Supporters of Shirazi and Attack on Saudi Embassy

Following the attack on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Tehran and Mashhad, individuals acting independently have been identified by both main factions of the government as the perpetrators. Although law enforcement and judicial officials claim to have arrested several attackers, no official sources have provided information about their identities or potential political affiliations. Some officials have suggested that the movement may have been instigated by infiltrators, pointing fingers at the Saudi government. However, others have introduced supporters of Ayatollah Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi as the instigators of the attack. Websites such as Fararu and Rah Dana, along with Mansour Haqiqatpour, the deputy chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Parliament, are among the individuals and media affiliated with conservatives who have, without providing credible evidence, labeled the Shirazi faction as the organizers of the attack on Saudi diplomatic centers. Forces close to Ayatollah Khamenei use the label 'English Shiism' for supporters of Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi, citing the activities of satellite networks linked to this Shia cleric in London as the reason for this accusation. Meanwhile, the regime does not consider the activities of religious centers affiliated with the Supreme Leader in Britain as indicative of ties to England! This claim is part of efforts to absolve Basij forces and groups known as loyalists and concerned individuals from the attack on the Saudi embassy. The article will further critique and analyze the validity of this claim. The Shirazi faction joined the ranks of critics of the regime in the early years of the revolution, resulting in Seyyed Mohammad facing restrictions and later house arrest. His funeral became controversial due to the government's prevention of burial according to his will, despite a condolence message from Ayatollah Khamenei and praise for his services. Ayatollah Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi is a traditional cleric residing in Qom who took over the leadership of the Shirazi movement in Islamic countries after the death of his brother, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Shirazi. This movement has a presence not only in Iran but also in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The Shirazi faction has historically criticized the regime, particularly during the violent suppression of the Green Movement in February 2010. One of the reasons for the regime's discontent with the Shirazi faction is their traditional views in opposition to Sunni leaders, their cursing of the Rashidun caliphs, and their promotion of extremist beliefs in Shia Islam. The Shirazi faction does not advocate for rapprochement and reduction of differences with Sunnis and holds an extremist view regarding confrontation with them. However, their actions indicate that this confrontation has only been verbal, discursive, and political, and they have not promoted violence against Sunnis. Their emphasis on the merits of self-flagellation, especially after Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting it, further intensified the conflict between the government and them. The Shirazi faction believes that the government has sidelined the true principles and beliefs of Shia Islam for political interests and has compromised with their opponents. The regime was not willing to accept the negative consequences of the Shirazi faction's extreme views against Sunnis, as they saw no benefit in doing so. However, the dual approach and silence regarding the positions of other factions that incite conflict with Sunnis in religious centers, along with planned restrictions and discrimination against Iranian Sunnis, indicate that the above approach is more instrumental for the government. The main problem the government has with the Shirazi faction is political, manifesting in opposition to the theory of Velayat-e Faqih as outlined in the constitution, delegitimization of the Islamic Republic, opposition to political executions, and engagement with government opponents. The Shirazi faction also has a high capacity and capability in using media and new organizational methods. This faction was among the first religious groups to use satellite networks to promote their views and beliefs about Shia Islam. In August 2014, intelligence ministry forces conducted a widespread operation to shut down television networks affiliated with Ayatollah Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi in cities like Qom, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Tehran, arresting several of their personnel. According to the intelligence ministry's statement, "creating discord among followers of Islamic sects through insults and slander against their sanctities, insulting Islamic scholars worldwide, declaring a week of disavowal against a week of unity, and promoting incorrect, superstitious, and violent mourning styles were the main focus and approach of the productions of these offices and the reason for the arrests and security actions." Media officials rejected these claims, considering them to be a form of fabrication. Following this event, government attacks on Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi and his associates intensified, with Ayatollah Khamenei indirectly attacking them during several of his speeches by denouncing 'English Shiism.' Therefore, attributing the attack on the Saudi embassy to the Shirazi faction must be considered in light of this history. Sheikh Nimr was a student of Ayatollah Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi and had a good and close relationship with him. The Shirazi faction has been active in supporting Sheikh Nimr's release since his arrest in Saudi Arabia. The Shia Human Rights Watch, an organization close to Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi, issued a statement urging all international and regional legal organizations to pressure Saudi authorities for the release of Sheikh Nimr and other prisoners of freedom of expression. Thus, it can be expected that the Shirazi faction would be outraged and protest following Sheikh Nimr's execution. However, several reasons can be presented that cast doubt on the credibility of attributing the attack on Saudi diplomatic centers to them, reducing it to mere accusations or unrealistic conjectures. The Shirazi faction believes in a peaceful approach to struggle and has always emphasized the necessity of non-violence and the rejection of force. Peaceful and reformist struggle held a prominent place in the views of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Shirazi. He wrote a book titled 'Al-La'naf' (Non-Violence) in Arabic, accepting non-violence as a principle in Islam and claiming that violent methods in politics are not legitimate from an Islamic perspective. The Shirazi faction has never resorted to violent confrontation with the government. If they were the organizers of the attack on the Saudi embassy, a serious question arises as to why they have not undertaken similar actions in the face of multiple restrictions and assaults by security forces against the residence of Ayatollah Seyyed Sadeq Shirazi over the past two years. They did not even hold a single protest gathering in the country during that time and remained silent in the face of security actions, judicial summonses, and one-sided media narratives, adopting a cautious approach. On the other hand, the Shirazi faction is an experienced group with a cohesive organization. Therefore, they should know that an attack on the Saudi embassy, in the presence of security and law enforcement forces and multiple cameras, poses serious security and legal risks, ultimately leading to increased pressure on Sadeq Shirazi and potential house arrest, and such actions cannot be concealed. The history of the government's reckless actions against the Shirazi faction contrasts with the passive response of law enforcement to the attackers, as claimed by the police commander. Some officials and government media have repeatedly spoken of a conspiracy by the Shirazi faction in recent years and warned about their intentions. How can it be believed that the Shirazi faction planned and executed the attack on the Saudi embassy without the oversight and monitoring of the country's security apparatus? Another factor that seriously questions the validity of the above claim is the better position of the Shirazi faction in Iraq. If they wanted to take action against the Saudi government, they would have had far better conditions in Iraq and could have targeted Saudi-affiliated centers in that country at much lower costs. Therefore, considering the points outlined, the claim attributing the attack on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Tehran and Mashhad to the Shirazi faction appears to be unfounded based on existing evidence and indications. In fact, this narrative seems more like a diversion to obscure the real culprits. The chain protests following last Friday's prayers and the adoption of aligned positions provide significant clues for uncovering and identifying the instigators and perpetrators of the attack on the Saudi embassy.