. The innocent passage of U.S. ships or any other country through this strait is permitted and is based on the 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea'—just as the naval vessels of the Iranian army pass through other straits and narrow waterways in accordance with the principles of this convention, and the Islamic Republic intends to send some of its ships toward U.S. shores. It would be better for the commander of the IRGC Navy to accept the U.S. proposal to establish a communication line or to present its demands formally or through diplomatic channels to the U.S. Ali Fadavi does not consider the passage of Americans and some other countries to be 'innocuous' and has established fourteen parameters for such passage. Therefore, it would be better for the commander of the IRGC Navy to accept the U.S. proposal to establish a communication line or to present its demands formally or through diplomatic channels to the U.S. In the absence of a dialogue, the show of force by IRGC boats in the Strait of Hormuz and international waters could lead to miscalculations and create a catastrophe. The behavior of the IRGC boats in political science and in discussions of international crises and their consequences is akin to compellence, which is fundamentally different from deterrence. Unlike deterrence, which involves the threat of punishment to prevent the other party from acting, compellence seeks to use threats to force the other party to do something desired by the threatener. The provocative and aggressive movements of the IRGC boats...