The Alawite Revolution in Syria Against Bashar al-Assad

No power in Syria can shake the throne of Bashar al-Assad like the followers of the Alawite sect in the country. This group is significant not only due to their widespread distribution in the army and government institutions but also because all Alawite-populated geographical areas in Syria, from Latakia to Homs and from the suburbs of Damascus to a vast area of Aleppo, have remained safe from falling into the hands of opposition groups due to their Alawite demographic base. In fact, the areas that Bashar al-Assad managed to retain after the escalation of the crisis in Syria were only preserved because of the Alawite population density. This religious sect has paid a heavy price to defend the Syrian regime, losing nearly a third of its youth in the five-year war. From another angle, due to somewhat misleading propaganda, the Alawites of Syria have incurred the enmity of Sunnis because of their complete alignment with the ruler of Damascus as portrayed in some Arab media. However, their recent statement distancing themselves from Bashar al-Assad and distinguishing themselves from Shia Islam could have a significant impact on their position in the current and future situation in Syria. Especially their emphasis on a non-religious approach to the future government and their distinction from Shia teachings indicates that the Alawites have no desire to engage in the ongoing religious war between Shia and Sunni Muslims, and the Supreme Leader ruling Iran cannot count them among his forces. The roots of the Alawite sect trace back to a figure named 'Muhammad ibn Nasir al-Bakri,' who was prominent during the time of 'Hasan al-Askari,' the eleventh Shia Imam in the ninth century CE, and considered himself the 'gate of the Sharia' of the Shia Imam. This term in Shia culture means inheriting all the characteristics of an 'Imam,' and thus Muhammad ibn Nasir held the position of 'Deputy of the Imam' among his followers. Today, in some circles, Bashar al-Assad and the followers of the Alawite sect are referred to as Nasiri. Some historical sources indicate that the followers of the Alawite sect lived on the margins from the time of their emergence until the rule of the Hamdanids in Mosul and Aleppo, but with the arrival of Sayf al-Dawla al-Hamdan, the Alawites entered government affairs and gained a respectable position. It is said that Sayf al-Dawla al-Hamdan and his cousin Abu Firas al-Hamdan were students of 'Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Khaseebi,' one of the greats of the Alawite sect. However, during the rule of the Fatimids and Ayyubids, the Alawites were marginalized again. With the arrival of the Mamluks, especially during the reign of a ruler named 'Sultan Muhammad,' the cleansing of Alawites began. This cleansing was based on a fatwa issued by 'Ibn Taymiyyah,' a radical Islamic cleric who expelled the Alawites from Islam. During the Ottoman period, especially during the reign of 'Selim I,' the famous 'Hamidiye' fatwa regarding the Alawites was issued, which expelled them from Islam and deemed their killing a religious obligation. These pressures and constraints drove the Alawites to mountainous areas, and for many years they chose isolation in the surrounding mountains. With the weakening of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century and the rise of France in the region of Greater Syria and present-day Syria, the Alawites gradually set aside their isolation and sought ways to cooperate with France, with many of their youths joining the French army. This mutual cooperation reached a point where in 1920, France announced an independent Alawite state in the coastal region, including Latakia and Tartus. This state lasted until 1937 and created an experience of peaceful coexistence among Alawites, Sunnis, Christians, and a significant number of Ismailis in this geographical area. However, after that date, they were again integrated into the current framework of Syria. Since their liberation from the rule of Ottoman rulers until today, the Alawites have not returned under the rule of the Sunni majority of Syrian society and oppose any religious inclination in the political system. A religious political system for the Alawite sect recalls the bitter events of cleansing and killing based on religious identity, and for this reason, they emphasize the secular nature of the political system and the equality of all citizens before the law. Although Alawites and Shia followers do not differ much in terms of religious principles and branches, in several important issues, the followers of the Alawite sect have maintained their distance from 'political Shia.' Firstly, unlike Shia, the Alawites do not have a 'religious authority,' and therefore there is no class called 'clergy' as formed in Iran or Iraq among the Alawites. Although the Alawites have 'tribal sheikhs,' these individuals do not have the breadth of the clergy class in Iran or Iraq and do not interfere in various aspects of people's lives. The social life of the people under Alawite thought has freed itself from the dominance of religion and sect, and for this reason, Alawites can be considered the most free-thinking Muslims. They have an 'open' approach to matters and particularly adapt quickly to new changes. Secondly, Alawite thought follows the principle of 'separation of religion from politics.' For this reason, there is no such thing as the 'guardianship of the jurist' for the followers of the Alawite sect. The Alawites strongly oppose a political system based on the guardianship of the jurist. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Iranian government has been present in Syria with all its might and has spent billions of dollars. However, the reception that the Syrian Alawites gave to the short-term presence of the Russians in their cities is incomparable to their previous interactions with the Iranians. Russian dictionaries became scarce in cities like Latakia and Tartus, and in Damascus, the city council allocated ten thousand square meters for the construction of a Russian school. In August 2015, in one of the streets of Latakia, one of Bashar al-Assad's cousins named 'Suleiman Assad' publicly killed a Syrian Air Force officer with his weapon. This officer, 'Hassan al-Sheikh,' belonged to one of the prominent Alawite families. After this incident, all the people of Latakia took to the streets and held strong protests against Suleiman Assad and his affiliated group known as 'Shabiha.' The power of this protest was such that Bashar al-Assad was immediately forced to issue an arrest warrant for his cousin. The Alawites showcased their power in this protest to the ruler of Damascus. Official sources of the Syrian regime downgraded the reason for this murder to a traffic violation and Suleiman Assad's failure to allow Hassan al-Sheikh to overtake his car. However, the issue was deeper than these matters. Hassan al-Sheikh belonged to the army, and Suleiman was part of the Shabiha group. Therefore, some believe that this murder was the result of an internal conflict between the army structure, which is mostly composed of Alawites who have paid a heavy price in the ongoing Syrian crisis, and the Shabiha militia, whose members often act outside the law, and some of its leaders, like Suleiman Assad, are accused of corruption. Alawite leaders who recently issued a statement against Bashar al-Assad believe that the Syrian army is neither complicit in the corruption of the ruling group nor in their crimes and thus, by separating the army's account from Bashar al-Assad and the ruling gangs like the Shabiha group, they seek to preserve the Syrian army for the future political guarantee of the country. This approach also sends a message to foreign countries, especially Russia, to support an important institution like the army instead of backing an individual like Bashar al-Assad. This statement also carries a message for Syrian opposition groups that if they want to build a democratic country, a strong and neutral army is necessary to protect the country and the people of Syria in the chaotic region of the Middle East.