Syria in the Past Year

Soon, Syria will enter its sixth year of a crisis that is estimated to have left 450,000 dead (at least ten percent of whom have been young children) and 4.8 million refugees. Additionally, 6.3 million people are homeless or have been forced to relocate within the country. In other words, a total of eleven million people from Syria's pre-war population of 22 million no longer live in their homes. This crisis began in March 2011 solely due to Bashar al-Assad's refusal to accept the existence of his political opponents and to concede to demands that at that time were nothing more than recognition of existence, respect for civil rights, and political participation. At that time, there were no signs of the so-called 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)' or the al-Nusra Front. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Turkey had not yet intervened, and the Kobani identity seekers were not calling for autonomy for Syrian Kurds or the formation of an independent political unit in northern Syria. The political opponents of Bashar al-Assad were merely voices comparing Syria to the world and believed they had to raise their voices loud enough for Bashar al-Assad to hear them and allow them political participation. They were unarmed. They were disheartened by the policies of this young and inexperienced son of Hafez al-Assad and criticized them, wanting to reform his path through a political process and empower the Syrian people. However, the Syrian military security apparatus controlled every movement of any protesting citizen and believed it could suffocate those voices. Such calculations may have been effective in the 1980s or 1990s in Syria, but Bashar al-Assad did not realize that after the victories of the people in the Arab Spring, security could no longer be maintained through intimidation and repression. With Bashar al-Assad's miscalculations and the initial crackdowns, the protesting voices went underground, and instead, armed hands emerged. The bloody war lasted five years, and at least until 18 months ago, when the United Nations was able to gather limited information about events in Syria, the death toll had exceeded 250,000. Due to the lack of access for independent organizations to many parts of Syria, reliable statistics have not been provided since 18 months ago. However, in the last days of 2016, The Guardian quoted the Syrian Dialogue and Policy Center, which published statistics that were both shocking and unprecedented. According to this new statistic, the death toll of the five-year war is approximately double, at 470,000. This non-governmental research center based in Beirut also addresses another important issue in addition to the statistics of the dead and wounded or those who have been forced to leave their homes and lives. According to these statistics, the birth rate of the Syrian population has decreased by 25% by 2015. The number of Syrian refugees outside the country exceeds four million, and it is natural that many of these refugees may not return to Syria, which will be another factor in the population decline in the coming years. The catastrophic dimensions of this war will only be examined after the conflict ends. In 2016, at the beginning of the year, about six months had passed since Russia entered the Syrian war as a new and powerful player. Throughout the year, both Iran and Russia independently and jointly played roles in supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Initially, Iran only spoke of a limited number of advisors in Syria, but gradually took on part of the military operations by forming multiple brigades under the title of defenders of the shrine and the Fatemiyoun Brigade, so that by the end of the year, at least a thousand Iranians were killed in Syria. It is said that some of the volunteers of the defenders of the shrine and the Fatemiyoun Brigade are selected from among Afghans and Pakistanis. The virtual space is filled with materials and videos showing the origins and organization of these individuals. The issue of peace and ending the war in Syria has completely gone beyond the control of Assad's government after years and has become a subject that only two global powers, Russia and the United States, and regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia could influence. On February 26, 2016, hope for peace in Syria briefly increased. The United States and Russia agreed on the principle of a ceasefire, which would not include ISIS forces, the al-Nusra Front, or 'other terrorist organizations' (as defined by the United Nations). A total of 79 armed groups agreed to the ceasefire. The official position of Assad's government had not changed, and it still considered the opposition as terrorists and justified its war against terrorists. The focus on Aleppo continued without a moment's pause. Putin, the President of Russia, appeared on a television program and spoke of the opportunity as a 'real chance to stop the bloodshed' and expressed hope for delivering humanitarian aid. In this situation, John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, spoke in a Senate committee about the necessity of having a backup plan in case the peace plan failed. This statement was immediately met with surprise from Putin. However, a few days later, when this ceasefire failed, the resumption of hostilities made it clear why having a backup plan was necessary. The United Nations postponed peace negotiations until March 9 to prepare the grounds for peace talks. However, on March 14, a new military development raised doubts and new questions. Suddenly, the Russians announced that their mission had been successfully completed, and Vladimir Putin personally ordered the withdrawal of some Russian forces from Syria. Following this, on March 15, Russian aircraft left the Hmeimim base in Latakia, Syria. This withdrawal of forces by Russia and Iran was interpreted as a move towards confidence-building. However, Moscow had no intention of abandoning the strategic axis of Tartus (naval base) and Latakia (air base), and this withdrawal was entirely selective and aimed at replacing it with fresh forces. Russia calculated on cooperation with Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Syrian government forces of Bashar al-Assad, and somewhat with Iraq in this important geostrategic axis, although cooperation with Iraq never turned into operational cooperation, but Iraqi political leaders welcomed being part of the axis of Russia and the region for the war against ISIS. Considering that a significant portion of ISIS terrorists come from Central Asian people and former Soviet Union countries, one can understand Russia's motivations and interests in this regional campaign. On the other hand, it seems natural that the Russians would not relinquish the important bases of Tartus and Latakia not only for their short-term goals in the Syrian war but also for their long-term purposes of confronting NATO and Eastern Europe. Once again, Palmyra – one of the significant events on March 24, 2016, was the recapture of the historical city of Palmyra from ISIS forces. Syrians managed to liberate Palmyra from ISIS occupation with the support of Russian airpower. Palmyra had been under ISIS occupation since May 2015, and many of its unique and ancient artifacts had been destroyed by ISIS. Moscow and Damascus presented the liberation of Palmyra as a symbol of success and cooperation of the Russians in the Syrian war. Unfortunately, less than nine months later, once again on the verge of controlling the city of Aleppo (December 12), and taking advantage of the chaos that ensued, ISIS forces managed to regain control of the city of Palmyra for the second time. The reoccupation of Palmyra itself is a sign of the complexity of the Syrian war puzzle, especially since this reoccupation occurs while ISIS is under attack from the ground and air by Russian and Syrian forces and particularly due to repeated attacks in northern Raqqa. Russian sources reported that their airstrikes killed more than 300 ISIS fighters in one night. Nevertheless, ISIS managed to organize a renewed attack with more than 4,000 fighters and retake Palmyra. According to reports from the Syrian state radio, the city of Palmyra changed hands without significant fighting. Syrian forces vacated their positions within Palmyra and moved to the outskirts of the city, and then the city came under ISIS occupation. The return of Russian forces – Shortly after the call for the withdrawal of Russian forces, the first notable development in the Syrian operational theater was observed. On August 16, (two days before August 19), the presence of Russian fighter jets at the Nojeh base in Hamadan and flights from Nojeh towards targets in Syria was reported. The publication of this news immediately caused significant negative reactions in the Iranian press, which is heavily controlled and suppressed by the government, and many considered it contrary to the principles of the Iranian constitution. Of course, some also justified it in terms of support for Syria and the war against terrorism. Later, U.S. military officials revealed that the Russians had informed the anti-ISIS coalition that Russian aircraft might pass near coalition forces. From mid-September, the return of Russian forces to Latakia began again. Initially, cargo planes began unloading military equipment and supplies at the Hmeimim military base, and then they themselves exited in support of Russian fighter jets. Observers reported various accounts of the transport of these goods, and it seemed that part of it was also delivered to the Syrian army. Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah in Lebanon, was one of the first to describe this transfer as positive and impactful on the fate of Syria. In August, Turkish forces, which had just overcome the failed coup the previous month, crossed the common border with Syria and entered part of Syrian territory. The declared goal was to fight against ISIS elements and also Kurdish rebels. Despite some Kurdish-Syrian groups, especially the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), being recognized by the U.S. as forces distinct from ISIS and fighting against ISIS, Turkey does not differentiate them from ISIS terrorists and targets them in its attacks. Apparently, internal issues in Turkey and the problems it has with armed and separatist Kurds (PKK) lead Turkey to perceive any formation and action to create a political unit in the region, especially in northern Syria, as contrary to its national security and therefore aligns it with the goals of the PKK and acts against it. Turkey's actions regarding Syria can be interpreted as Turkey believing that Kurdish independence in northern Syria or even the independence of the Kurdistan region could be emulated by Turkish Kurds and become a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity. Therefore, the continuation of the Syrian crisis could delay this catastrophe; at the same time, a desirable leader (who, from Turkey's perspective, is not Bashar al-Assad) could manage society in a way that prevents the rise of smaller identities for secession. The Aleppo issue – The last month of 2016 was a decisive month in Russia's operational strategy in Syria and in restoring the regime's sovereignty over a very important part of Syrian territory. The largest city in Syria, Aleppo, had been under the control of various rebel groups since 2012. Aleppo, which is on UNESCO's World Heritage List and has been named by Time magazine as the largest commercial capital, was previously a multicultural treasure chest consisting of Kurds, Iranians, Turkmen, Armenians, and Serkis within an Arab historical context. Aleppo, which once had a population of only 300,000, had turned into a major industrial-commercial center with a population of 2.3 million by 2005, competing with Damascus in every respect. Today's Aleppo population is a mix of Sunni and Shia, while many Christians, including Armenians, and also Alawite Shia reside there. Anti-Assad protests in Aleppo began a year later than in other places. In fact, a year and four months after the onset of crackdowns in Syria, in the summer of 2012, various rebel and anti-Bashar groups infiltrated this valuable historical complex, and Bashar's regime, by ignoring UN demands to prevent the deepening of hostilities and halt the crackdowns, caused the crisis to take root rapidly within Aleppo. Over the past years, many professional rebels with backgrounds from Libya, Chechnya, and even France joined the rebel groups in Aleppo. From June to December 2016 – starting in June, the Syrian army began its attacks towards northwest Aleppo. Reports indicated Iranian participation in the Syrian army's operations, and it was from this point that the number of Iranian casualties in the Syrian war increased. By the end of the first month of the offensive, government forces were able to control communication routes that primarily came from the north and besiege the city of Aleppo. However, these temporary successes intensified the fighting with the rebels and made life in Aleppo increasingly difficult. After the bombing of Aleppo by Moscow in late summer and early autumn, the situation worsened. Moscow had promised to target only ISIS forces and not to interfere with Western-backed opposition groups, but from the very beginning, it was clear that there was a significant difference between words and actions. On September 22, a very extensive attack by government forces began. Reports indicated unprecedented bombings against rebel hideouts. These bombings unilaterally stopped around mid-October. The cessation of bombings was to allow ordinary people and rebels to exit from the eastern part of Aleppo. From November 15, airstrikes resumed, and government forces launched a major ground assault. By the end of the month, several neighborhoods in Aleppo had been targeted by attacks that made no distinction between civilians and military, resulting in thousands fleeing their homes.