Street Protests, Youth, and Social Humiliation

Saeed Peyvandi, a sociology professor at the University of Paris, discusses the causes and roots of street protests and the involvement of youth with Radio Farda. Initially, the demands of the people were limited to livelihood and economic issues. However, the protests quickly took on a political tone, with people (mainly youth) directing their grievances towards the entirety of the Islamic Republic, the government's overall policies, especially its extraterritorial activities. Saeed Peyvandi states that 'youth face a kind of social humiliation from the very beginning of their lives, starting from kindergarten and school. The authoritarian type of education and the coercion present in schools strip students and even teachers of any freedom and opportunity to express their opinions. The performance of official media, morality patrols, compulsory hijab, and... all these issues and humiliations indicate that youth are the primary victims of repression and social restrictions.' Another issue is the lack of dialogue between youth and the authorities of the Islamic Republic. Despite the recent protests spanning a hundred cities, the authorities have trivialized these protests and attributed them to foreign countries, effectively closing off any communication with society and the younger generation. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei referred to the protests as 'fireworks,' 'mischief,' and 'the enemy's counterattack' in a speech on Tuesday, January 9. Peyvandi believes that 'on one side, there are young people who are fed up with the current situation, and on the other side, there is a government run by elderly individuals who have lost the ability to see and hear and there is practically no communication between these two social sections. There is a kind of blind dialogue in society; our youth scream, but no one hears them.' Another issue that seems to have caused despair among youth is the hopes that have been given to them over the years but have not been fulfilled. If youth have hope that the situation in Iran will improve in the coming years, they will tolerate the current conditions. However, it seems they no longer trust the officials' promises for the country's improvement. In fact, the disappointment, frustration, and deep anger that exists among youth stem from hopes that have turned into despair. The widespread participation of youth and women in the elections of 1997 and then in 2001, followed by the Green Movement and later participation in parliamentary elections and ultimately the election of Hassan Rouhani, stemmed from this hope. Peyvandi states: 'The issue that frustrates youth is the lack of perspective for Iranian society. For twenty years, youth hoped that by participating in the spaces offered by the government, they could convey their message to the government. But we are dealing with a government that has closed its ears and eyes and has no real connection with this society.' The culture of discrimination in society can be another cause of youth dissatisfaction. In most countries, going to university and having higher education paves the way for finding jobs and better living conditions. However, it seems that in Iran, due to economic problems and deadlocks, going to university with high costs only slightly helps youth find jobs. Meanwhile, many children of officials and government authorities easily obtain high positions by leveraging family influence and government rents. This phenomenon has long been known in Iran as 'Aghazadegi.' In public perception, this phenomenon is seen as an obstacle to social justice, meaning equal opportunity for all. There are various indicators through which an Aghazade can utilize special privileges to reach positions and ranks. For example, financial and educational advantages, benefiting from national and public wealth, the possibility of studying abroad, using the political power of a family member, being listed among known parties and politicians, etc. All these indicators, stemming from the weaknesses of the country's structural and supervisory foundations, allow the Aghazade to advance. Meanwhile, another individual from society, despite having greater capabilities, is prevented from reaching that job or position due to lack of ties to political authorities. Peyvandi discusses the connection between recent protests and the phenomenon of Aghazadegi, stating: 'In the past year, the discussion of good genes raised by Mohammad Reza Aref's son has received a lot of attention in cyberspace. This indicates the blatant discrimination that has arisen and is increasing in Iran over the decades. Individuals with families connected to power (political, economic, or religious) enjoy all kinds of opportunities. These individuals do not need much talent, effort, or hard work for social success; this family capital is enough for them to attain high political positions, economic opportunities, or various forms of social privileges.' Peyvandi adds: 'Iranian society suffers from these inequalities. When kinship plays a major role in the distribution of government positions, youth feel that there is no free, scientific competition and equality in society.' Peyvandi points out that one of the features of democratic societies is equal chances for all members of society, stating: 'In Iran, many key political positions are divided among close relatives of the core power circle, and it seems they have no trust in society.' Alongside Aghazadegi, another issue that has fueled dissatisfaction during the recent street protests is the high number of jobs held by some officials of the Islamic Republic. Recently, even some conservative analysts in Iran have stated that someone like Ali Akbar Velayati holds twenty-some jobs while many youth, including those in cities witnessing protests, suffer from unemployment.