Strait of Hormuz; The Intersection of Khamenei and Rouhani at Trump's Station

Ayatollah Khamenei expressed his support for Hassan Rouhani's new foreign policy positions during a meeting with officials from the Foreign Ministry. He stated: "The President's remarks during his recent trip to Europe, that if Iran's oil is not exported, no country's oil in the region will be exported, reflect the policy and approach of the system. The Foreign Ministry's duty is to seriously pursue such positions of the President." These comments, which imply the closure of the Strait of Hormuz if the U.S. government intensifies its restrictive measures against Iran's oil sales, have been supported by forces known as 'Velayatmadar' and interpreted as the leadership's appreciation of the President's 'assertive positions.' They believe that defending Rouhani's confrontational stances against Trump's aggressive approach and retreating from the interactive policy has the potential to create social mobilization for the slogan 'All together for Iran.' Regardless of how feasible the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is, and whether it is merely rhetorical or genuinely pursued by the system, the increasing convergence between the two factions of the regime in response to external pressures is a significant event in Iran's political arena. Blocking one of the world's major energy transit routes and international waterways is so far from reality that even some military forces have reacted to its feasibility and high costs. As Hussein Alayi, the former Chief of Staff of the IRGC, has stated, the government can only keep the Strait of Hormuz closed for a short time, and the U.S. government, along with its regional allies, has the capability to reopen it. On the other hand, this positioning brings Europe closer to the U.S. regarding the containment of the Islamic Republic and also raises concerns for the governments of China and Russia. However, what is important for the forces supporting the institution of the Supreme Leader is the convergence within the factions of the regime and state powers regarding a foreign policy that is enemy-centric and anti-American, beyond the execution or non-execution of the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. As Khamenei emphasized in this meeting, hoping for negotiations with the U.S. to solve the country's problems is a mistake; they seek to exploit the deadlock of the moderate government's efforts in de-escalating foreign policy. Trump's victory in the presidential election and his unjustified decision to withdraw from the JCPOA provided the hardline faction of the government with the opportunity to complete the last piece of the puzzle in containing the nuclear compromise and return the Islamic Republic's foreign policy to the pre-JCPOA conditions. Before the JCPOA, Khamenei, by applying a dual policy behind the scenes, gave Rouhani the green light to reach a nuclear agreement while maintaining the nuclear infrastructure, but publicly portrayed a pessimistic critic. The JCPOA was a temporary and situational choice for the leadership, but Rouhani hoped it would become a model. However, the supremacy of the hardliners and Rouhani's weak performance, alongside the changing political positions of the U.S. government, ultimately led to Khamenei's wishes being realized, and de-escalation with the U.S. and the approach of resolving foreign disputes within the framework of diplomacy fell into abeyance. Now, Rouhani expresses the same foreign policy rhetoric that Ebrahim Raisi proposed during the 2017 presidential election. The President of the eleventh and twelfth governments has now adopted a discourse that was previously that of his principlist rival and is more advanced than Rouhani. It is not incorrect to say that Rouhani, during the first parliament, when he was part of the rational group of that parliament, also hesitated in adopting positions that could mobilize the world against the regime. It now seems that in a period where the regime is testing different strategies to overcome the heavy pressures from the U.S. government, internal cohesion and bridging the gaps are of key importance, and subsequently, launching propaganda to unify society around defending Iran is on the agenda. A regime that fundamentally considers itself committed to the Islamic world, now that it is in a predicament, has highlighted Iran and national components and is trying to portray the conflict with the Trump administration as a struggle between America and Iran and Iranians. The unity of Iranians for the dominant power sector is only relevant in opposition to Trump, and in the realm of respecting citizens' rights, welfare, and human dignity, there is not only no sign of a call for unity and national reconciliation, but the governing institutions continue to impose the values, interests, and discourse of the institution of the Supreme Leader and political apartheid on society. Rouhani's shift also once again demonstrated that political issues and discourses among the political agents of the Islamic Republic are not inherently valuable and are overshadowed by the distance from power and changing political relations.