The Army Came, Pishavari Fled, and Qazi Mohammad Was Executed

In the previous 29 parts of the program about the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the autonomous government in Azerbaijan, Iran, broadcasted by Radio Farda, we examined the history of what we now know as Azerbaijan on both sides of the Aras River. We heard about the renaming of the Turkish regions north of the Aras to Azerbaijan, the establishment of the Soviet Union, and ultimately the ideas of Mir Jafar Bagirov, the head of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, for the formation of Greater Azerbaijan. The occupation of Iran during World War II, the Soviet Communist Party's decision to encourage separatism in Azerbaijan, the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the formation of an autonomous government in Azerbaijan under the shadow of Soviet military forces were among the topics discussed in detail with historians in this series of programs. We also examined the performance of these two organizations and how the Soviet forces withdrew and the end of the national government of Azerbaijan in the recent episodes. In the previous episode, we learned that in the fall of 1946, the Iranian government decided to hold the 15th parliamentary elections on December 7 after a 9-month suspension of the National Assembly, and for this reason, three days earlier, the Iranian army began its movement towards Tabriz. The Iranian army began its movement towards Tabriz on December 4. At this time, the armed militias affiliated with the Democratic Party, known as 'Fadai', were still active. However, the repeated requests of the party leaders for more weapons from the Soviet Union all hit a dead end in Moscow. Of course, the Soviet Union did not withdraw its diplomatic support for the Democratic Party, and following Qavam's announcement to send military forces to Azerbaijan, Ivan Sadchikov, the Soviet ambassador in Tehran, expressed his dissatisfaction with this decision to Qavam. In other words, the Soviet Union, while insisting that the National Assembly elections be held as soon as possible, preferred to maintain military power in the hands of the Democratic Party's militias during these elections in Azerbaijan. However, from seasoned politicians in Azerbaijan to nationalists, the army, the Shah, and the court, none could tolerate such elections. Touraj Atabaki, a university professor in the Netherlands and president of the International Association of Iranian Studies, who has also written a detailed book on the developments in Azerbaijan, states that at this time, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was completely confused. This professor notes that a look at the party's newspaper during these days shows that the positions of this party changed 'day by day', and 'one day they wrote that we will defend the achievements of the party to the last drop of blood, and the next day they announced that we are committed to the independence of Iran and the territorial integrity of Iran and extend a hand of friendship to our Iranian brothers.' At the same time as the army's movement towards Tabriz began, the official position of the Iranian government was that these forces were sent to Azerbaijan to oversee the elections. However, in practice, even in the announcements dropped by the Iranian army's planes over the cities and villages of Azerbaijan, the people of Azerbaijan were asked to end the Democratic Party's control. Jamil Hasanli, an Azerbaijani researcher and one of the authors of the Cold War Studies project at Harvard University, wrote in his book that at this point, the party leaders, especially Jaafar Pishavari, were adamant that with military and arms assistance from the Soviet Union, they could resist the army. Touraj Atabaki, author of the book 'Azerbaijan, Ethnicity, and Power Struggle in Iran', however, believes that in the absence of this military assistance, many of the party's militias, some of whom were Azerbaijanis from north of the Aras, did not have enough morale to resist the army. He states that a large group of the party's militias were those who had been expelled from the Soviet Union before World War II and had immigrated to Iran, but with the army's movement towards Azerbaijan, 'they took whatever livestock and property they had and returned to their homeland.' In such circumstances, where contradictory reports of scattered clashes were also published and even in some areas, local tribes disarmed the party's militias before the army's arrival, on December 8, while the army was rapidly moving towards Tabriz, the party leaders turned to Moscow one last time. Abbas Javad, a historian of Azerbaijan and one of the managers of Radio Free Europe, believes that the tone of the last letter from the party leaders indicates that the party leaders had no accurate information about the Soviet Union's final policy towards the party until the last moment, and probably Pishavari did not know that he would only be able to stay in Azerbaijan for three more days and that he would have to leave Iran at the initiative of the Soviet Union. He states, 'This letter was written only three days before December 12. In this letter, it is stated: We have been for eight months contrary to the feelings of the people of Azerbaijan and against our wishes, holding back on peacefully resolving disputes, and considering the global policy of our great friend, the Soviet Union, we have tried to portray Qavam as democratic. And even at times, contrary to our beliefs, we have praised him. The goal has been to ensure that our work is not disrupted.' According to this researcher, the party leaders presented two requests to the Soviet leaders in this letter. First, that the Soviet Union secretly provide weapons to the party. And second, that the Soviet Union allow the Democratic Party to resist the army with armed resistance. Abbas Javad, a historian of Azerbaijan and one of the senior managers of Radio Free Europe, states: 'In continuation, they wrote that if the Soviet Union does not see either of these two paths as advisable, at least allow the party to cut ties with Tehran and establish its independent government.' All the party leaders signed this letter and sent it to Baku so that through Bagirov, these requests would reach Stalin. Meanwhile, although according to documents, the signatures of Salamollah Javid, the governor of Azerbaijan, and Ali Shabestari, the head of the provincial association, are also seen at the end of the last letter, there were still differences between the positions of these two and the rest of the activists of the party. As Touraj Atabaki analyzes the activities of these two in the last days, both were trying to find a different solution for what was about to happen. He states: 'In the last days in Tabriz, a very noticeable chaos was evident. On one hand, Salamollah Javid claimed the governorship and tried to implement the central government's policy as governor and attempted to return the situation to what it was before the party's government. On the other hand, Bi-Riya, who had recently taken over the leadership of the party, was trying to consolidate the disorganized ranks of the party. Meeting after meeting and gathering after gathering were held in Tabriz to try to restore cohesion to the party. At the same time, news arrived that if the military defeats of the party's Fadai continued, what would happen to the officers who had separated from the Iranian army a year ago and joined the party's military? Following this issue, instructions came from Baku that these officers must leave the party ranks as soon as possible and go to the Soviet Union with their families, which they did, and this also dealt a blow to the military strength of the party, and now only untrained cadres with very limited ammunition remained against the organized central army that could not resist. On December 10, Ahmad Qavam sent a telegram to Salamollah Javid as governor asking the party's militias to cease armed resistance. On the same day, Mir Jafar Bagirov wrote to Stalin that the armed party members were rapidly retreating and that soon the Iranian army would dominate all of Azerbaijan. Bagirov requested Stalin to allow a larger group of Azerbaijanis from Iran to enter the Soviet Union. Jamil Hasanli, author of the book 'At the Dawn of the Cold War: The US-Soviet Crisis Over Iranian Azerbaijan' On December 11, the Soviet consulate in Tabriz also requested the party leaders to end armed resistance against the Iranian army forces. Shortly thereafter, a meeting was held at the provincial association in Tabriz, and representatives issued a statement asking the party's militias to cease military operations. The decision to end military operations was sent to Mohammad Reza Shah and Ahmad Qavam, signed by Shabestari and Javid. And on the evening of that day, in a meeting of the party leaders with representatives from Bagirov, it was decided that among the party leaders, Salamollah Javid and Ali Shabestari would stay in Tabriz, and the remaining leaders would move towards Baku. Jaafar Pishavari also left Tabriz and Iran for good after this meeting. The Resistance of the 'Fadai'? In what followed, there is disagreement among some historians. Jamil Hasanli, an Azerbaijani researcher, believes that at this time, not only did the Fadai militias resist the Iranian army fiercely, but Jaafar Pishavari was also forced to leave Iran against his will. He states: 'When the Soviet representatives told Pishavari that they should not resist, he said leave us alone, we will die anyway, so it is better to die honorably in battle. (Meaning they were not even allowed to die in their own country.) They disarmed them spiritually as well and left them unsupported. The Fadai groups resisted until the last moment. In the Tabriz citadel, the last group of them resisted until the very end, and after they were wounded, they wrote on the walls of the citadel with their blood, 'Long live Azerbaijan.' Even Pishavari did not want to go to the Soviet Union. At the last moment, when he saw the insistence of the Soviet representatives, he said he would go to Bulgaria. In fact, Pishavari was forcibly taken out of Iran. In reality, there was resistance; the roads to Tabriz were blocked, and the Fadai were sacrificing themselves in every sense. Moscow broke this resistance and sent a list of nearly 170 people who had to leave Tabriz immediately. This passionate image of the Fadai's fierce resistance is one of the topics that many other historians reject, and contradictory reports about it have been published. Among them is Ervand Abrahamian, author of the book 'Modern Iran History', who states that the main reason for the incorrect statements about the level of violence of the army and the resistance of the Fadai lies in the Soviet Union's position in this matter. This university professor states: 'The level of violence was not as high as some historians later claimed. The main reason was that instructions came from Moscow for Pishavari to not resist and to retreat. Thus, a coordinated and planned resistance did not take place, and most clashes were scattered. In these clashes, some were killed, and some sought refuge in Soviet Azerbaijan.' Abbas Vali, former deputy president of Erbil University, who currently teaches in Istanbul and has written the book 'Kurds and the State in Iran', also believes that there was no serious resistance against the army in Azerbaijan and regarding the main reason for the lack of resistance in this region, he states: 'Azerbaijan had its own army, and that there was no resistance is surprising. Those who worked on the issue believe that the main reason for the lack of resistance was that the Soviet Union opposed such an issue. And they did not want to disrupt the very cordial relations they had established with Tehran under those conditions.' In this context, regardless of whether the Fadai showed fierce resistance or not, Abbas Milani, head of the Iranian Studies program at Stanford University and a researcher at the Hoover Institution in California, believes that everything that happened was disproportionate to the previous claims of the Democratic Party. He states: 'According to reports from some embassies, in many cities not only was there no resistance, but people welcomed the army and even arrested some of these migrants and handed them over to government officials. However, in places where the party resisted, the army acted violently. To say that no one was killed, in my opinion, is not correct. However, the resistance was much less than what everyone expected. I believe the party members were exaggerating a lot. And as soon as the Soviet Union began to evacuate Iran, the extent of the party's exaggeration shocked even their supporters.' This university professor states that one of the main reasons for the lack of resistance in Azerbaijan was primarily due to the lack of historical roots for the Democratic Party movement, which was intertwined with public dissatisfaction with the party and led to the rapid disintegration of this group. Disagreements over the extent of the resistance of the party's militias lead to another disagreement over the level of violence of the army and the death toll from these events, especially since to this day, this part of the historical truth of what happened has had propaganda significance for a group of dissidents in Iran, and the political use of what has been described as the 'bloody suppression' of Azerbaijan continues.