The 60-Day Deadline That Made No Change

Sixty days have passed since U.S. President Donald Trump announced his administration's strategic policy towards Iran. At that time, one of the actions taken by the U.S. President was to not certify Iran's compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA and to open a 60-day window for Congress to take action in this regard. Now, that 60-day deadline has expired, but no practical action has been taken by American lawmakers that could yield results by the end of this deadline, and once again a 90-day deadline awaits the President, which will arrive on January 11. January 12 will also see another 120-day deadline for the President to sign sanctions waivers. Two months ago, when Donald Trump was about to announce his policy towards Iran, his advisors stated that the President's decision regarding the JCPOA 'provides a few months or even years of opportunity for the U.S. and its allies to reach an agreement on the limitations facing Iran and to create a united front to pressure Iran to negotiate over some of these limitations.' David Albright, founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security and a critic of the JCPOA, confirms this perspective of Trump's advisors, stating that a President who initially believed the U.S. should exit the agreement immediately has now conceded to a 'compromise' to address the challenges of the coming years. Albright refers to a phase of the JCPOA in its eighth year known as 'Transition Day' and assesses the U.S. government's perspective as a forward-looking one, saying: 'The eighth year has always been seen as a sign that some issues need to be addressed and perhaps changes should be made. What the Trump administration has decided is that we need to prepare for the eighth year today and cannot wait. Perhaps Obama-era officials would say we can deal with this later, and there is plenty of time, but Trump officials believe that there is not much time left, Iran is getting stronger, and will be more resistant to changes, and the U.S. has lost much of its previous influence over Iran, therefore, it must seek to change the situation now so that when the eighth year of the agreement arrives, Iran is in a position to seriously consider concessions.' The eighth year of the agreement, which will arrive in six years, is when the U.S. must lift other nuclear sanctions against Iran, and Iran must also ratify the Additional Protocol in its parliament. However, Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, does not assess the recent actions of the government regarding the JCPOA as looking to the future. Kimball, who is a supporter of the JCPOA, states that Donald Trump, by not certifying Iran's compliance, has only implemented a campaign promise. He adds: 'Some supporters of the President's approach say that this should be started now to clarify what will happen in 10 or 15 years, but I think this is a mistake because the agreement must remain intact, all parties must adhere to their commitments, and then discussions about the future can begin based on the key elements of the JCPOA. We can even talk about globalizing some of the restrictions imposed on Iran and explore the possibility of applying them regionally. We need to find ways to discuss other sanctions regarding human rights and terrorism, how to reduce these sanctions if relations improve, although it does not seem we are heading in that direction. But all of this is on the condition that the JCPOA remains the cornerstone.' The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group, consisting of three European allies of the U.S., the UK, Germany, and France, as well as Russia and China, was reached. Since two months ago when the U.S. President did not certify Iran's compliance, these countries have repeatedly emphasized that the JCPOA must remain intact, but among them, the three European countries have stressed U.S. concerns regarding Iran's other behaviors, including stating that discussions could be held regarding some of these concerns, such as Iran's ballistic missile program. UN Security Council Resolution 2231 calls on Iran not to develop and test ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons. However, Iran has repeatedly stated that it will not negotiate over this program, which it claims is defensive. David Albright states that negotiating about the missile program will not satisfy the U.S. and will not be sufficient for Washington. He adds: 'I have been in meetings with Europeans, and they are very interested in advancing the missile issue, but I and others have informally conveyed the message that this will not be enough, and it has also been raised at the official level that this will not be sufficient. I do not know what the Trump administration's approach is to the three European countries starting these negotiations without the U.S., but I think it is a good idea, just as they started nuclear talks in 2003 without the U.S. But it is not enough; I think the Europeans are gradually realizing that the idea that Iran will be very good in the next 10 years is a mistake, and they cannot expect change. At the same time, they realize that in eight years they cannot accept that Iran has a very extensive enrichment program, just as they did not accept it in 2015. This is considering that, for example, Iran is engaging in all sorts of bad actions in the region.' However, on the other side of this issue, Daryl Kimball explains that discussions about the arms and missile program should include all countries in the region to provide an incentive for Iran to be willing to come to the negotiating table on this issue and adds: 'I think the Trump administration believes that Iran's behavior in the region is on par with a threat like the military nuclear program. They want to draw attention to these issues, aligning themselves with Saudi Arabia in the Riyadh-Tehran conflict, and I think in the long run, such an approach makes it harder to address issues like the proliferation of weapons in the Middle East, including those that will expire in 10 or 15 years in the JCPOA or the ballistic missile program.' While the path ahead for Iran and the P5+1 group is ambiguous and it is unclear what the final outcome of the JCPOA will be, the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to monitor Iran's actions based on the JCPOA and has so far confirmed it. The Joint Commission of the six countries and Iran will also meet again on Wednesday, December 13, in Vienna to review the implementation of the JCPOA.