The Account of a Prominent American Hostage on the 45-Year Impact of the Embassy Occupation on the People of Iran

It has been 45 years since the group known as "Muslim Students Following the Line of Imam" stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran; an event that resulted in the hostage-taking of over 50 Americans for 444 days, creating a major crisis in Tehran-Washington relations whose consequences continue to this day. One of the diplomats taken hostage, who was trapped in the embassy building throughout the crisis, was John Limbert. At 81 years old, he spoke with Radio Farda about this event, its consequences, and the future of relations between the two countries. John Limbert joined the U.S. State Department in 1973 and had just begun his work at the embassy a few weeks before the attack when he and his colleagues were taken hostage. After his release in January 1981, Limbert continued to work in the State Department until his retirement, serving in positions such as ambassador, deputy secretary for counter-terrorism, and first deputy secretary of state for Iran. In a past interview, I heard you refer to the hostage crisis as a "wound that has not healed." Do you still think of this event in the same way? Unfortunately, it is a wound that has not healed and may still be festering. However, I now think that after 45 years, it is time to move beyond this issue and look realistically at the benefits for ourselves and the future of the people of both countries. If we want to remain stuck in the so-called swamp of the past, perhaps that situation benefits some people. I do not understand why, after 45 years, we have still not been able to move past this issue. Why not? I ask this because you have been one of the few voices over these four decades who spoke with a forward-looking approach and emphasized the importance of moving beyond this event. This is a great mystery, and it is very hard for me to understand. For example, look at the stories of U.S. relations with Vietnam, China, or Cuba, which had so many wounds and casualties; yet if there are no friendly relations today, at least there is some relationship. We can talk to each other. But why has this not happened with Iran? It remains a mystery to me. Perhaps the continuation of this situation benefits some people. Who does this animosity benefit? It does not benefit the Iranian people; it does not benefit the American people. So why is it this way? It remains a mystery to me. If they looked at it rationally, they would see that this initial hostage-taking—during our hostage period—caused great harm to the Iranian people. You look at Iran now, with its people, its resources, and its land; it should be a paradise. Why is it not? There are various reasons, but one of them is that the effects of this hostage crisis are still present. This issue has kept Iran in a state of isolation, and interestingly, as far as I understand, the hostage-takers themselves have realized this. They now say what a mistake we made and how our actions caused such misery. Mr. Limbert, what impact did being a hostage for 444 days have on you and your life? First of all, I really regret why this happened. I had been in Iran for six or seven years before this incident. I am a member of a very educated and active Iranian family that was scattered due to the revolution. But they still maintained that connection and those roots. I constantly ask myself why it should be this way. What policy is this? Who benefited from it? Make no mistake, Ms. Kavyani! I do not like the Islamic Republic or the system of the Islamic Republic and the dominance of a group of so-called clerics; I dislike it very much. But at the same time, I know that it should not be this way. I wish it were different. And my constant effort has been to create a relationship that ultimately benefits both countries. Not to remain in a state of empty slogans, exchanging accusations and insults. What way can we find a more fruitful approach? Ali Khamenei is seen talking to John Limbert at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In response to Khamenei's inquiry about the conditions of the hostages, Limbert says, "The only problem is that we are here." In these decades, have you ever felt that you were getting closer to that hope and aspiration you had for Iran and the U.S.? There were times when there were advancements. For example, during Khatami's presidency, it seemed that the walls were slowly coming down a bit. The same was true during Obama and Rouhani. There was a small opening. There is a saying that goes, "If the big door is closed, look for a small window." Unfortunately, for whatever reasons, it was destined or not meant to be that these efforts would reach a greater outcome and remained, so to speak, unfulfilled. Perhaps for some, improving or normalizing relations was unfamiliar. They were afraid, and the old way, even if it had no results, was familiar to them. They knew how to insult the other side, but they did not know how to advance this relationship in a more fruitful and positive way. When I looked at one of the images from the hostage crisis related to your conversation with Mr. Khamenei, it seemed to me that your manner of behavior and expression reflected a deep understanding of the society that you had now become a hostage of its politicians. Don’t you think that that depth of understanding and familiarity with each other's society no longer exists, and this might be one of the reasons why both sides cannot find a new path between themselves? It is possible. When he came to the embassy to meet us, it was 44 years ago. My behavior was nothing more than the normal work of a diplomat. There is a saying that goes, "Cutting someone's head with cotton." I never insulted him. I did not say anything bad. This is the work of a diplomat. Unfortunately, I think that in these forty-some years, diplomacy has not been utilized much. Now, I do not know if they have forgotten this or have not learned it? Diplomacy is not about surrendering or accepting everything. What is diplomacy? Listening, being patient, having control over one’s emotions. I was a hostage there, I was in prison, but I was still a diplomat. Of course, for example, during the JCPOA when Mr. Kerry and Mr. Zarif were negotiating, and Mr. Salehi and Mr. Moniz, a bit of the profession of diplomacy was used again. It was as if they went into the garage, opened a box, and found some rusty tools, but they still worked. Now, why it did not work out and reach a conclusion is another matter. Another requirement of diplomacy is not to abandon the subject. If the first way does not lead anywhere, you go for the second, third, or fourth way. And eventually, you reach a conclusion. Since we are talking on the anniversary of the hostage crisis, I want to ask you this question. Have you ever thought about forgiving those who took you hostage? The issue of forgiveness is not relevant here. It does not matter whether I forgive or not. Hafez says, "The war of seventy-two nations, excuse them all / Since they did not see the truth, they made a legend." They made a legend. We saw the result of that. If anyone wants forgiveness or an apology, it does not concern me or my colleagues. It may, but it is more related to the Iranian people themselves. You see how the Iranian people have suffered over these 45 years. In terms of inflation, unemployment, war. The eight-year war with Iraq was directly a result of the hostage crisis. Tyranny, oppression. Because in the early days of the revolution, there was still a struggle between various political currents. In those early days, for example, there was no mandatory hijab. There were various newspapers and groups. There was some freedom. At that time, it was not clear that this path would lead to tyranny. And do you think the hostage crisis was a turning point in this regard? Yes, it had a lot to do with the hostage crisis. In fact, one of the hostage-takers, I do not remember who it was, explicitly told me that you should not think this event is about you, the Shah, or America. This is an internal reckoning. They wanted to crush the religious opposition groups, they wanted to suppress them, to silence them, and that is exactly what happened. No one dared to say explicitly that what you did was wrong. It is against all our national customs. Which Iranian behaves this way with a guest who is responsible for their safety? But no one dared to say that, or if they did, they would have to pay a heavy price for it. I would love to return [to Iran]. Our children are Iranian-American. Fifty percent are Iranian from their mother. Our daughter was born in Tehran and our son in Shiraz. They still know Persian and have a deep attachment to Iran. John Limbert, since you mentioned behavior towards guests, I wanted to ask about this. When you were a hostage, did you ever think that you might lose your life and not return to America alive? Yes. There were times when we had some show executions, and some things were very scary. But I somewhat knew or had convinced myself that one day, whether tomorrow, the day after, or next year, we would leave this place. But we knew that this was not in our hands. Mr. Limbert, a topic in the political atmosphere of America has resurfaced in the last couple of years that I want to ask you about. Last year, Mr. Ben Barnes, a well-known politician from Texas, revealed that during negotiations by Reagan's campaign, he was involved in delaying your release until after the elections and was present in this regard during a trip to the Middle East. We are talking about what is known as the October Surprise. In recent weeks, a new book titled "Den of Spies" has been published. We know that after initial reports on this matter, congressional investigations did not reach a conclusion, and it was said that there was no negotiation. What significance do you think discussing this topic has, and that perhaps you could have been released several months earlier? Look! If we want to discuss this issue, it could take a long time. Mr. Craig Unger, who wrote this book, says he has been working on this issue for thirty years. About 32 years ago, Mr. Gary Sick—who worked in the White House during Carter's administration—also wrote a book called "October Surprise." Another journalist named Robert Parry also wrote about it. But people did not accept it much. At that time, in 1979 and 1980, almost everyone in Iran knew. Of course, they may not have known precisely who was negotiating with whom. But they knew something was going on. I mean, they knew that first, the results of the U.S. presidential election had to be clear, and then you would be released. They knew more. The fact that Imam Khomeini disliked Carter and wanted to humiliate him by any means possible, to crush him, and what better way than for him to lose the election? Then he could say we did this. We defeated Carter. Because of the brave action of, for example, the Iranian people, Carter was defeated. On the other hand, the American Republicans who were rivals, meaning those around (Ronald) Reagan, especially Mr. (William) Casey, who later became the head of the CIA and was responsible for Reagan's campaign activities, had almost the same goal. They wanted Carter to lose. They thought that if we were released before November 1980, Carter's chances of winning would be much greater. A few months before this, in August 1980, after the Shah's death, Khomeini sent a message to the U.S. through Mr. Sadegh Tabatabai, saying we are willing to resolve the issue under these conditions. From the U.S. side, Mr. (Warren) Christopher (the then Deputy Secretary of State) went to Germany and met with Mr. Tabatabai and said that most of these conditions do not pose significant problems for us. I mean, about three months before the election, both sides had practically reached an agreement. Of course, complications also arise. For example, the Iran-Iraq war started a month later. And I must emphasize that Mr. Casey never confirmed reports regarding involvement in negotiations, and after his death, his family denied it as well. And the congressional investigation did not prove that there was any negotiation between Iran and Reagan's campaign, which is why you were released shortly after his inauguration in January. But my question is, does confirming this event matter now? In my opinion, it matters on two levels. After all, history has meaning. We must learn from history, and history must be accurate. They say that anyone who forgets history is condemned to repeat it. We must learn lessons. We Americans tend to forget history quickly. Iranians, on the other hand, do not forget anything. They do not necessarily learn lessons from it. Perhaps. We do not learn lessons either. They do not forget, and we do not forget everything too quickly. These are two sides of the same coin. You see, I pointed out this reality that in Tehran, at the same time we were hostages, ordinary people on the street somewhat knew that there was a secret deal between Khomeini's enemies and Carter's American enemies. Why did we not accept it when Mr. Gary Sick or Bob Parry or others wrote about it? I have thought a lot about this issue. Perhaps in our politics, we do not want to accept that our leaders and politicians are capable of doing such things. We always, right or wrong, look at ourselves as a model. For example, we say this democracy of ours should be like this everywhere. Then how can we accept that, for example, Mr. Casey, Mr. Connolly, or our politician is capable of such actions?