Strategic Program of Leadership in 1394

The Leader's Nowruz speech in Mashhad outlined the general lines of his program for the new year, as is customary. Mr. Khamenei typically uses the New Year's speech to express his strategic viewpoints and the government's overarching policies. Analyzing his statements reveals the rationale behind naming the year 1394 as 'Government and Nation, Sympathy and Common Language.' The Leader emphasized the importance of cohesion and synergy among the forces of the regime and support for the government in implementing a resistant economy and increasing welfare in the country. His remarks covered many themes, some of which will be addressed further. However, the ideological interpretation of Nowruz by the Leader and the claim that Nowruz gained its desirable and pure meaning through the initiative of Muslims within the framework of Islamic concepts indicates that his true intention regarding the people refers to the defenders of the regime, or more precisely, supporters of the fundamentalist Islamic approach and ideological traditionalism. He does not mean the general populace. His remarks can be divided into two main sections: domestic and foreign policy, based on an analysis of the internal and external situation of the regime. A deep dive into Mr. Khamenei's statements reveals his skepticism regarding the outcome of nuclear negotiations and his thoughts on maximizing cohesion among political forces within the regime and garnering support from other segments of society to maintain and expand confrontational space with the West and manage the country in the post-nuclear negotiation conditions. Although his remarks encompass both agreement and disagreement with the nuclear issue, he calls for the separation of people's daily lives and government performance from dependence on the outcome of nuclear negotiations; however, the conditions arising from a lack of agreement carry more weight. In this context, his invitation to intellectuals to observe the alleged destructive actions of the U.S. government is noteworthy, as he attempts to rally even non-affiliated and critical forces in society against the U.S. in a year he views as post-negotiation and approaching elections. Reducing the gap between Rouhani and the hardliners Although at first glance, this interpretation strengthens the view that the Leader supports Rouhani's government, a deeper examination indicates he emphasized the necessity of proximity between Rouhani and the hardline conservatives. Khamenei considered criticism a right of the hardliners and urged Rouhani's government to engage with them empathetically while also inviting the extremist conservatives not to undermine the government. Khamenei's interpretation of the concept of 'enjoining good and forbidding wrong' and its current examples provided theoretical and political tools for the activities of the regime's hardline critics against the moderate government. Topics such as establishing an Islamic system and preserving the Islamic system, maintaining the dignity and honor of the Iranian nation, elevating culture, ensuring a healthy moral environment, family environment, population growth, and preparing the youth for the country's elevation, boosting the economy and production, popularizing Islamic ethics, expanding science and technology, establishing judicial and economic justice, striving for the power of the Iranian nation, and beyond that, the power of the Islamic Ummah and efforts for Islamic unity as current manifestations of 'good' and also introducing moral depravity, aiding the enemies of Islam, weakening the Islamic system, weakening Islamic culture, weakening the economy of society, and weakening science and technology as 'wrong' have created a favorable environment for the field activities and extralegal actions of hardline conservatives and the group known as the hardliners. Mr. Khamenei emphasized that he does not give a blank check to the government and helps it with constructive criticism. His statements clarify that he wants the defenders of the moderate program to unite with traditional and hardline conservatives against the alleged hostile programs of the West. The goal of encouraging increased cohesion and reducing disputes is to expand the strategic depth of the regime's macro policies in society. Additionally, Rouhani's government has increasingly distanced itself from promises of political and cultural reforms and is focusing its efforts on economic activities and expanding internal capacities. The Leader announced the necessity of hardliner activities and reduced the people to them while simultaneously calling for them not to cross the controlled and hygienic boundaries set by the regime. The emphasis on the need for investment in internal development in economic growth indicates his desire for the government and other regime institutions to pay more attention to the growth of a resistant economy. He delegitimized views that condition the country's progress on improving relations with the outside, especially the West, highlighting the West's hostile plans to cripple the country through economic pressures. From his perspective, the economy has the nature of a battlefield where government forces must adopt a military posture against the West and global economic relations. He believes that by increasing the use of domestic resources, he can neutralize Western economic pressures and turn sanctions into an opportunity for the growth of the country and the regime. His remarks practically limit the government's scope of activity in developing foreign relations for economic improvement. Furthermore, it shows that he does not have concerns about economic siege and evaluates increased domestic activities as sufficient for economic prosperity. Strengthening the confrontation line in foreign policy Khamenei once again emphasized the hostile and irreconcilable nature of the U.S. towards the Islamic Republic and defended a confrontational and combative foreign policy. He accused Obama of insincerity and claimed that no one in Iran opposes a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear dispute but rather opposes the U.S. government's excessive demands. He stated that the government will not cooperate with the U.S. in any non-nuclear area. The Leader articulated Iran's position in leading the Islamic Awakening movement, which the U.S. government is now the main opponent and obstacle to in the Middle East. This viewpoint clarifies that the regime has a decisive decision to be present in the anti-U.S. front in the region and the world, and the anti-U.S. approach will continue. Complicating the nuclear agreement Khamenei stated that the prerequisite for a comprehensive nuclear agreement is the removal of sanctions in one go, and the lifting of sanctions is part of the negotiations, not a product of it. Thus, the work of the Iranian nuclear team to reach a nuclear compromise becomes more difficult. His remarks regarding the nuclear negotiations continue previous positions, revealing the will not to concede further. He wants all terms of a potential agreement to be reversible and the period of reversibility to be short. This position significantly differs from the U.S. government's view, which wants the nuclear breakout time to be at least one year. Khamenei's strong emphasis on the reversibility of the agreement signifies his firm decision to maintain the nuclear structure and the potential for nuclear adventurism and prevent U.S. influence in limiting nuclear capabilities. The Leader insists that the nuclear program proceeds within the framework of his desired objectives and pays no attention to Western concerns, especially those of the U.S. government, which he views as treacherous, deceitful, and capricious, and does not want Iran to progress. Khamenei also made it clear that he believes the U.S. needs negotiations and that there is essentially no gap between Congress and the U.S. government regarding negotiations with Iran. In his view, if the Republicans were in power, they would also need to negotiate with Iran and would follow a similar path. He encouraged the negotiating team to resist U.S. demands more and tried to boost their confidence to seek an agreement where the balance of exchanged concessions favors Iran more. However, if the negotiators are not allowed flexibility in this regard, Khamenei's insistence could lead to the failure of negotiations. Of course, he does not have concerns about this and believes that the Americans, due to the high risk of failure of negotiations, will soon return to the negotiating table, and the passage of time, given the regional developments, is in favor of the regime. Khamenei's statements revealed his strategic recommendations for 1394, which he expects the three branches of government and the ruling forces to consider in their activities. However, the realization of these recommendations goes beyond the Leader's will, and the multitude of influencing variables, especially realities, pose serious challenges to his program. What caused his dissatisfaction with the officials' performance regarding the resistant economy program last year could lead to a similar fate for his recommendations this year. However, overall, the Leader is relatively in a better position than in previous years. Upcoming developments will show how much he can engineer the internal and external situation of Iran.