Ten Unresolved National Cases

Over the past 36 years, cases have emerged in the public opinion and media of Iran that involve public crimes; however, these cases have either not been established in the judicial system or have not progressed at any stage of investigation or sentencing. What has been the nature of these cases? Why have they not been investigated or ultimately archived? What do these cases have in common? Disappearance of Statues: In 2010, statues in Tehran and some other cities (like Ahvaz) were stolen. Initially, the statues in Tehran disappeared one by one. After a year, despite having recorded footage of the thieves in the hands of the police, no one was arrested, and the authorities of the police and municipality referred the matter to others. (What’s the news about the theft of the city’s statues? Etemad, June 5, 2011) This silence and lack of follow-up implicates influential gangs close to the government in the theft of the statues. Subsequently, the statues of horses and their riders (Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sasanian soldiers that were made in Italy 54 years ago at Iran's request) were collected from a square in Sari and sent to a landfill (the footage is available on YouTube and the photos on various websites). These artworks were not small in size, and heavy machinery was needed to transport some of them. Their theft was carried out in such a way that no observer could report on them, let alone prevent their theft. After a while, it was only promised that similar ones would be made and installed by other artists, which has yet to happen. The destruction of statues was not limited to 2010 and 2011. In the early 2000s, statues in Isfahan were also set on fire. Acid Attacks in Isfahan: Several months after acid attacks on a number of women in Isfahan (between 4 to 15 according to official and unofficial reports), there has been no progress in this case. The commander of the Islamic Republic's police stated several months after these crimes: "The issue of acid attacks in Isfahan has not yet reached a conclusion." (IRNA, January 13, 2015) The Deputy Minister of Security and Police, Hossein Zolfaqari, said during a press conference about the latest status of the Isfahan acid attack case: "We have examined those with psychological problems, those at risk of divorce, or even black-clad motorcyclists. We have now examined 191,000 people and narrowed it down to 100,000 suspects." (Arya News Agency, December 13, 2014) The population of Isfahan in 2014 was about two million, of which one million were men. Men aged 15 to 30, who were very likely to be the acid throwers, constituted about 30% of the country's population according to the age pyramid in 2011. Thus, about 300,000 men in Isfahan were aged 15 to 30. Assuming 191,000 suspects means suspecting 2 out of every 3 young men aged 15 to 30 in this city, which fundamentally renders the idea of suspicion and investigation meaningless. Even if we consider the final 100,000 after filtering this population (it is unclear which filter), still one in every three would be a suspect, indicating the futility of the investigations and giving the acid throwers the assurance that they would never be arrested. If it is a matter of cover-up and denial, the actions of a member of parliament from Isfahan, who denied the Isfahan acid throwers were from Isfahan (Hassan Kamran, Alef, December 15, 2014), seem more consistent. Attacks on University Dormitories: In the 1990s and 2000s, several university dormitories (twice at Tehran University and once at Tabriz University) were attacked. In these attacks, hundreds were injured and several were killed. Despite being condemned by regime officials, the cases of these attacks were pursued in all instances except one. In the one case that was pursued (the attack on Tehran University dormitory in July 1999), ultimately a soldier was convicted of stealing a razor. There is no trace of the investigation into the murder of Ezzatollah Ibrahim Nejad in this case. Deaths in Prison: Zahra Kazemi, Sattar Beheshti, Akbar Mohammadi, Omidreza Mirsiyafi, and many others have died under unnatural circumstances in prison over the past 36 years, and the complaints of their families have led nowhere. The bodies of these individuals were immediately buried after death without informing their families and without autopsy by independent authorities and without family supervision; in some cases, the entire grave was cemented. This has become so routine that the families of the victims no longer file formal complaints because they know it will not be addressed. Invalidating 700,000 Votes in Tehran: In the sixth parliamentary elections, about 700,000 votes in Tehran were invalidated to prevent Alireza Rajai from entering parliament, allowing Gholamali Haddad Adel to take his seat. Mostafa Tajzadeh, the political deputy of the Ministry of Interior, submitted a complaint regarding this to Ahmad Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council. This complaint was never investigated. Assassinations in the 1980s and 1990s: In the 1980s and 1990s, dozens, if not hundreds, of Iranian dissidents inside and outside the country were assassinated by agents of the Islamic Republic or their allies (Hezbollah of Lebanon) both domestically and abroad. Except for a few (Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar, Mohammad Mokhtari, and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh), no cases were established. In the case of those four, the instigators and fatwa issuers were never tried. The Massacre of 1988 and the Destruction of Khavaran: Cases like the massacre of between three to five thousand prisoners in 1988 or the destruction of Khavaran cemetery, where they were buried, have not been able to be raised in the judicial system of the Islamic Republic. The families of the victims have either been pursued themselves or have found filing complaints with the judiciary (assuming such complaints were accepted) to be futile. Attacks on Baha'is: Over the past 36 years, hundreds of Baha'is have been killed through summary trials or without trial. Many cases of the killing of Baha'is have been left unaddressed outside the judiciary. For example, Attaollah Rezvani was abducted on August 24, 2013, in Bandar Abbas, and a day later, his body was found in one of the roads near Bandar Abbas inside his car, with a bullet shot to his head. He had been threatened multiple times by the intelligence and security forces of Bandar Abbas. Investigator Emani of the second branch of the public and revolutionary court in Bandar Abbas and the person responsible for the Rezvani case told the Rezvani family that they found no clues as to whether this incident was a murder or suicide and that this case would lead nowhere. He advised the Rezvani family to accept blood money from the state to close the case. According to Iranian criminal laws, if a body is found in public places and after a while, the murderer or murderers are not found, the heirs can receive blood money from the state, and after that, the case will be closed. The Rezvani family did not accept this offer and demanded that the case be pursued, but Emani said that if they had evidence of murder by someone, they should file a complaint against them. According to Iranian judicial laws, the responsibility of finding the murderer lies with the investigator of the case. In another recent case, Leila Kargar, a Baha'i citizen residing in Shiraz, was killed after drinking a beverage poisoned with rice pill (aluminum phosphide). According to a family member, Ms. Kargar went for a walk in a park near "Chaharrah Mosir" in Shiraz on January 9, as she had done in previous days, and after returning, she suffered severe nausea and vomiting and died shortly after being taken to the emergency room. The attending physician diagnosed the cause of death as "rice pill" consumption. Before her death, Kargar had told her family members that a woman she had met in the park and discussed religious issues with had given her juice. According to a family member, despite a week passing since her death, her body had still not been returned to her family. Kahrizak: In the Kahrizak case, ultimately a few low-level police officers were administratively punished, and there has been no news about the execution of their sentences. The formation of the case was also influenced by the presence of a child of one of the officials among the deceased. The instigators of these crimes were never tried. The Deaths and Injuries of the Green Movement: In the case of dozens of protesters killed in the streets, no cases have been established. Most families of the deceased see no avenue or means to file complaints. Many of them, under government threats, could not even hold memorial services for their deceased. Some of the deceased were also counted as Basij casualties killed by protesters. Besides the deceased, hundreds were injured during these protests by police, paramilitary, and plainclothes forces. According to Hossein Hamadani, one of the IRGC commanders, 830 people were paralyzed during the crackdowns (Asr Iran, February 8, 2015); this was later denied by the IRGC's public relations, which introduced 830 as the total number of injured. (Fars, February 8, 2015) The injured have never been able to file complaints against the forces or officials. Common Features: The common features of all these cases are: 1) All these cases relate to issues concerning the foundations of the government and its survival, such as the sanctity of statue-making and installation in public spaces (according to Sharia), considering a religious minority as impure (according to Sharia), reacting to street protests to challenge legitimacy (Green Movement), undermining social movements (student movement), discouraging political activists, destroying opposition groups, and disrupting the process of news reporting and information dissemination; 2) There is no will to investigate these cases even if they are registered; the relevant officials have made statements in the face of pressure from families and public opinion indicating they cannot pursue the case; 3) In all these cases, there is a clear fingerprint or footprint of the coercive powers (security, judicial, military, and police forces and Basij and plainclothes forces); the presumed suspects in these cases are forces affiliated with and close to the government; 4) All government powers are using force, money, and other government resources to close established cases or to prevent the formation of complaints and cases altogether. In some of them, families have been coerced into not pursuing cases; in others, families have been offered money to drop their pursuit; and in some, family members have been arrested.