The series of programs titled 'Faction', broadcasted by Radio Farda coinciding with the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of the autonomous government in Iranian Azerbaijan, is dedicated to examining this historical event. This is the sixth episode of the series. (In previous episodes, we learned that two years after the onset of World War II, northern Iran was occupied by the Soviets. We also saw that during the war, local nationalism was strengthened in the Soviet Union, and the leaders of the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic first proposed the idea of expanding Soviet borders and annexing Azerbaijan to Soviet territory.) The policy of World War II, from its very first day, was a complex and extraordinary policy where political alliances and suited diplomats sometimes influenced the final outcome even more than armed soldiers and warring generals. Soviet diplomacy, like other players, resorted to backdoor deals in service of the ultimate goal of victory in the war, making key decisions based on calculations of war profits and losses. These calculations also influenced Soviet policies in occupied Iran. For the Soviets, the turning point of World War II was the winter of 1943. During the famous Battle of Stalingrad, the stubborn resistance of the Red Army thwarted the German forces' attempt to capture the strategic city of Stalingrad, now known as Volgograd. During this battle, the Germans, who had even managed to enter the city, were defeated after five months of heavy fighting and retreated. From this point onward, the German retreat on the Eastern Front began and continued until the capture of Berlin by the Red Army. Touraj Atabaki, a senior researcher at the Social History Research Center in Amsterdam, believes that Soviet behavior in Iran differed before and after the Battle of Stalingrad. He describes this change in Soviet behavior during the occupation of Iran: 'Until the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet government played a defensive role in the war and placed great importance on Western support for its military operations. However, after the Battle of Stalingrad, we can see a shift in wartime policies and also policies related to occupied countries. Here, the Soviet Union adopts a more aggressive stance and raises demands that were not previously mentioned. At this time, reconnaissance groups are sent to Iran to assess the economic situation. They attempt to establish a better foothold for the Soviet Union in Iran. They engage in discussions with industrialists and large landowners in northern Iran to see if there is a basis for cooperation. Notably, they negotiate with Ahmad Qavam, who owned large tea plantations in the north. Throughout the occupation of northern Iran, Qavam had a very good relationship with the Soviet army, and he later leveraged this background in his negotiations in Moscow.' The issue of northern oil became more important for the Soviets than ever during this change in behavior. At a time when Britain was seizing a significant portion of the country's oil in the south based on concessions from the Qajar era, acquiring oil concessions from the underdeveloped country of Iran did not seem like a difficult project. However, first and foremost, Soviet leaders had to ensure that there was oil in northern Iran. As Abbas Milani, a Stanford University professor, states, they secretly sent engineers to Iran for this purpose. According to this researcher, Lavrentiy Beria, the head of the Soviet secret police at the time, wrote a letter to Stalin after receiving reports from the engineers he had sent to Iran, stating that the Soviet Union must take action to acquire northern oil concessions. (Beria, who was Georgian, was also considered an ally of Mir Jafar Bagirov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan.) Abbas Milani, a Stanford University professor, states that Beria secretly sent engineers to Iran to investigate northern oil. There is disagreement among researchers about how much oil influenced Soviet decisions in Iran during the final years of World War II. Some believe that the issue of northern oil concessions was the main motivation behind various Soviet efforts in Iran at that time. However, others argue that the issue of oil, alongside the Azerbaijan issue pursued by Baku, were both central to Soviet policies in Iran. Irvand Abrahamian, a historian residing in New York, believes that Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, was not initially concerned about northern oil, but due to competition with Britain and the United States, he concluded that the Soviet Union needed to secure northern oil concessions before they did. Abrahamian states: 'If you read the documents of the British embassy in Tehran and also the writings of the well-known George Kennan, the chargé d'affaires of the American embassy in Moscow, you will see that both sources state that the Soviet Union was not interested in obtaining oil concessions in northern Iran until American and British companies secretly began negotiating for northern oil concessions with Iran, and news of these negotiations leaked. At this time, the Soviet Union reactively raised the issue of northern oil concessions.' According to Abrahamian's analysis, from this point onward, the Soviet effort to acquire oil concessions became the main motivation for its activities in Iran. In other words, they had no motivation other than oil, and any other actions – including activities in Azerbaijan – were all conducted within the framework of the goal of obtaining oil concessions. However, another researcher, Jamil Hasanli, a renowned historian from Azerbaijan and a professor at Baku University, believes that despite the importance of the oil issue for the Soviets, the Azerbaijan issue also emerged as a significant and separate political project at the end of World War II, and the assertion that they did everything to obtain oil concessions is not correct in his view. Hasanli states: 'On March 20, 1944, about 20 high-ranking officials from Soviet Azerbaijan were invited to Moscow and appointed to diplomatic positions in Soviet embassies and consulates in Iran. Most of them were sent to northern Iran and Soviet diplomatic offices in Southern Azerbaijan such as Ardabil, Urmia, Tabriz, etc. Molotov [the Soviet Foreign Minister] emphasized in meetings with these individuals that you are being sent there with a special mission, not because the Soviet government lacks a diplomatic cadre for activities in Iran, but because you are sent there to increase Soviet influence among the people, create attraction for the Soviet Union, and gradually raise the issue of Southern Azerbaijan. If in the initial phase, i.e., the years 41-42, only the issue of Southern Azerbaijan was raised, now in 1944, two issues were on the table for the Soviets: Southern Azerbaijan and oil. Many Western researchers believe that the Soviets used the Southern Azerbaijan issue as leverage against Iran to obtain oil concessions. However, in my opinion, this theory is incorrect. The Soviet government initially wanted both, but when it became clear that achieving goals related to Azerbaijan was impossible, it decided to exit Iran with concessions, including oil, to avoid leaving as a defeated power and to maintain its image. In other words, they sacrificed territorial ambitions for the sake of oil, knowing that there was also no prospect for obtaining concessions regarding oil.' Meanwhile, some experts believe that the disagreement over the motivations of the Soviet Union in Iran actually stems from a more significant disagreement that existed among Soviet leaders. That is, what separates the paths of researchers like Hasanli and Abrahamian in analyzing the events of the late years of World War II is this disagreement among Soviet leaders; leaders who included Bagirov, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, and Lavrentiy Beria, the head of the Soviet security service on one side, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on the other. (What were the details of the duality of Soviet policy in Iran, and what disagreements existed between the Bagirov-Beria group and Molotov? How did the establishment of an autonomous government in Iranian Azerbaijan become the official policy of the Soviet Union? Answers to these questions will be provided in the next episode of the 'Faction' program.)
Soviet Motivation in Iran: Northern Oil or Azerbaijan Acquisition?
The article discusses the motivations behind Soviet actions in Iran during World War II, particularly focusing on the significance of northern oil and the political aspirations regarding Azerbaijan. It highlights differing perspectives among historians regarding whether oil or Azerbaijan's political status was the primary motivation for Soviet policies. This matter is crucial for understanding the geopolitical dynamics in the region during and after the war.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The article examines the motivations behind Soviet actions in Iran during World War II, focusing on the significance of northern oil and the political aspirations regarding Azerbaijan. It discusses differing historical interpretations of whether oil or territorial ambitions were the primary drivers of Soviet policy.
- The Soviets occupied northern Iran during World War II and sought to expand their influence.
- There is debate among historians about whether the primary motivation was oil concessions or the political status of Azerbaijan.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
During World War II, Iran was strategically important due to its oil resources and location, leading to foreign occupations and influence.
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%