The Account of the CENTCOM Commander; How the Plan to Kill Qassem Soleimani Was Formed and Executed?

Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC, was killed in a targeted U.S. attack on his vehicle near Baghdad airport on January 3, 2020. This report, first published in June this year, is being republished on the fifth anniversary of this event. General Frank McKenzie, the CENTCOM commander at the time of Soleimani's death, provides a detailed account in his book, 'The Burn-In: High Command and War in the 21st Century,' which has sections published in The Atlantic, presenting himself as responsible for the attack that led to Soleimani's targeting. This American general, who was appointed to CENTCOM in 2019, initially refers to the background of the challenges various U.S. administrations faced with Soleimani and his actions in the region. 'Soleimani is a pivotal figure in the contemporary history of Iran and the U.S. He became the face of the IRGC for over 30 years and led an independent branch of the armed forces tasked with ensuring the integrity of the Islamic Republic; he joined the IRGC in 1979, a year before Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran, and gained a reputation as a fearless and controlling force during the war.' McKenzie further notes Soleimani's background and his activities as a division commander at the age of 20, referencing the formation of the Quds Force and its focus on conducting 'unconventional operations outside Iran's borders.' The book also mentions Soleimani's special relationship with Ali Khamenei, describing him as the 'son' of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. McKenzie continues by stating that Soleimani was promoted to the rank of major general in 2011 and became a hero in Iran in 2014. As Soleimani's fame increased, so did his security; events that McKenzie believes turned Soleimani into a dictator who often acted without consulting other Iranian intelligence agencies, the military, or even the IRGC regarding his actions in the region. The former CENTCOM commander further writes about Soleimani's relations with the U.S.: 'He operated throughout the region and cleverly supported the return of American forces to Iraq, forcing the United States to take on the heavy lifting of defeating ISIS. Then he surprisingly killed us out of Iraq and innocent American, international coalition, and Iraqi and Syrian forces.' McKenzie emphasizes that Soleimani considered himself invincible, and when asked about this in 2019, he replied, 'What are they going to do? Kill me?' McKenzie mentions his joining CENTCOM as a 'young general' and recounts witnessing the Obama and Bush administrations' inability to counter the 'dynamics and leadership' that Soleimani had in the fight. This background led McKenzie, when appointed to CENTCOM in 2019, to ask himself, 'If the President of the United States asks CENTCOM to target Soleimani, is there a plan for this purpose or not?' McKenzie writes that the answer to this question was not very satisfactory, leading him to decide to design solutions regarding this matter. He adds that other organizations like the CIA and U.S. regional partners were also interested in targeting Soleimani, and efforts had even been made with the White House for this purpose, which were ultimately set aside due to operational difficulties or high political costs. However, McKenzie continues that ultimately suitable options were developed that would be executable if the White House made this decision. The then CENTCOM commander states that in December 2019, two months after he took office, American bases were targeted 19 times by mortars and rockets, and he believes Soleimani was openly organizing those attacks through his networks inside 'Kata'ib Hezbollah,' which is one of the Iranian proxy groups in Iraq. McKenzie introduced the December 27, 2019 attack on one of the U.S. airbases in Iraq, which involved the firing of 30 missiles and ultimately resulted in the injury of four American soldiers and the death of one contractor, as the climax of these actions. He continues, 'While previous attacks were carried out with harassment targets or with prior warning, this time the attack was on a populated area in our military base aimed at causing high casualties, and I knew we had to respond.' The then CENTCOM commander continues that at his home in Tampa, he and his colleagues reviewed a range of options; options that included targeting a Quds Force commander stationed in Yemen who had a long history of coordinating operations against American forces, along with action against an Iranian intelligence-gathering ship with IRGC crew named Saviz, which was present in the southern Red Sea, and also attacking Iran's air defense and oil infrastructure in the south of the country. However, McKenzie continues that he decided to propose to the White House and the Department of Defense to conduct operations inside Syria and Iraq to prevent the escalation of conflict. He further writes, 'We felt that four logistical targets and three human targets would be affected by this attack. Two of them were facilitators of Kata'ib Hezbollah, and the third was Qassem Soleimani. We also had options for action in Yemen, the Red Sea, and southern Iran on the table, but we did not recommend them.' This senior American general continues that through Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he sent this report to Mark Esper, the then Secretary of Defense of the Trump administration. He soon received initial approval for conducting operations. McKenzie states that logistical operations were approved, but targeting 'facilitators' and not Soleimani himself. McKenzie says he had previously been informed through Milley that Trump might not consider such attacks sufficient. While he was aware of Trump's interest in targeting Soleimani, on Saturday evening, he added a section to his latest edits explaining what would happen if an attack on Soleimani took place. McKenzie notes that he knew that Soleimani's absence would make decision-making very difficult for the Iranian government and could increase America's deterrent power, but he was still very concerned about the nature of Iran's response. Regarding his analysis before the attack, he writes, 'After careful consideration, I believed that the Iranians would respond to such an action, but probably not with a military action that we had been concerned about for years.' Ultimately, McKenzie emphasizes that he did not recommend an attack on Soleimani in his report and outlined its risks. The next day, on Sunday, the attacks were carried out, and Trump was informed of them. McKenzie states that five sites across Syria and Iraq were attacked within a four-minute timeframe, and in at least one case, an attack was carried out on a meeting of the Kata'ib Hezbollah command, killing several key leaders of this Shiite militia group. However, that night, McKenzie learned through Mark Milley that Trump was not satisfied with this attack. He continues in this regard, 'As Milley had warned, Trump was not satisfied. He ordered us to hit him if he went to Iraq. I was at my home office when Milley told me this. My staff had gathered around me, but the phone was not on speaker, so none of them could hear. I was stunned for a second and then asked him to repeat what he said. I had heard correctly.' Milley told McKenzie on that phone call that Trump had even agreed to attack the Quds Force commander in Yemen and the Saviz ship in the Red Sea. He continues to refer to the options and choices that were considered for targeting Soleimani and emphasizes that he preferred to attack Soleimani in Syria because he believed that an attack in Iraq could provoke Shiite militia groups and also lead to a severe military and political reaction from Iraq. However, McKenzie continues that striking Soleimani in the moments after he exited the plane could minimize collateral damage. He writes in this regard, 'After the assessments we had made, we knew that when Soleimani arrived in Iraq, his plane usually lands at Baghdad International Airport and then quickly exits the airport.' McKenzie noted that based on the not very heavy traffic on that route, armed MQ-9 drones equipped with Hellfire missiles could be a suitable option to target Soleimani's vehicle and his escort. The then CENTCOM commander continues that based on received information, it was determined that on January 1, 2020, Soleimani was flying from Tehran to Baghdad. It was decided to first attack Soleimani at Baghdad airport and within minutes also target another Quds Force commander whose name was not mentioned in Yemen. McKenzie writes that at the same time, protests near the U.S. embassy in Baghdad intensified in response to U.S. attacks on Kata'ib Hezbollah targets, making it harder to execute the operation against Soleimani and its potential repercussions. He also refers to the possible scenarios after the attack on Soleimani that he was mentally reviewing, wondering whether such an action would lead to the protesters storming the U.S. embassy in Baghdad? And how would Washington's relationship with Baghdad be after that? 'The predictions did not come true.' McKenzie continues, 'Early on January 1, 2020, the day we hoped to target Soleimani, I went to the CENTCOM headquarters. Two large monitors were installed on the wall, one showing black-and-white images transmitted from drones and the other monitoring the movement of hundreds of aircraft, including civilian flights passing through the skies of Iran and Iraq. Soleimani finally left home and boarded a plane in Tehran. Although we were not sure if it was a charter or commercial flight.' The CENTCOM commander continues his account in his book, 'The Burn-In: High Command and War in the 21st Century,' recounting that while Soleimani's plane was approaching Baghdad, it did not land and passed over Baghdad at an altitude of 30,000 feet. At that moment, McKenzie was on a conference call with Milley and Esper, the Secretary of Defense. As Soleimani's plane did not land in Baghdad, someone from the Pentagon asked McKenzie, 'Can you shoot that damn plane?' McKenzie recounts the continuation of the story as follows: 'Without making the decision to execute it, I contacted our airbase commander in Qatar and asked him if an order was given, could he do such a thing? He quickly responded, and we launched two fighter jets behind this plane. We were trying to determine whether it was a charter or commercial flight. Eventually, we learned it was a commercial flight that likely had at least 50 innocent passengers and was delayed in reaching Damascus. I immediately advised Milley that this plane should not be targeted. Even Soleimani was not worth losing those lives.' McKenzie continues that based on the signs, they realized that Soleimani would likely return to Baghdad within 36 hours from Damascus. The time for the operation. Ultimately, on January 2, McKenzie received a call from the region indicating that Soleimani would soon leave Damascus and head to Baghdad. McKenzie states that Soleimani boarded a plane in Damascus on January 1 and that CENTCOM commanders were monitoring the situation. A commercial flight took off at 3:30 PM Eastern Time from Damascus and landed at Baghdad airport at 4:35 PM U.S. time, which was just before midnight on January 2, 2020, Baghdad time. McKenzie notes that on that cloudy night in Baghdad, at 4:40 PM, it was confirmed that Soleimani was disembarking from the plane. According to the CENTCOM commander, the MQ-9 drones responsible for carrying out this operation had to fly at low altitude to improve visibility and to avoid being seen or heard, they had to maintain their distance from the target. McKenzie also recounts that at that time, the commander of the special forces responsible for carrying out the operation called him and told him that everything would happen very quickly, and if there was any intention to cancel the operation, to inform him right now, to which McKenzie confirmed that the operation would proceed as planned. He continues, 'We saw Soleimani get into a car and start to leave the area alongside an escort vehicle. Everyone's eyes were glued to the large monitors, and the two vehicles sped away. All eyes were on the large monitors. No one spoke, and then suddenly a white light...