Syria and the Leadership of Bashar al-Assad

About two weeks ago, the American network PBS aired a 55-minute documentary titled "Inside Assad's Syria" on its FRONTLINE program for viewers of hundreds of local television channels across the U.S. The author's personal opinion on this film may not be of much importance. What matters is that this 55-minute film presented a reality through the lens of its journalist that is rarely seen elsewhere. PBS operates over 360 local television stations. It is a national network that Republicans have repeatedly attempted to cut its modest public funding, and currently, over 82% of its budget is funded by its viewers and listeners. Just observe the journalist's reaction in one scene where he does not allow the Syrian regime's media and propaganda exhibition to use his interview for promotional purposes and leaves the venue halfway through, highlighting the importance this journalist places on the independence of his reporting. In another instance, scenes from Damascus reminded the author of a trip during Hafez al-Assad's era, recalling a bitter memory of how a student I knew from my studies in France was terrified to discuss Hafez al-Assad's government even in the open courtyard of a restaurant in Damascus. However, it was clear in this film that at least under current conditions, Bashar al-Assad does not wield such power. In another scene, when a mother spoke of her 'martyr' son and mentioned that her other 13 children had left the country, wishing that all her children would sacrifice their lives for 'Syria,' two immediate conclusions come to mind: Unlike an elderly man who considered Bashar al-Assad irreplaceable, this mother, who likely benefits from the 'martyr family' privileges, spoke explicitly and wisely about the 'country and nation' of Syria, wishing her children would sacrifice their lives for Syria without mentioning Bashar al-Assad's name. Another point that perhaps indicates the depth of the Syrian tragedy is that when one person is killed (as that mother described regarding the departure of her 13 children), at least 13 people leave the 'homeland,' which aligns closely with United Nations figures. The number of casualties is unknown, and perhaps it will never be possible to determine the exact figure. Various statistics [from a mid-August 2015 UN Security Council meeting] estimate the death toll at 250,000, while the UN observer group reported it to be 330,000 that same month. Of these, at least one-third are civilians. This ratio of 330,000 dead to over four million refugees corresponds with what that mother whose child was lost mentioned in the documentary. In fact, for every one person killed, 13 have fled Syria and sought refuge in other countries. In another part, the filmmaker is taken to the city of Homs under the protection and support of a Syrian Air Force intelligence officer to show him how out of 36 neighborhoods in Homs, 35 are under the control of the governor chosen by Bashar. This governor, who was previously a merchant residing in Dubai, was invited by Bashar al-Assad to Syria to be entrusted with the governance of Homs. Homs is one of the cities where the simple protests of the Syrian people against regime corruption were severely suppressed and was under siege by government forces for two years. Now, nothing remains in the city except for buildings destroyed under the airstrikes of Assad's army. At the same time, Assad's appointed governor is showcasing a summer exhibition of films, clothing, and fashion in one of the neighborhoods to demonstrate how much the government is in control and how normal everything is. The PBS filmmaker even meets with the Syrian Minister of Tourism and accompanies him to 8 kilometers east of Homs to visit the tourist facilities and open-air pool there, which is operating normally 15 kilometers from the lines of armed opponents, registering and reserving customers for that season. Some of the president's relatives were customers at the pool that day. The filmmaker's conversations with the people and regime affiliates cannot lead to a definitive conclusion about the roots of this civil war and cannot determine whether the conflict's onset in 2011 was a 'foreign conspiracy' or a 'mistake by the regime's security forces' that suppressed the protesting people. Although even they do not rule out the possibility that Bashar al-Assad made a mistake. According to what is common in the Middle East, people in the streets who do not want to show their faces to the camera usually speak out against the ruling regime, while regime supporters, who are usually cheerful and plump, speak with smiles and accuse foreigners. *** Today, proving who is at fault is no longer important because even if this war was the result of a conspiracy from the beginning, Bashar al-Assad's regime has instead of neutralizing the 'conspiracy,' put ordinary people on the edge of the sword and destroyed them, an act that clearly calls into question the wisdom of his leadership. Interestingly, Bashar al-Assad himself appeared before the Syrian people five years into the civil war to admit the impotence of his army due to a lack of sufficient forces and to justify the loss of parts of the 'homeland' as legitimate or temporary. If this is the same Assad, then why did he not resort to this rationality five years ago? The PBS film can also be viewed from the perspective of U.S. policies regarding Syria. The U.S. policy towards Syria has been formulated based on the understanding that Bashar al-Assad is equivalent to the 'Islamic State' (ISIS) for U.S. strategic interests in the region, with the difference that ISIS is worse than Assad, and therefore, between the two, as long as no other alternative can be chosen, Assad has superiority and priority. Whether this is the best strategy regarding the current issue is highly questionable, but no other strategy seems to be visible on the horizon of U.S. political calculations that could end this widespread civil war. Assad's military-police capability against political and armed opponents acts as a complement to his political power and his insistence on remaining in power. The PBS film effectively shows some angles of this political and military battle. From this perspective, the U.S. is constantly waiting for Bashar al-Assad himself to be able to reconcile with his political and armed opponents, while Assad wants to remain in power until the Syrian war ends. The chronic and exhausting pressure from the Free Syrian Army pushes Assad towards an alliance with Russia and Iran, and Bashar al-Assad personally uses this coalition for attacks and bombings against the Free Syrian Army forces. Units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps under the name of Quds Force, as well as 'Fatimiyoun Brigade' and 'Zainabiyoun Brigade' (which reportedly recruits among Afghan Shiites residing in Iran or Pakistanis), with the support of Russian air power, strengthen the hope in Assad and his supporters that the end of the war is near. This group should also include about 6,000 Hezbollah militants from Lebanon, whose presence has been reported in several major cities such as Damascus, Homs, and occasionally in Aleppo and smaller areas. The diversity of ground forces involved in the battles is not something that the Russians approve of, as it leads to a variety of expectations and demands, making the formation of a stable coalition and alliance with these forces practically impossible; the coordination of air power with ground forces that do not operate under a unified command faces its own linguistic, tactical, operational, and command challenges. Therefore, as desirable as Russian air support may be, in practice, coordination with forces that are not under direct Russian command is impossible. Additionally, the slightest mistake in coordination endangers the lives of ground forces and can yield counterproductive results. At the same time, investment in ground forces increases Assad's and his loyal military's organizational capacity in decentralized militia units like the National Defense Forces. These forces increasingly operate in both combat fields and in popular support bases in favor of Assad. The experiences of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah have combined, and despite the increasing casualties among IRGC commanders and so-called 'advisors' in recent weeks, they have strengthened the organization of internal forces (possibly with Iranian financial-organizational and logistical support) and have cleared small sections around major Syrian cities. These small advancements halted following the crash of a Russian plane in Sharm el-Sheikh (Sinai Desert) but were boosted after the liberation of the 'Kweiris' airbase in eastern Aleppo (on November 10). In any case, the fate of Syria will not change due to these small victories. A brief look at the map of Syria makes it clear that Bashar al-Assad's hypothetical 'victory' is very limited, and government control after victory will extend over areas equivalent to one-fourth of current Syrian territory. Of course, it may be that in this Syria, Alawites hold the absolute majority. The goals of Russia and Iran in assisting Syria are fundamentally different and lack strategic alignment. Each pursues its own objectives, which cannot be elaborated on in this article. The costs of these objectives must be understood from the analysis of what has been spent so far. One Russian soldier faces over 45 'advisors' [IRGC commanders] who, regardless of their military rank, are higher than the Russian soldier. The results obtained raise many questions that must be answered over time: Is Iran and Russia's support unlimited? If the casualties of Russian military forces reach the level of Iranian IRGC casualties, will the Russians still remain in Syria? And finally, besides the 'advisory' forces of Iran, how many infantry troops from Iran are involved in this conflict, from what source are they supplied, and is there accurate data on their casualties? The film text clearly shows how Assad's strategic mistake has created a wave of uncontrollable anger and fury and led to the fragmentation of ethnicities and ethnic groups. Today, many angry and armed groups are positioned opposite the moderate political opponents. Can the internal forces that cautiously oppose Assad reach an agreement with the armed opponents outside the territories controlled by Assad? If Assad's armed opponents receive weapons and missiles from abroad, what kind of support do unarmed and political opponents need to sit at the negotiating table with Assad, and are Assad and his supporters willing to put what they want on the table? The film clearly shows that Assad has multiple battles ahead. First, he must reconcile with internal political groups, assuming they are either unarmed or armed but willing to negotiate. Then he must build trust between the pro-militia and the opposing militia, and for this, he must grant significant concessions in the form of political participation. If anyone thinks this can be done easily or through mediation and without political participation, they are either dreaming or closing their eyes to existing realities. Only after that can Syrian political leadership hope to rely on a small but unified Syria to fight for the liberation of the remaining Syrian territory from ISIS, al-Nusra Front, and extremist groups. The film naturally raises many questions and cannot provide answers to all viewers' questions. The questions that I have posed are not as questions about the film but as questions about reality. We do not need to have immediate answers for them. Immediate answers do not solve the issue: - Is Bashar al-Assad capable of solving the problem he created? - Can the Vienna negotiations open a way out of this deadlock and prevent further massacres of the Syrian people? - Is there still a will to fight against ISIS?