Terrorism: Government Vulnerability and a Major Barrier for Society

The armed attack on the annual military parade in Ahvaz, resulting in the deaths and injuries of dozens of military personnel and civilians, once again brought the ugly face of 'terrorism' to the forefront of Iranian attention. The meaning and examples necessary to label an action as 'terrorism' are a subject of debate, and there are no universal objective criteria regarding this phenomenon, which has political, theoretical, social, and religious dimensions. The instrumental approaches of global powers have also added to the complexity of the issue. Furthermore, part of the definition is subjective and depends on the desires and inner intentions of the actor or group involved. However, since the indiscriminate attack resulted in the loss of life of non-combatants, particularly a child, and the targeted military personnel were mostly soldiers who had joined the armed forces for mandatory military service, labeling the tragic incident in Ahvaz on the last day of Shahrivar 1397 (September 22, 2018) as a 'terrorist act' is justified and accurate. Beyond the reactions, from a technical perspective, the event reflects two possibly contradictory or conflicting images. First, it reiterates the high vulnerability of the Islamic Republic to terrorist movements within Iran. Similar to the ISIS attack on the Majlis (Parliament) building, the assassination of scientists and managers of the Atomic Energy Organization, or the attacks by radical Baluch groups in Sistan and Baluchestan, the threshold of surprise for the security and military apparatus of the Islamic Republic regarding asymmetric military operations is low. The disruption of the military parade in front of television cameras and the terrified faces of the people who had come to watch the parade, along with blood-soaked soldiers, challenged the image of authority that the Islamic Republic seeks to project. This challenge undermines the regime's claim of securing the country through regional intervention aimed at confronting 'terrorist groups.' It was already clear that this claim was merely a justification, and in reality, the Islamic Republic has not faced significant and credible threats from terrorism within the country. In the few 'terrorist incidents' that have occurred, none have been particularly complex, and it can even be said that they were carried out by relatively amateur or poorly trained forces. The negligence in the aforementioned event was so great that it even drew public criticism from Hoshmatollah Falahatpisheh, the head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament. The weakness of the Khuzestan Intelligence Department was such that it discovered the terrorists' safe house only after the act was committed! This claim, however, is not confirmed and may serve as a propaganda tool to escape criticism and protests. Although complete information about the backgrounds of the perpetrators of the Ahvaz tragedy is not available, some unconfirmed reports suggest their infiltration into the Basij organization. For example, Mohammad Taher Kan'ani, a lawyer close to the judiciary, wrote on his Telegram channel: 'The killers reportedly attacked under the guise of Revolutionary Guards soldiers and seemed to have infiltrators within the Basij, not from outside the units. The attackers used the cover of popular Basij members to infiltrate. The organization of the assassination was from within the units. Four individuals from the units present at the parade shot.' Over the past two decades, Iranian intelligence and judicial officials have repeatedly announced the identification of networks of spies from the security apparatuses of foreign countries and claimed to have closed the created information gaps. However, the continued arrests and the formation of related courts, along with a relatively large number of convictions for espionage, raise serious doubts about the accuracy of this claim, and it seems that the security institutions of the Islamic Republic are facing the challenge of an 'information tunnel' rather than a repairable 'information gap' from the involved institutions or groups. In fact, infiltration into the governing institutions of the Islamic Republic is not difficult, and this reality has increased the government's weakness in controlling terrorism. The repeated failures in deterrence against 'beginner terrorists' have also invalidated the hypothesis that the government's severe retaliatory actions prevent the spread of terrorism in Iran. However, why, despite this deficiency and the Islamic Republic's conflict with some jihadist Islamists, including ISIS, are 'terrorist activities' rare within Iran? The answer to this question is related to the different aspect of the Ahvaz attack. The widespread reactions in society in disgust at this harmful and inhumane act, as well as the high convergence of various political and civil currents in Iran in condemning it, demonstrated the high solidarity of Iranians against terrorism and the high cost of this violent act for its perpetrators. Terrorism is based on two negative and positive goals. The negative goal is the individual or individuals chosen for killing, as well as the political system or society that must be instilled with fear. However, the positive goal is the community and collective desired by the 'terrorists' to attract their favorable attention through their operations. Fortunately, Iranian society once again showed that there is no capacity within its various sectors to welcome terrorism in any form. This characteristic, which has cultural, social, psychological, and political dimensions, is a significant barrier to the spread of 'terrorist activities.' Opposition to extrajudicial punishment and essentially the deprivation of the right to life of individuals within the social layers of Iran is on the rise. This awareness and social growth is a solid barrier that prevents terrorism from taking root in Iran and going beyond sporadic and non-sustainable acts. However, safeguarding this potential requires delving into the roots of violence and the reasons for attracting dissatisfied and protesting individuals to the terrorist network. As long as the factors creating discrimination, inequality, and poverty in areas that experience relatively more deprivation and ethnic-sectarian tensions are not eliminated, 'terrorist groups' can recruit forces by investing in accumulated anger and hatred and ignorance. Therefore, the lack of social groundwork in Iranian society and the interconnectedness of various ethnicities, classes, and religions is a significant barrier to the spread of 'terrorist activities.' Of course, after this main factor, the decision of some extremist Sunni Islamists, such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, to avoid confrontation with the Islamic Republic and some tactical exchanges between them and the security and military institutions of the government also contribute to the low statistics of 'terrorist attacks' in Iran.