The Ambiguity of Iranian Youth

One of the characteristics of the Iranian people in the past four decades is ambiguity and confusion. This ambiguity and confusion arises from 1) political instability and the rulers' lack of confidence in the regime's survival (with constant talk of internal and external overthrowers), 2) the totalitarianism of the dominant subculture and the ongoing war of subcultures, 3) the severe gap between the nation and the government, 4) the constant shifting of institutional functions (such as building schools and mosques by the IRGC or holding Friday prayers at universities), and 5) the inability of the repressive machine to be satisfied with its achievements in imposing restrictions and its thirst for further implementation of the authoritarian regime's Sharia and ideology. The political and legal ambiguity of the people has led to moral, religious, social, and economic ambiguity. A regime that is constantly seeking overthrowers and has created an imaginary enemy for its overthrow, making every effort to turn this illusion into reality (through terrorism, nuclear and missile programs, and threats to destroy a country) naturally drives the people towards ambiguity. I explain this confusion and ambiguity in six topics: education without a future, draft evasion, risky investments and economic exchanges, religious hypocrisy, unstable jobs, and the desire to emigrate, with a greater focus on youth. For the 2016 Master's entrance exam, 761,273 candidates registered, of which 566,159 attended the session. From the 566,159 candidates present, 444,532 were allowed to choose their field of study, and from this number, 317,560 candidates selected their fields. Of the 317,560 who chose their fields, 180,086 were among the final accepted candidates. These figures show that two hundred thousand individuals with a bachelor's degree register for an exam but do not participate. About one hundred and twenty thousand participate in the exam but do so in a way that they are not allowed to choose a field. About 120,000 of those who were allowed to choose did not select a field. Thus, more than 60% of those who registered for the exam ultimately did not engage in the relevant activities and failed to select a field. The issue here is not that a group was unsuccessful in the exam. About 60% do not reach the passing mark or fail. According to official statistics, there are about 1.5 to 2 million draft evaders in Iran. Draft evaders (those who do not have any exemptions) cannot obtain passports to leave the country, cannot obtain business licenses, cannot have employment contracts, cannot be employed by the government, and cannot receive government pensions. This group of one and a half to two million lives in a state of complete suspension. Another group of the lost in Iran are those who have lost their wealth and have no way to recover it. They lose their assets in about 15 million bounced checks annually, bankrupt credit institutions, and investments in usurious companies. In all three types of monetary exchanges, gambling is evident, but the eagerness to gamble and make money from money (easy money) has turned into a social epidemic. Interestingly, news of these losses and bankruptcies is constantly published, yet the game continues. Apparently, many in Iran are not afraid of the suspension of their financial losses. Since kindergarten and elementary school, the process of constructing hypocritical and deceitful individuals in Iranian society has been underway. Parents ask their children not to bring home secrets - not conforming to the government's dictates and ignoring totalitarianism - to school and to be careful when speaking with their friends. Such behavior places millions of Iranians in a state of value and normative suspension because individuals cannot behave according to a consistent behavioral system at home, work, school, and the street. All mechanisms are aimed at reinforcing this suspension in the value and normative system. These dualities emerge every day, from a female actress's advice to others to refrain from attending stadiums while she herself watches competitions abroad to millions of young Iranians eager to emigrate to Western societies. Hundreds of thousands leave Iranian society annually through student visas or legal and illegal immigration. There is no gathering or camp of immigrants in the world that does not include Iranians. The Iranian immigrant population today is visible in all parts of the world (except for Europe, America, and Australia) from South Africa and India to Malaysia, Dubai, and Turkey. Such a situation, which places the individual and their relatives in a state of complete suspension before leaving (in a period of at least ten years from decision to exit), has dominated a portion of Iranian youth aged 18 to 40 for four decades. Various social classes and professionals such as pilots, nurses, academics, and even tailors have lived around the issue of emigration, and many of them have left the country. The head of the Internal Trade Commission of the Iran Chamber of Commerce says: "We have a vast distribution network... our number of distributors is seven times the global average." (ISNA, October 5, 2017) The Iranian economy is based on oil sales by the government and the formal and informal imports of state and quasi-state companies (companies of officials, their children, and religious and military institutions). In such a situation, everyone competes to get something from the distribution system. The unprecedented prevalence of street vending is a result of this competition. In Iran, millions of shopkeepers live by selling multiple times. Compare the prices of imported goods in Iran and other countries. They are more expensive in Iran than anywhere else. In these conditions, individuals turn to effortless and high-income work, resulting in millions in the distribution sector but without income stability. In this sector, sellers are constantly thrown from selling one product to another. As you can see, this ambiguity has primarily affected the youth aged 18 to 40. In three of the six topics mentioned (draft evaders, emigration, and confusion after education), only the youth are subject to the mentioned points. Iranian youth, instead of going through their socialization period within existing institutions and assuming they are to become citizens with rights and responsibilities, are constantly engaged in the question of where their place and demands and needs are and how they can escape from the current conditions. As a result, millions of Iranian youth continue to live in Iran with this mental state that keeps them in a state of necessity and despair and has no attachment to any part of this society (except for family).