Social Weighing of Election Boycotters and Protest Participation

The elections of March 7, 2016, have many consequences. One of these consequences is that it can approximately show the social weight of various groups. If this judgment does not hold for the internal rival groups participating in the elections—due to supervisory oversight, the extensive elimination of prominent rival figures, and making many regions uncompetitive—it is true for both participants and boycotters of the elections. Virtual media, especially Telegram, played a crucial role in these elections, and the election boycotters not only used these media but also all popular satellite television networks to present their views and reasons for boycotting the elections. The results of the elections serve as a criterion for judgment in this regard. Participation and boycotting of elections is the right of each individual and group. Participating in or boycotting the elections of a non-democratic regime is not a strategic issue in the process of transition to democracy but rather a tactic and method that can be used depending on the situation. However, some individuals and groups considered it a matter of honor and dignity. Some former leaders of certain parties wrote that reformists, by participating in the elections, left a stain of disgrace on their political, moral, and human conscience that they will always be ashamed of. Such unjust judgments have severely darkened the atmosphere and blocked any path for future cooperation. Can one demand cooperation with reformists in the future—those who are always ashamed of their historical record, which is stained with disgrace—after issuing such heavy judgments? Let’s assume that reformists also rose up in opposition and said that those who held memorial services for Stalin's death and later called him 'the steel leader of all the peoples of the world' are making a double standard judgment. Did the leftists in Chile not compromise with General Pinochet—who overthrew Allende and killed thousands? They granted him permanent immunity, lifetime senatorial status, and ten years of command of the armed forces to make the transition to democracy possible. We must look at successful experiences of transitions to democracy and learn from them. Or, in contradiction to all historical realities—to justify the boycott of the elections—they claimed that reformists derive their credibility from their interaction with the progressive and secular forces of society and that by participating in such a manner, they lose their credibility. Hundreds of historical witnesses show that they had no interaction with such forces—especially those residing abroad—when they created the events of June 2, 1997, and thereafter to gain credibility. Did Mousavi, Karroubi, Rahnavard, Khatami, and Tajzadeh derive their credibility from such forces residing outside of Iran? Some, to justify the boycott, compared participants in the elections to various animals and hurled the most vulgar insults at voters and defenders of participation in the elections. Is it justified and constructive to insult about 62 percent of the Iranian people in this way? If defenders of participation in the elections also made the issue an honor-based one and used such morally unjust methods, we should weep for ourselves, as we have not only suffered moral decay but will also get nowhere. The impact of the boycott is effective when opposition groups have social bases and reach a consensus on it. If socially-based groups reach a consensus that to say 'no' to the regime and demonstrate its illegitimacy—particularly in the transition to democracy—they must boycott the elections, using this tactic is not only their right but they can also showcase their social weight. Let’s first look at a successful example of a boycott and then return to the case of Iran. The successful boycott example of Egypt: After the 2011 revolution in Egypt, the parliamentary elections of this country were held in December 2011 and January 2012. On January 21, 2012, the final results of the parliamentary elections were announced. Islamists secured over 70 percent of the votes. Out of 498 seats elected by the people, the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood) obtained 332 representatives—47.18 percent—and the Salafi Nour Party obtained 96 seats—about 23 percent. Of Egypt's 85 million population, about 50 million were eligible to vote, and the turnout reached 54 percent. General Sisi, through a coup, overthrew the elected government of Morsi and became president in his place. The coup leaders initiated widespread massacres—Human Rights Watch called it 'the largest massacre in contemporary Egyptian history'—and thousands were arrested and sentenced to death, life imprisonment, and long prison terms. This year, General Sisi held parliamentary elections in Egypt, from which opposition groups were excluded. The Brotherhood, some liberal and secular groups boycotted these elections. On December 4, 2015, Ayman Abbas, head of the High Election Commission of Egypt, announced the final results of the elections, stating: '28.3 percent of eligible voters, about 15 million out of 53 million eligible to vote, participated in the recent parliamentary elections.' Sisi's supporters took all 120 seats allocated to parties. In the Egyptian parliament, which has 596 representatives, 448 are elected independently, 120 through lists, and 28 are appointed by the president. Analysts have stated that an overwhelming majority or nearly all 596 new representatives of the Egyptian parliament support Sisi. The boycott of the elections in Egypt was effective, and the boycotters managed to reduce the participation rate from 54 percent in 2010 to 28.3 percent in 2015. This means that they can show through their official statistics that they managed to reduce participation by 26 percent through the boycott and prove their social weight. If there is a relationship between participation rates and legitimacy, then it must be said that a parliament in which 72 percent of the people played no role in its election lacks legitimacy. However, all governments of the world—except for Erdogan—recognize the current Egyptian government and work with it. The case of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran: According to official statistics from the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic, the participation rates in the past nine parliamentary elections have been as follows: First Parliament: 52 percent. Second Parliament: 64.6 percent. Third Parliament: 59.7 percent. Fourth Parliament: 58 percent. Fifth Parliament: 71.1 percent. Sixth Parliament: 67 percent. Seventh Parliament: 51.15 percent. Eighth Parliament: 51 percent. Thus, the lowest participation rate was 51 percent and the highest was 71 percent. The ninth parliamentary elections were very important because they were held two years after the 2009 presidential elections with an 85 percent participation rate and the suppression of the Green Movement. Opponents boycotted the elections, and the regime tried to show a high participation rate. They could use two methods to show a high participation rate: a) reducing the number of eligible voters. b) increasing the number of votes in the ballot boxes. The elections were held on March 1, and Mohammad Najjar, the then Minister of Interior, announced on March 2, 2011, while the manual counting of votes was ongoing, that 'so far, out of 46,924 polling stations in the country, 40,536 stations have counted their votes, and so far the total votes cast is 26,472,760.' He further noted that the final result would be announced after counting the remaining stations. The participation rate was estimated at 64.2 percent based on initial assessments. In the final report, the number of votes was announced as 29 million. If we also add the invalid votes to the announced figure, the number of participants reaches 29.5 million. On February 19, 2011, Mohammad Najjar announced the number of eligible voters as 48,288,799, which in this case would make the participation rate about 61 percent, not 64.2. Based on the population census of 2011, which was later published and is now accessible to everyone, the total population of the country in November of that year was 75,149,669. Of these, 52,842,019 were over 18 years old and eligible to vote. In this case, if we ignore the demographic changes of three months, the actual participation rate was 55.8 percent. In the tenth parliamentary elections, if the boycotters could reduce the 55.8 percent participation rate of 2010 to, say, a 35 percent participation rate through the boycott, they could claim that their boycott led to a 20 percent reduction in participation and that they had this level of social base, which would indicate their social weight. However, it was already clear that they could not achieve this goal because not only the regime's main supporters but all moderate groups, reformists, leaders of the Green Movement, and their allied groups inside the country had stated that they would participate in the elections. For this reason, participation increased from 55.8 percent in 2010 to 'about 62 percent' in 2016. 54,915,024 people were eligible to vote nationwide, and thus 34 million voted. What does a 6 percent increase in participation from 2016 compared to 2010 mean? It means that the social base/social weight and the impact of boycotters in Iranian society were zero and negative. Boycott: Political or Symbolic Action? The boycott of elections does not turn into a political act. If the boycott led to a political act, its acceptance would be easier. The boycotters would command people to stay home so that the streets would be empty and the regime could not gain legitimacy by showing their presence. In other words, the boycott had a symbolic aspect. However, it was clear that even the symbolic aspect of the boycott was not accessible. The symbolic aspect of the boycott could be better demonstrated through negative votes against the symbols of the regime, and it was given. The negative vote of the people against the main symbols of the velayat regime—'the triangle of Jim,' etc.—was a big 'no' to Khamenei and clerical rule. (The reasons for the success of protest participation are explained in the article 'Something is not right! - The need for a quantitative assessment of the votes of Sadegh Larijani, Ahmad Khatami, and Alamolhoda'). Boycotters and the issue of accepting the regime's legitimacy. Max Weber spoke of three types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and rational/democratic. The institution of elections—where each individual in society (regardless of gender, race, and religion) has the right to vote—belongs to rational/democratic legitimacy. Many boycotters established a causal relationship—or at least a correlation—between voting and legitimacy, claiming that by voting, the system gains legitimacy. Now that people have voted, according to their claims, the Islamic Republic regime has legitimacy. However, defenders of protest participation emphasized from the beginning and explained that given that the Islamic Republic is a non-democratic regime and a violator of human rights, high public participation in elections does not legitimize the system. Defenders of protest participation succeeded in saying 'no' to Khamenei and the symbols of the velayat regime. How can opponents of the Islamic Republic be effective? Some opponents of the Islamic Republic pay no attention to realities and consider their wishes as reality. It is very difficult for individuals and groups that have not seen opposing and invalidating realities for decades to change. However, those opposition members residing abroad whose goal is the transition from the Islamic Republic to a democratic system committed to freedom and human rights must accept the reality that the main role is played by the opposition inside the country, and if democracy-seekers residing abroad contradict them and make this contradiction an honor-based and dignified issue, they will completely lose their impact. When the leaders of the Green Movement and the main members of this movement said from inside prisons that they would participate in the elections, the more we attack them, the more we will marginalize ourselves.