Strengthening Cooperation with London: An Arab Model for America

Critical remarks by Theresa May, the Conservative Prime Minister of Britain, against Iran's regional provocations at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit elicited a strong reaction from Tehran, occurring just weeks before the formation of Donald Trump's Conservative government. This calculated move aims to outline the roadmap for the next U.S. administration in the region. Shortly after Ms. May's participation in the summit, which marks the third attendance of Western leaders at such meetings, Boris Johnson, the newly appointed Foreign Secretary of London, met with Saudi leaders and emphasized London's official policies on enhancing defense and security cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Ms. May's visit to the southern Gulf countries coincided with a shift in the balance of power in the region and the strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Tehran, a development that the Arab countries of the southern Gulf have welcomed with concern. In Syria, the imminent completion of government forces' control over Aleppo and the retreat of rebels supported by Arab countries can be seen as an indirect victory for Tehran and a consolidation of the Islamic Republic's presence in that country. In the northern Iraq conflict, the increase in the presence of Shiite military forces, known as Hashd al-Shaabi, is considered another victory for Tehran. In Yemen, after over a year of costly and destructive war, Saudi Arabia has failed to achieve its declared objectives and stabilize the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, its supported president in Sana'a, while the Houthis, backed by Tehran, continue their attacks against Saudi villages. The Gulf Arab states expect that by strengthening military, economic, and political cooperation with London, they can not only enhance their defensive capabilities but also encourage the next U.S. administration to adopt policies similar to those of Britain in the region, emphasizing the consequences of the shifting balance of power in favor of Tehran. The security of the Gulf region has always been of particular importance, even after the transfer of the three Iranian islands to Iran in November 1971 and the gradual reduction of British military presence in the southern waters of Iran. Over the past decade, prior to the signing of the nuclear agreement with Tehran, which raised the possibility of war against Iran and the threat of blocking the Strait of Hormuz, the capacity of British vessels present in the Gulf waters was considered the second regional power after the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The volume of Britain's economic trade with the southern Gulf countries exceeds $45 billion annually, and British military exports to the Gulf Cooperation Council member states alone are ten times the total annual trade with Tehran. Trade exchanges between Tehran and London have not grown in proportion to Britain's economic power, which is the second-largest economy in the European Union after Germany and ahead of France, while Britain's trade with Arab countries in the region has seen more growth compared to European countries. Britain has planned investments of up to $5 billion in the region for the next year, while Arab investments, in addition to purchasing real estate and football clubs in England, have made significant investments in the London Stock Exchange. This year, Britain has ordered the construction of three ultra-modern military vessels for coastal protection from a shipbuilding unit in Glasgow, with their mission to be operational overseas. In the context of its announced exit from the European Union, Britain is not only seeking to stabilize and expand its export markets and investments and defend them but is also looking to create a military and political cooperation axis independent of Europe with the next U.S. administration during this transitional period and change of government in Washington. Tehran's long-term perspective is not focused on Ms. May's recent remarks at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit but rather on the potentially different behaviors and policies of the Trump administration, which will take power on January 21. Arab countries view the shift in the balance of power in Syria as a result of the Obama administration's policies and the diminished military presence of the U.S. in the region, and based on this conclusion, they intend to position themselves alongside Britain to influence the behavioral model of the next U.S. administration in the region. Among the conditions for a favorable change for Arab countries is the sidelining of the Islamic Republic and the Assad government in a political agreement with Russia, following the elimination of extremist Islamists in that country, and subsequently, applying pressure from Washington on the Baghdad government to distance it from Tehran; a new situation that will have the first part supported by Israel and the second part supported by Saudi Arabia. In both cases, Britain is capable of playing an effective role. Trump presents his electoral victory as a continuation of Brexit, or the British people's vote for structural dismantling and leaving the European Union, and contrary to Obama, who stated that for negotiations with the U.S., Britain should be at the end of the line after leaving the EU, Trump wants London at the forefront of America's allies, and strengthening this axis is a major concern for Tehran. To save the JCPOA, Tehran needs the cooperation of the next U.S. administration, and increasing tensions in relations with a major Western country, which is one of the signatories of the JCPOA, before the new Washington administration takes office, can only make achieving this goal more difficult. Iran needs to secure financial resources, gain congressional support, reach a definitive agreement with the next U.S. administration, and maintain calm relations with the West to implement the agreement for purchasing passenger aircraft from Boeing and Airbus from the U.S. and Europe. The threat to reduce the level of relations with Britain, while Tehran-London relations have not yet returned to normal after several years of suspension, despite the establishment of ambassadors from both countries in their areas of mission, is a premature welcome to a danger that could affect not only the regional positions of the Islamic Republic but also the internal position of Rouhani's government.