Stalin's Letter to Pishavari

What you will read is the first and only complete translation of the historic letter from Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Communist Party, to Seyyed Jafar Pishavari, the head of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (Iran). Pishavari served as the Prime Minister of this party's government in Tabriz for one year, which was established on December 21, 1945, four years after the occupation of northern Iran by the Red Army, and was dismantled just a year later with the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the return of the Iranian army to Azerbaijan. However, before addressing Stalin's letter, becoming familiar with another document will help us understand all these developments and even Stalin's letter itself. First: Pishavari's letter to the Soviet leadership. In the last days of the party's rule, Pishavari and several other leaders of the Democratic Party wrote a letter to the 'Soviet leadership.' This letter, dated December 8, 1946, exactly four days before December 21 of the same year, was submitted to Mr. Krasnikh, the Soviet consul general in Tabriz, to be communicated to the 'Soviet leadership.' The letter, signed by Seyyed Jafar Pishavari, Sadegh Padegan, Ali Shabestari, Dr. Salamollah Javid, and Gholam Yahya Daneshian, is actually a serious and urgent yet respectful complaint to our 'great friend, the Soviet Union,' which had asked the party government to accept the limitation of its powers against the central Iranian government and not to show resistance. The tone of the letter indicates that the Soviets had not yet instructed the party leaders to leave Iran, but the party leadership, feeling an imminent danger, requested a 'small amount of help,' including weapons, to counter the attack of the central army. Some interesting excerpts from that letter: 'For eight months, against the sentiments of our people, against the wishes and desires of our members and activists; for the sake of advancing matters and peacefully resolving disputes; considering the global policy of our great friend, the Soviet Union, and with the mediation of the Soviet government, we have tried to portray [Ahmad] Qavam as democratic and progressive, and even at times, contrary to our thoughts and beliefs, we have praised him. The goal has been to ensure that our work is not disrupted. (...) The people of Azerbaijan, the leader of the Democratic Party, and the party leaders have two expectations from the Soviet government: Firstly, as long as our borders are open and our national power is intact, a small amount of weapons should be provided to us. Because if things continue this way, this will no longer be possible. We can easily deliver these weapons to the national forces so secretly that the opposing forces will not be aware of it. After the start and intensification of conflicts, doing this will be very difficult. We do not want a lot of weapons. Our intention is a small amount so that the Fedaian do not have to go to the enemy empty-handed. Secondly, now that Qavam has started the war and is shedding the blood of our brothers, we should be allowed to corner him from all sides, so that in this way, the possibility of a revolt by freedom fighters throughout Iran is created, initiating a great movement across Iran and establishing a democratic government in place of the reactionary government of Tehran. If this is not advisable, let us completely sever ties with Tehran and establish our national government. ([Our people] are more inclined to the latter solution). The Soviet policy can implement either of these two paths honorably and successfully. (...) The oil issue is a very overdue matter that the Soviet government will not be able to achieve without having supporters in parliament and society. Qavam's 'goodwill' cannot be considered a strong guarantee. Because he has shown what goodwill is in the Azerbaijan issue. (...) The oil issue can only be resolved in favor of the Soviet Union when social forces are behind it. These forces are currently being suppressed and eliminated in other parts of Iran. But [they are] not completely gone yet. Our force in Azerbaijan is significant. We have serious capabilities to exert pressure on the Tehran government. (...) The hope of all the people, the party, and its leaders is on [the help of your country] and they see salvation in [its assistance]. What you must do is simply provide a small amount of weapons [to us].' This letter, originally in Azerbaijani Turkish, was translated into Persian by Sirus Madadi and published on the 'Khabar Rooz' website. According to Mr. Madadi, the original document is kept in the 'Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation' with the following specifications: АВПРФ, ф. 094, оп. 38, п. 364A, д. 49, л. 1-7. Azerbaijani historian and politician Jamil Hasanli, who has conducted research on the party government and published it, states that a second copy of the same letter exists in the 'State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding political organizations and social movements' (repository 1, list 89, folder 114, pages 218-230) with the specifications: AR SPIHMDA, f. 1, s. 89, i. 114, v. 218-2. It is unclear whether the content of Pishavari's letter was communicated to any high-ranking leaders of the Communist Party or the Soviet government. Five months after the fall of the party government, in Stalin's famous letter to Pishavari dated May 8, 1946, which you will read below, Stalin makes an indirect reference to his 'hearsay' regarding Pishavari's complaints, but there is no direct indication in this letter that the Soviet dictator had seen Pishavari's letter. Essentially, throughout the entire period of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran and the establishment and subsequent fall of the party government, the only intermediaries between Moscow and Tabriz in political, and sometimes military, matters were Mir Jafar Bagirov, the leader of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, and his close associates General Salim Atakishiyev, Emilianov, Yakubov, Hasanov, and perhaps Ibrahimov, and there is no evidence that Moscow directly contacted the party or Pishavari's government. From the very beginning, the problems of the party had started with the formation of the party government on December 21, 1945. Within two or three months after this incident, both the Iranian government and Washington and London experienced increasing anxiety regarding the continued presence of Soviet forces in Azerbaijan, repeatedly reminding the Soviets that they must adhere to the 1941 Allied treaty and withdraw their forces from Iran. They considered the occupying army of the neighbor as the main support of the Democratic Party. However, Moscow astonishingly denied such accusations, claiming that 'Soviet representatives and military officials have not and do not interfere in the internal political life of the northern provinces (of Iran).' Meanwhile, U.S. President Harry Truman, in the spring of 1945, following all the warnings from the West regarding Moscow, stated: 'I do not think we can continue this game of compromise any longer... We must refrain from recognizing Romania and Bulgaria until they comply with our demands. We must clarify our positions regarding Iran in a completely unambiguous manner... I am tired of this childish game of the Soviets. In late February 1946, Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam's trip to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin was a very clever initiative at just the right time. Perhaps Stalin, while feeling compelled to eventually withdraw Soviet forces from Iran, thought he could at least gain the concession of extracting oil from northern Iran in exchange for the withdrawal of these forces, which was anyway necessary. This was a facet of the agreement that Qavam secured Stalin's approval on its principles. In return, Iran committed to take a conciliatory stance towards the party government, provided that the dissolved party government would transform into a 'provincial council' and the party's Fedaian would become a 'guard force.' These principles were accepted in Moscow. However, Stalin showed reluctance and hesitation in withdrawing his forces from Iran. One or two months passed with pressure being applied on Moscow to evacuate its troops. Tehran-Moscow negotiations continued. The main cleverness of Qavam during this period lay in convincing the Soviets that the condition for implementing this agreement was its approval by the Iranian National Assembly. However, since the 15th Assembly had not yet been elected, elections had to be held first so that the Assembly could vote on the Iran-Soviet agreement. But for the elections to be legitimate, Iran could not be under occupation, and therefore foreign forces had to leave Azerbaijan. Moscow eventually accepted this condition, and the aforementioned agreement was signed in Tehran. Perhaps Stalin knew well that the oil concession from northern Iran was nothing but an illusion. Perhaps he saw no other option but to sign the agreement, and the possibility, however unlikely, of an oil concession was primarily a means for the Soviet dictator to maintain his political persona and weight. In the meantime, Pishavari continually warned the Soviet consul in Tabriz and Mir Jafar Bagirov in Baku that Qavam would not be faithful to his commitments. He also claimed in his messages to Bagirov that 'all of Iran is ready for revolution,' and they, meaning the party, needed weapons to resist Tehran. Until the last months and even weeks, Pishavari and other party leaders were apparently unaware of Moscow's main agenda or did not want to believe that, like many other classic examples, they were a small pawn in the grand calculations that would be discarded after use. In June 1946, Soviet forces withdrew from Iran. Pishavari signed an agreement with the Tehran government, according to which the party government was transformed into a 'provincial council' and the 'National Assembly' of Azerbaijan into a 'local council.' With the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the period of restoring the central government's sovereignty in Azerbaijan had begun—whether through the peaceful transfer of power from the Fedaian or through clashes and attacks by the central government. It was becoming clear that the final curtain of the play had begun for the party. Nevertheless, probably four days before December 21, that is, on the date of Pishavari's letter, the party leaders were unaware of what was soon awaiting them, because if they had known, it is unlikely they would have requested weapons or permission to declare independence from Moscow just three or four days before their planned exit from Iran. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party, officially established on December 21, 1945, despite all the unpleasant news and developments for the party leaders, intended to celebrate the anniversary of this government. However, one day before December 21, 1946, representatives of Bagirov told Pishavari and other top leaders of the party that soon several cars would come to take them to Baku. Pishavari told his close friends that he did not want to leave Tabriz, but there was no other option left for them. On December 20, the newspaper 'Azerbaijan,' the organ of the Democratic Party, published its last issue in Tabriz, in which Pishavari called on all 'Iranian brothers' to 'resist and fight for freedom and democracy.' The main article of the newspaper was the last statement of the party from Tabriz, concluding with patriotic slogans like 'Long live freedom and independence of Iran!' But it was too late for other pro-Iran slogans, and not only were the 'Iranian brothers' generally unwilling to fight for the Democratic Party, but the 'Azerbaijani brothers' were also unwilling to fight for it. On Thursday, December 21, Ayatollah Haj Mirza Abdullah Mojtahed, one of the few prominent clerics who remained in Tabriz during Pishavari's rule, wrote in his memoirs: 'We woke up to the continuous sound of gunfire. Before dawn, we were informed by a servant who had gone out to buy breakfast that the situation had completely turned. The townspeople had revolted against Pishavari's government and had taken the city. They disarmed the Fedaian and immigrants, and groups of armed townspeople were busy pursuing, arresting, and killing their leaders.' Most of the high-ranking leaders of the party fled to the Soviet Azerbaijan. The Iranian army continued its advance, which had begun a month or two earlier. However, except for a few instances, the central army faced little resistance. In most cases, local people had disarmed the Fedaian and removed them from power before the army arrived. The Democratic Party's press, which was now being published in Baku, spoke of 'over ten thousand casualties,' while semi-official Iranian reports indicated eight hundred casualties, while a British source, citing the U.S. embassy in Tehran, reported '421 Democrats killed.' In any case, the story of the Democratic Party ended in bloodshed. A few months later, elections for the 15th Assembly were also held. Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh accused Qavam in the Assembly of interfering in the elections and altering the results in his favor. Perhaps this accusation was not unfounded. The 15th Assembly reviewed the Iran-Soviet agreement, including the oil concession to the Soviets, and rejected it. Thus, the oil concession issue was eliminated. It is said that this was exactly Qavam's plan that was executed. Stalin wrote his famous letter, which you will read below, five or six months after the fall of the Democratic Party government and the flight of its leaders, including Pishavari, to Baku. And now, Stalin's letter to Pishavari, dated May 8, 1946 (1325), about five months after the fall of the party government and the flight of its leaders to the Soviet Union, means that when Stalin wrote this letter, Pishavari was in Baku. In this letter, Stalin explains the reasons for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran to Pishavari. The general belief is that the Democratic Party came to power under the shadow of the occupying Soviet army, and with their withdrawal from Iran, it lost its ability to stand and disintegrated. This letter serves as Stalin's endorsement, the highest informed authority regarding this public speculation.