Temperature Check of the Presidential Election with a Cold and Repetitive Debate

The first debate among five early presidential election debates of 1403 was a long and boring program. The broadcast of emotional and promotional films about Ebrahim Raisi effectively shifted the atmosphere from the start, making criticism of his government costly and leading to a 'martyr-making' narrative from the government about Raisi that was endorsed by all candidates, including Behdarvand, who at least claims to be an opposition candidate to the current situation. The questions and comments from experts were general and lacked specific and up-to-date inquiries, failing to distinguish between the candidates' economic viewpoints. The poor quality of speech, lack of knowledge and understanding of basic economic principles, and the manner of speaking as if none of them had held responsibility until now and were just starting from scratch brought the impact of this debate almost to zero. This assessment relies on the significant gap between expectations and the reality that occurred in the first debate, which could be the last debate in terms of impact on the election outcome. The function of electoral debates is to reveal the points of contention and confront the sharp points of differences and otherness. Although this debate had minor confrontations, a bipolar atmosphere did not emerge. Masoud Behdarvand, despite provocations from Alireza Zakani and Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, did not engage in serious discussion to expose their false claims. Behdarvand likely refrained from serious confrontation with the principlists and criticizing Raisi's government to adhere to red lines and behind-the-scenes agreements. In terms of speech, oratory, and political expression, Mostafa Pourmohammadi was significantly different from others, but his structural refusal to gain votes due to security backgrounds and position was a problem. He tried to distance himself from the current situation and target the dissenting and gray areas. However, Ghazizadeh Hashemi's attack revealed his security nature and led him to repeat the government's propaganda in foreign policy while praising Ali Khamenei. Although Pourmohammadi belongs to the principlists, he seems to have a larger common voting base with Behdarvand, especially in fluid votes. Zakani, based on his personality traits and past activities within the Hezbollah basijis, known as a 'pressure group,' was the first line of attack against Behdarvand and his supporters, launching multiple attacks against Rouhani's government and reformists. However, his contradictions, relative distance from decorum, and false claims did not provide him an advantage in the debate. Ghazizadeh Hashemi was a repetition of the previous round, but it seems he uses these candidacies as a political deposit account for the future. However, Zakani failed to enhance his position among the principlists in the first debate. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf did not say anything particularly noteworthy in the debate, but by delineating himself from Raisi's government and especially supporting the necessity of lifting sanctions alongside increasing domestic capacity, he tried to reduce negative sensitivities towards himself. Sending a message of a break from Raisi's government performance could enhance Qalibaf's position in fluid votes. Qalibaf also did not engage in confrontational behavior with Behdarvand and reformists. He maneuvered on increasing workers' wages, which might be effective for those who have a short-term and situational view of the elections. The antidote to Qalibaf's approach could have been Behdarvand's response to expose the falsehoods of his claims and his role in preventing the reconstruction of the JCPOA, but Behdarvand did not do this. He did not even challenge Qalibaf's grand and unfeasible claims regarding domestic automakers and wage increases equal to inflation. Behdarvand performed relatively better than in the initial interview, but his main problems remained. The first debate showed that creating a wave by Behdarvand is difficult and perhaps impossible. Creating a wave requires polarizing the space, which Behdarvand himself shies away from. Other challenges for Behdarvand include a lack of insight into political and economic issues, being outdated, weak political skills, playing with words, and generalizations. Behdarvand once again showed that he does not understand politics as a process of conflict resolution and believes that he can create consensus through preaching and referring to religious texts like Nahj al-Balagha. Political theory and pragmatism remind us that political disputes are not resolvable and can only be peacefully resolved when fair rules of the game exist for the participation of all actors and the free choice of the people; a matter that Behdarvand neglects by inviting society to accept the principle of Velayat-e Faqih and Khamenei's superiority, which is a form of religious despotism, and by calling for understanding with an autocratic ruler, he expands the strategic depth of political authoritarianism. Nevertheless, parts of his speech received some attention on social media, leading to limited challenges. By referencing Iran's better situation than Turkey before the revolution, he inadvertently aligned himself with the Pahlavi regime, which contradicts his other positions that seek to implement the desired changes of the people while adhering to Khamenei's policies and opinions. Overall, doubts about Behdarvand's potential impact in the economic sphere, even at the level of presidential powers, were not alleviated. Behdarvand's efforts to create a dichotomy around sanctions against Qalibaf and Pourmohammadi were also unproductive. His informational oversight was so minimal that he even sought help from his rival Qalibaf regarding the performance of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Saeed Jalili was the same as he appeared in the 92 and 1400 elections, repeating general statements and previous grand claims like a broken record. He and his close associates have not been able to realize these claims even on a small scale. Almost no significant statements that could be understood within the framework of Iran's political realities were made. Jalili did not improve his position in this debate and further fueled the perception in the audience that he lacks even minimal competence. The final part of the debate was weaker than other sections. Behdarvand and Pourmohammadi lost the rhythm to their rivals by reading from paper. Jalili, Zakani, and Ghazizadeh Hashemi presented themselves as continuations of Raisi. The other three candidates did not openly confront Raisi but raised topics that diverged to varying degrees from the prevailing view of his government. In terms of adding to potential votes, Qalibaf can be considered the winner of this debate, but in terms of political capability display, Pourmohammadi was ahead of all. In the matter of displaying populism and lack of good governance skills, all candidates received failing grades, but Behdarvand's situation was relatively better. However, the impact of this debate increased doubts among undecided voters, which could work against Behdarvand. Despite all this, it should be noted that four more debates remain, and political and cultural debates may change the conditions; although the reduction of expectations from the impact of debates is itself one of the outcomes of the first debate.