Suppression of the Green Movement; New Confessions

Six and a half years after the controversial and ambiguous presidential election of 2009, last week Ayatollah Khamenei once again addressed the Green Movement, expressing his intense agitation regarding the Green protests and their leaders. The former commander of the national police also revealed new aspects behind the bloody suppression of the Green Movement and the perspectives of those affiliated with the core of power regarding the 2009 presidential election. In his recent remarks, the Supreme Leader referred to the Green Movement for the first time as a 'color revolution' and described it as an 'unsuccessful American color coup.' However, Ahmadinejad's former police chief mentioned data that serves as new evidence regarding the 2009 election, indicating signs of an electoral coup. Although parts of the former police chief's statements include distortion of truth or dissemination of fabricated narratives based on coerced confessions or biased personal analysis, certain sections of his interview (especially those related to the backdrop of suppression policies) are thought-provoking and contain meaningful data indicating an electoral 'coup' in 2009. The former police commander attempts to repeatedly attack Hashemi Rafsanjani, who, according to Ahmadinejad, had a more radical position than Khatami during the Green Movement. Ahmadinejad's former police chief does not hold back from sharp and biting criticisms against the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, especially just weeks before the Assembly of Experts elections. In the course of these critiques, he raises a thought-provoking question: 'Mr. Hashemi repeatedly said in interviews that if 40 million participate, the people's vote will truly be realized; meaning Ahmadinejad would lose. He constantly emphasized that real participation means 40 million. At that time, 40 million meant 85% of the people participating in the elections. However, one must ask Mr. Hashemi, when you were responsible for eight years, when did 85% of the people participate in elections?' Ahmadinejad's former police chief raises this strange question while forgetting that according to the official report of the Ministry of Interior, the participation rate in the 2009 presidential election was indeed what Rafsanjani stated; that is, according to the official data of the Islamic Republic, over 39 million and 371 thousand people, or about 85% of citizens, participated in that election. From this perspective, and with this starting point, two notable and probable situations arise: 1. Either the official statistics of the Ministry of Interior were false, and the participation rate was artificially inflated through a fraudulent report or by casting fake votes in favor of Ahmadinejad; 2. Or the official statistics are correct; however, the result was manipulated in a way that contradicted the truth and went against the majority of voters' participation, an event that occurred contrary to Rafsanjani's predictions, and beyond him, the assessments of reformists, and even more so, the judgment of millions of citizens. The highest participation rate in presidential elections prior to 2009 was related to the famous second Khordad election of 1997, where about 80% of eligible citizens went to the polls and 69% voted for Mohammad Khatami. The mobilization of various social layers in the 2009 election was so significant and unprecedented that Ahmadinejad's defeat was assumed by observers; an assessment that was not realized due to the 'electoral coup.' A bitter and meaningful confession from the former police chief is expressed in this area; Ahmadinejad's former police chief states in his interview: 'Reformists used the term 'high participation' and since they were interested in the presence of the gray section, they mobilized their own people. We also said it was good for us to use the term high participation so that the Hezbollahis would also participate and everyone would come.' This statement clearly indicates the participatory rise of hesitant and gray sections of society against Ahmadinejad, and consequently, his definitive defeat in the 2009 election; at the same time, it implies the illegal and effective intervention of security-military forces to mobilize 'Hezbollahis' (as Ahmadinejad refers to them). The former police chief even adds and emphasizes that 'when Mir Hossein appeared on the scene with media support, he received widespread receptions. When several reports of these receptions were brought to Ahmadinejad, he was surprised by the level of reformist presence and became worried. Ten days before the election, he suddenly increased his provincial trips and traveled to two or three provinces every day.' This report is yet another testament to the social situation and the prevailing attitude in society against Ahmadinejad. A situation that did not receive a commensurate response after the official election results were announced. It is not in vain that the protest reaction of millions of citizens outraged by the government's betrayal of their electoral participation was at odds with the previous assessments of security-military apparatuses. Ahmadinejad's former police chief admits that 'in 2009, our resources and readiness to confront those events were insufficient; we did not anticipate the extent of the events to this degree. In fact, predicting it was somewhat difficult; we did not expect the level of potential, depth, and scope of the issue to be such that it would last for eight months.' Ahmadinejad's former police chief also refers to the preparations of the police from 'late 2008' and states: 'Exercises titled 'Calm and Security' were held across the country ostensibly to arrest thieves, landings from the sky, and other matters, but the goal was something else. These exercises were carried out mainly in cities where there was a higher likelihood of threats.' Interestingly, the former commander of the Islamic Republic's police confirms this assessment by Abdollah Ramazanzadeh (a senior member of the Participation Front) who said, 'In one of their private meetings, he said these maneuvers were ostensibly for social security but were designed for us.' He adds: 'We conducted these maneuvers to demonstrate the readiness of the police to them [the reformists and Ahmadinejad's opponents] and also to increase the readiness of the forces. The execution of those exercises allowed us to complete the special forces, rescue, and 110, and somewhat integrate these sections into a network.' This network later played a role in attacking the election headquarters of Mousavi and Karroubi (from the night of the election) and also in the violent and bloody suppression of civil protests after the electoral coup, alongside other arms of violence. The former police chief also reveals the role of the hidden government of the IRGC and especially its security section. He reports that on June 15, 2009, the commander of the IRGC personally contacted him: 'Aziz Jafari called me and made a series of recommendations. He said: Mr. Ahmadinejad, today you have a tough dilemma. You must not allow a gathering to form here.' Notably, Ahmadinejad's former police chief also mentions the call from Taeb, the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. These calls have no place in the official and legal relationships and hierarchies of military and police forces, especially since the commander of the police is appointed by the Supreme Leader. Yet both the commander of the IRGC and the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization see themselves in a position to advise and instruct the police chief on how to deal with protesters. Beyond what has been mentioned, the former police chief explicitly discusses the unique and distinct role of the system's top figure in the events following the 2009 election. According to his report, the Supreme Leader assigned a 'special committee' in the Supreme National Security Council responsible for the results of its sessions to be reported daily to the top of the political system; although, as Ahmadinejad's former police chief states, the final decision-maker and main strategist is the absolute jurist. He repeatedly speaks of the 'leadership strategy': 'The leader classifies and analyzes the data correctly; then determines the strategy. The leader's strategy led to the elimination of reformists' potentials.' Although Ahmadinejad's former police chief speaks of the 'correct summary of the leader' and the strategic success of the top of the political system, and although the core of power in the Islamic Republic appears to have distanced itself from the 2009 election and its consequences with the presidential election of 2013, it seems that the story of the electoral coup and its repercussions has not ended. Regardless of the continued illegal imprisonment of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard and several activists of the Green Movement, and apart from the new reports and data (such as the recent interview of the former police chief), and irrespective of the extraordinary sensitivity still expressed by authoritarian platforms towards the Green Movement, this recent statement by the Supreme Leader is also significantly meaningful: 'I do not know when the damages that occurred to us in 2009 will be compensated. I really do not know! It has not been compensated yet...'