Tactical Retreat Instead of Heroic Flexibility? Outlook on Change in Iran's Foreign Policy

Just a few days after Ali Khamenei spoke of "tactical retreat" on August 15, the Supreme Leader in another speech to members of Masoud Pezeshkian's cabinet deemed "interaction with the enemy" permissible under certain conditions. Khamenei stated to a group referred to as "the organizers of the National Congress of Martyrs of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province": "Non-tactical retreat in any field brings divine wrath, but sometimes there is tactical retreat, and that is not a flaw because retreat, like advance, is a tactic." He then said in his first meeting with members of Masoud Pezeshkian's cabinet regarding the "permissibility of interaction with the enemy": "Do not pin hopes on the enemy. Do not wait for the enemies' approval for our plans. This does not contradict interacting with the same enemy in some cases. This is not a barrier." The return of figures supportive of interaction with the world? The Supreme Leader made these remarks while just a few seats away sat Abbas Araghchi as Foreign Minister, who is known as a key figure in achieving the 2015 nuclear deal, a result of the Islamic Republic's interaction and dialogue with global powers, especially the United States. Since taking office as the new Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi has expressed Tehran's willingness to begin nuclear talks in several statements. Although he initially implicitly referred to the JCPOA as "irreversible" with its previous specifications, he emphasized that the new government does not intend to engage in "unnecessary delays" in negotiations to "lift sanctions." Pezeshkian and the "National Accord" government; with whom and for whom? All this comes as Mohammad Javad Zarif, after some back and forth, has resumed his role as "Strategic Deputy to the President." He has repeatedly spoken about the necessity of "managing differences" with the United States. During Masoud Pezeshkian's electoral campaign, Zarif played a prominent role, especially in the years after his tenure as Foreign Minister, emphasizing in various discussions that differences with the U.S. should not escalate into security issues and tensions. What message do all these developments, comments, and movements convey? Have the leaders of the Islamic Republic decided to implement a change in their foreign policy? Hamidreza Azizi, an expert on Iranian foreign policy, told Radio Farda: "It seems that the Islamic Republic has concluded, considering the series of regional and international events, that it is necessary to create a space and opportunity for dialogue, while we have a series of developments on the horizon that could have significant effects on Iran." This regional policy expert adds: "The likelihood of a broader war in the region, the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House, and the upcoming expiration date of the sunset clauses of the JCPOA in October next year, which could lead the remaining members of the JCPOA to activate the snapback mechanism and reinstate international sanctions against Iran, are the most important international factors in this regard. These factors, in my opinion, could lead Tehran to consider dialogue with Western countries as a priority in its agenda." A new chapter of "heroic flexibility"? However, this is not the first time Khamenei has spoken of "case-by-case interaction with the enemy." Although his remarks are often referenced in the context of the "heroic flexibility" that ultimately led to the 2015 nuclear agreement, Khamenei had also spoken of interaction with the enemy even during Ebrahim Raisi's government, yet no practical change occurred in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy approaches. This issue, along with the increasingly complex regional environment and the complicated political situation in the United States, especially with the upcoming presidential elections, leads many to speak more cautiously about the possibility of a real change in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy approaches. Although the presence of figures such as Abbas Araghchi, Javad Zarif, and Masoud Pezeshkian instead of senior officials from Ebrahim Raisi's government may open windows for potential thawing in relations between Tehran and Western capitals, even if Tehran has such intentions, it seems that the international environment, at least in the short term, is not ready for this. In less than three months, the presidential elections in the U.S. will take place, with Joe Biden spending his last days in power and his vice president Kamala Harris engaged in campaign activities. On the other hand, the world has experienced the U.S. withdrawal in 2018, and some analysts interpret Trump's decision as an effort to destroy the remnants of Barack Obama's administration; now, in a situation where polls indicate a close competition between Trump and Harris, what benefit could engaging in dialogue with Iran bring to Kamala Harris's campaign, especially given that conditions have changed significantly since 2013 and 2014? Proposed Iranian Foreign Minister; Who is Abbas Araghchi? The series of recent events, from Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022 to the extremist Hamas group's attack on Israel in October 2023, and the rising tensions in the Middle East, have led to Iran being recognized much more than before as one of the culprits disrupting regional order and security; in such conditions, and with the U.S. presidential elections approaching, there are many doubts that even reviving the JCPOA and the Iran nuclear agreement could be seen as a leverage for Kamala Harris's campaign and Joe Biden's administration, and conversely, it may even pave the way for Trump's campaign team to attack their opponent more. What are the signs of change? But internally, and without considering the international atmosphere, how can one be sure that Iran is moving towards a real change in its foreign policy? In such circumstances, perhaps monitoring some signs could provide a clearer picture of the Islamic Republic's intentions. Hamidreza Azizi states in this regard: "The nature of Iran's response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh could be one of these signs; if Iran decides to carry out operations as extensive as in April, it would complicate the situation. Although we see that both in the rhetoric of Abbas Araghchi and from Iranian military officials, the 'hard response' has given way to a 'calculated response.'" Azizi further points out that the outcome of the U.S. elections could significantly impact the future trajectory of Iran's foreign policy, and the manner in which discussions regarding the Islamic Republic's nuclear program are pursued could be another sign that could provide a better picture of Tehran's diplomatic outlook. He states: "First, the status of the JCPOA needs to be clarified; we need to see what the remaining members of the JCPOA think about Araghchi's statements regarding the impossibility of reviving the JCPOA and the need for reopening and renegotiating it. I think if discussions take place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September between the Iranian side and the remaining members of the JCPOA, it could be considered another sign indicating that Iran genuinely intends to implement changes in its foreign policy approaches." Although time may provide a more accurate picture of the outlook for Iran's diplomatic path, any changes in this process will not only face regional obstacles such as events in Lebanon and the Israel border, as well as international challenges like the outcome of the U.S. elections, which is even facing internal difficulties, and the conflicting interests of various political currents and power centers could each become obstacles to creating changes in this area.