The 10-Year Record of Sadeq Larijani; The System's Jailkeeper

On August 5, 2009, the newspaper Etelaat published an open letter. Its author was Mostafa Mohaghegh-Damad, a professor of law and philosophy, addressed to Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the then-head of the judiciary. Mohaghegh-Damad wrote that the judiciary during Shahroudi's era was 'not only unstable but publicly destroyed.' This was an interesting remark, considering that Shahroudi had used the same expression about Mohammad Yazdi's presidency just days before his own presidency was announced on August 1, 1999: 'Today, the judiciary is nothing but a ruin.' About ten years after Mohaghegh-Damad's letter, if someone were to write to Sadeq Larijani, what expression would they use? 'Historical criminal,' 'just jurist,' and he became the head of the judiciary. Sadeq Amoli Larijani is an unassailable, hasty, hot-tempered, straightforward, vengeful, and ambitious figure. He knows how to speak and speaks a lot, enjoys debate, and likes to appear strong and bold. Where he said Ahmadinejad did not dare to yell at him or told Rouhani what business he had wanting to break the house arrest, was a deliberate display of this self-imposed bravado. Nevertheless, he has not been much of a politician, has not nurtured students, nor has he built a network, unlike his brother Ali Larijani. In the 2015 Assembly of Experts elections, fearing he would not be elected or his defeat in the Assembly's presidency elections in June 2016, it was evident that he could not convert his power and influence into a network and pawns. He faced the same problem in the judiciary; Ebrahim Raisi, who had been the first deputy of the judiciary since 2004, had become Raisi himself and had a strong network, and Larijani eventually transferred him from the first deputy position to the attorney general in 2014 to perhaps at least form his judicial network. Sadeq Larijani comes from a rooted family in the political structure that emerged from the 1979 revolution, both in terms of jurisprudence and politics. His roots are not only due to being a cleric or being the son-in-law of 'Vahid Khorasani,' but he has also been a clever cleric. In the fall of 1988, when Abdulkarim Soroush's collection of articles 'The Theoretical Expansion and Contraction of Sharia' caused turmoil and anger in the seminary, Sadeq Larijani was the first to write a detailed response against Soroush. Their debate lasted about seven or eight months, and his fame spread more. This was his serious entry into discussions of human sciences, as an opponent of Western human sciences, which he claimed 'export liberal society's values' and from this perspective opposed the promotion of sciences like 'psychology and sociology.' He has spoken a lot about his opposition to human sciences but has not been able to do anything significant, even at Imam Sadiq University, which he has now become the godfather of and is supposed to be the cradle of transformation in human sciences and the birth of Islamic human sciences. In 1992, when Sadeq Larijani's father died, he became his executor and head of their seminary. In 1996, he became a member of the Assembly of Experts representing his province, Mazandaran. In 2001, he received a membership decree in the Guardian Council from Khamenei, and in 2009, he became the head of the judiciary by his decree. Now, as he is leaving, he is still a member of the Guardian Council and head of the Expediency Council. In addition to the Imam Sadiq University organization, he himself has a growing collection in Qom and is also a member of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council and the cyberspace council. His two influential brothers, Ali and Mohammad Javad, who have formed what Abdulkarim Soroush describes as the 'triangle of wealth, power, and deception,' continue to stand behind their brother. Throughout these years, while Sadeq Larijani has rapidly risen, there have been no shortage of controversies in his life. Since the summer of 2006, when villagers around the city of Amol were arrested for protesting the forced sale of their lands by Sadeq Larijani, until now, when allegations of 'his daughter's espionage' circulate on social media and ambiguities about his brother Mohammad Javad Larijani's land-grabbing case and the bribery of his other brother, Fazel Larijani, remain, his name has always been tied to corruption and controversy. The 'personal accounts' of the head of the judiciary have also been a troublesome case for him; from Mahmoud Sadeghi, a representative from Tehran, who called Sadeq's reaction to the pursuit of these accounts 'nonsense,' to Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, who referred to Larijani as a 'wealthy tough guy' having '300 million dollars' in his personal accounts, have always angered Sadeq Larijani. Despite all these controversies and oppositions, he is now considered a high-ranking confidant of Ali Khamenei. The leader of the Islamic Republic, who sees the judiciary as a crucial pillar of the regime's survival, has consistently provided special support for Sadeq in all decrees and meetings, praising his character, and in return, Sadeq Larijani's language has been smooth and soft, making him a full-fledged 'court jurist,' as Akbar Ganji puts it; he has referred to the leader's requests as 'velayati orders,' deemed oversight over the leader meaningless, described the leader's statements as indescribable, issued directives, and monopolized asset confiscation to the 'Executive Headquarters of Imam's Command,' which is the wealthiest institution affiliated with the leader, and of course, has accomplished significant missions: The first mission; pressure on the 'head of affairs' of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which, according to Hossein Ali Shahriari, a representative from Zahedan, 'is not at the head of affairs, but at the bottom of affairs,' has always had the sword of the Guardian Council's elimination hanging over it. In the past ten years, another sword has been added; the judiciary. During Larijani's era, the prosecution and pressure on parliamentary representatives peaked. In June 2011, when this pressure was gaining momentum, Ahmad Tavakoli, a representative from the eighth parliament, wrote a letter to Larijani stating that this would cause 'fear, sadness, and despair,' but there was no listening ear, and Tavakoli himself was later summoned in May 2014 regarding a case. In July 2012, it was Ali Motahari's turn to be charged by the Tehran prosecutor against him. Sadeq Larijani had a new argument at that time. He said the interpretation of judicial immunity for parliament members, which is based on Article 86 of the Constitution, is an illusion and false. Motahari managed to respond, saying these remarks 'smell of despotism,' and he did not go to court, but Larijani did not cease his confrontation with the representatives, and the peak of these pursuits was in December 2016 when, after Mahmoud Sadeghi's inquiries about the personal accounts of the head of the judiciary, judicial agents went to the parliament member's house at night to arrest him. The arrest did not happen due to Ali Larijani's intervention, but judicial officials reiterated that representatives do not have immunity. The goal of that failed nighttime raid was the same. The second mission; reviving Khalqhali. In the history of the Islamic Republic, the name of two Sadeqs is tied to executions, Sadeq Khalqhali and Sadeq Larijani. He describes opposition to executions as opposition to Islam, characterizing the executions of 1988 as 'according to Sharia and law' and has repeatedly expressed his opposition to the elimination or reduction of executions publicly. As reported by the Iran Human Rights Organization, the statistics of executions have shown an upward trend since Sadeq Larijani became head in 2008. A simple comparison is enough to understand the disaster. In the last three years of Shahroudi's term, 600 people were executed, and in the first three years of Larijani's term, about 1200 people. Between 2009 and 2018, approximately 69,000 people were executed while Larijani was in charge. Criticism of the rise in executions has never forced Larijani to retreat; just a few months ago, he threatened economic activists with execution and, despite the parliament's efforts to limit executions in drug-related cases, he explicitly stated that the elimination of execution is 'not the policy of the judiciary.' His insistence was not limited to executions; he was a staunch defender of the implementation of Hudud and Qisas and no judge has spoken against 'human rights' as much as he has. He has been on the EU sanctions list since 2012 for human rights violations, not only considering Iran's accession to the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' a mistake and calling international human rights documents 'pieces of paper,' but he even opposed the implementation of the 'Citizen's Rights Charter' of Rouhani's government, deeming the establishment of a 'Citizen's Rights Institution' contrary to Sharia and law, stating that all matters should be referred to the 'Human Rights Headquarters' of the judiciary, which his brother, Mohammad Javad Larijani, was the secretary of. The secretary who called the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran a 'clown,' paid no attention to European human rights criticisms, and agreed with Sadeq, who said that some European officials should be banned from entering for criticizing human rights conditions in Iran, preventing civil activists from meeting with European officials, and that Europeans should explain the human rights situation in their own countries. The third mission; suppressing the sedition. The suppression and marginalization of reformists during Sadeq Larijani had two aspects. The first was the same approach that the judiciary during Shahroudi began and Larijani completed, resulting in the imprisonment, exile, and emigration of many reformists and their elimination from the political and social arena. The second aspect, however, began in August 2013, after Rouhani's victory in the presidential elections, when Sadeq entered the field and opened his warning tongue: 'The seditionists have once again raised their heads, and it seems that the snake has been warmed and is moving, but they are mistaken.' Sadeq Larijani, who considered the reformist plan of 'national reconciliation' to be without subject matter and insisted on the limitation of Khatami, also had an open hand in the Guardian Council. He was a member of the council and believed that 'opponents of the religious government' should be eliminated. The reformists, however, were not opposed to the religious government but were opposed to the government of figures like Larijani, and this was enough for their marginalization. The fourth mission; controlling Ahmadinejad.