The Ahmadinejad Team's Move for the 2021 Elections or Beyond

A collective welcome from Ahmadinejad's team for Hamid Baghaei after his release from prison (July 26, 2017) did not receive much reflection on the country's official media and propaganda outlets but garnered significant attention on social media. His remarks about the conditions of prisons in the Islamic Republic, corruption in the judiciary, the lies of the judiciary spokesperson, the corruption of Hassan Rouhani's brother, and the announcement of the imminent downfall of the authorities were particularly noted, mainly because Baghaei and other members of the 'Spring Government' had defended this situation for eight years. Ahmadinejad's team turned the welcoming ceremony for Baghaei into a political gathering and a platform for igniting a political campaign. New news? Baghaei's remarks did not offer any new information. The financial misconduct of Hossein Fereydoun had already been publicized by some members of parliament. Reports on the dire conditions of prisons have been repeatedly presented by political prisoners. The prevalence of bribery in the judiciary is not even denied by officials of that branch. The lies of the Islamic Republic's officials are also a common currency. Despite having extensive information about members of the inner circle and military and security officials, Ahmadinejad's team has not revealed any hidden angles of corruption and abuse of power in the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic since leaving the presidency. However, they have expressed their strong desire to return to power in various ways. The 2021 presidency or beyond? What is new in Baghaei's remarks after his release and Ahmadinejad's statement regarding his arrest is the expression of the serious determination of the 'Spring Movement' to become an opposition (unclear whether inside or outside the system) and to strive for a return to power. Ahmadinejad's team uses every opportunity for gatherings and news-making. Ahmadinejad, Samareh, Mashaei, and other prominent figures from the 9th and 10th governments of the Islamic Republic were present at the welcome for Baghaei. Baghaei expressed his unconditional loyalty to Ahmadinejad at this event ('If he [Ahmadinejad] says die, we only ask how'). This indicates that Ahmadinejad is set to play the role of the spiritual leader of this movement. The theme of 'Imam Zaman' was also repeatedly mentioned at this event. It seems that the ideological axis of this movement is the same past messianism without any embellishment of clerical rule or velayat-e faqih. Therefore, perhaps gaining the presidency is not the only goal of this movement. When a group can attain the presidency through fabricating cases against others (something Ahmadinejad did at one time) and abusing power and participating in various crimes of a regime and distributing public resources to certain groups (municipal resources to religious committees), the ambition for something beyond that does not seem far-fetched. The defeat of Raisi, while all opposition groups to Rouhani's government rallied behind him, was a confirmation of Ahmadinejad's claim that the principlist faction cannot win against reformists and moderates in the Islamic Republic's allegiances without him. For this reason, Ahmadinejad's team is currently preparing Baghaei for the 2021 presidential election. Mashaei, after his release from prison, introduced him as a 'hero' and 'symbol of resistance and steadfastness.' The present crowd constantly cheers for him. However, marketing him as a hero while his accusations are abuse of power and financial crimes seems difficult. Two other suitable grounds for the political campaign and the rise of the 'Spring Movement' are observed: the decline in government activities in the second term, and the intensification of U.S. pressures on the Islamic Republic. Governments in their second term tend to follow fewer specific programs and continue in a kind of routine. This has made the ground more favorable for the activities of opponents. Additionally, the intensification of pressures on the Islamic Republic, which will deprive the regime of exploiting the benefits of the JCPOA, will render both the JCPOA and the government's economic program ineffective. Close associates of Khamenei could not exploit this issue in the 96 elections to sideline Rouhani's team because it was still too early for public opinion to judge the JCPOA. However, in two or three years, everyone will be able to judge the benefits of the JCPOA, which the hard core of the government has been trying to neutralize through creating tensions. An important point to note here is that social and political movements are neither formed nor eliminated by the Guardian Council's approval or disapproval of candidates. It seems that the messianic and populist political movement in Iran has a political and social base, and Ahmadinejad's team wants to rely on this base to continue their political life. For this reason, it cannot be said that the 'Spring Government' movement is a dead political movement. Ahmadinejad's team, through their behaviors, wants to appear in the 2021 presidential elections not as a faction that has melted into the velayat (the constant claim of principlists in political campaigns to label their opponent as dependent) but as an unofficial opposition to the regime, similar to what reformists did during Khatami's era. The slogans against oppression, corruption, hypocrisy, deceit, power-seeking, and the small government clique that are voiced by the 'Spring Movement' clearly reflect this strategy. I will list some of the actions of Ahmadinejad's team that fall within the framework of oppositional behaviors: Ahmadinejad's disregard for Khamenei's advice against candidacy, Ahmadinejad/Baghaei's lack of support for any candidate in the 96 presidential election, introducing the judiciary as responsible for Baghaei's life (in Ahmadinejad's statement after his second arrest), announcing the impossibility of justice by the judiciary and the blatant violation of the law by this branch, Baghaei's hunger strike in prison, Mashaei's call for people's uprising, Mashaei's request for a public trial before the people, and warnings of overthrow. These are not the kind of statements that fit into the official discourse of the Islamic Republic. The normalization of corruption. Of course, various factors act as difficult barriers against Ahmadinejad's team returning to power. Corruption and abuse of power in Iran have become such an integral part of people's lives and an inseparable feature of the government that it is highly unlikely that a group with an anti-corruption slogan could come to power. In the 96 elections, Rouhani's rivals presented documents of Rouhani and Jahangiri's abuse of power during live debates to the public but could not secure the presidency. Ahmadinejad, in 2005 and 2009, managed to rally some segments of the population who still believed that a faction of the government could fight corruption by claiming to combat corruption, but his own government experience showed that his 'clean government' was one of the most corrupt governments in the past four decades in Iran. For this reason, Baghaei's remarks about the corruption of Hossein Fereydoun no longer have any political utility. Hope for unexpected conditions. On the other hand, security and military institutions, along with the leadership's inner circle and the Guardian Council, which have the power to veto presidential candidates, will never allow a group that does not fully obey the Supreme Leader to take control of the executive branch. The judiciary has enough files on the 'Spring Movement' to launch them whenever Khamenei deems it necessary. Mashaei's remarks about relying on the people and Baghaei's remarks about relying on Imam Zaman clearly indicate that Ahmadinejad's team is aware of Khamenei's and the leadership's determination to prevent their return to power. Ahmadinejad's team is looking for an opportunity for the political and security control of the government to unravel (for example, with Khamenei's death) or for the government to lose the ability to exert will over political movements (with the rise of a leadership that does not control all instruments of power) so that at that moment, as the only option that the general public pays attention to, they can seize power. Mashaei, in his remarks at this event, introduces Ahmadinejad as the only individual among the heads of government who is welcomed by the public in the streets. Ahmadinejad's team believes that only they can mobilize a significant portion of the public behind the government.