Technical Constraints Continue to Threaten Nuclear Agreement

Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency returned to Vienna after a one-day stay in Tehran without any publishable results, despite recent statements by Ali Akbar Salehi about 'breaking the deadlock in technical negotiations.' Breaking the technical constraints in the nuclear negotiations with the Islamic Republic is considered one of the essential conditions of the U.S. and the 1+5 group to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran. Ali Akbar Salehi, who for the first time attended the negotiations in Geneva on February 21 as the head of the Atomic Energy Organization alongside Mohammad Javad Zarif, stated in an interview with the Fars News Agency that he had opened the technical constraints of the nuclear file during his meeting with Ernest Moniz, the U.S. Secretary of Energy. Salehi, who remains loyal to the policy of 'silence before finalizing the nuclear agreement,' did not explain which deadlocks he had opened in Geneva. The technical deadlocks in the Islamic Republic's nuclear file, which has a long list, are one of the two areas of dialogue between Iran and the international community. The other area involves political issues, which are led by the Islamic Republic's technical team. In November 2011, the IAEA raised 12 questions regarding past nuclear activities in Iran. These questions are generally related to activities suspected of having military dimensions aimed at acquiring nuclear weapon technology. The technical negotiations have practically stalled for several months, unlike the political negotiations with Iran, which have been ongoing without interruption and have reportedly made significant progress. The issue of conducting neutron shooting tests in Parchin to create a nuclear bomb trigger, visiting the suspicious site in Parchin, soil sampling, providing documents related to the mentioned tests, and discussions with technical experts on nuclear programs are only part of the remaining technical constraints that the Islamic Republic has refrained from addressing for the past six months. The opposition of Iranian military personnel, who control Parchin as a military center, to inspections—citing security considerations—has undoubtedly been one of the reasons for the lack of authorization for visits by agency representatives. Another reason could be the conduct of neutron tests and the fear of exposure. Apparently, Salehi's statement about 'breaking technical constraints' pertains to another area related to the future of the underground Fordow site and the change in the status of the main reactor core in Arak (from heavy water to a type that cannot produce plutonium). Plutonium, like uranium, is one of the two materials needed to build a nuclear bomb. The deadline for the comprehensive nuclear agreement framework with Iran ends at the end of March. Apparently, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have accepted this situation despite Ali Khamenei's previous opposition to 'two-stage negotiations' and have framed it as 'understanding' instead of 'agreement' to maintain the leader's face. At the beginning of next week, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the chief negotiator of the Islamic Republic, will first meet with John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, and the next day with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany. The aim of these meetings, which are considered the last opportunity in this phase of negotiations for reaching an initial agreement, is to clarify the framework of the final nuclear agreement after more than 18 months of negotiations. Even if the differences between the parties regarding the Arak reactor, the future of Fordow, the permissible number of centrifuges in Iran, and of course the issue of sanctions and the agreed duration for their gradual lifting are resolved, unresolved technical deadlocks and nuclear activities suspected of having military dimensions could prevent the negotiating parties from reaching a final agreement.