The Assembly of Experts Elections and the Opportunities to Counter Khamenei's Hegemony

The Guardian Council published the initial results of the qualification review for candidates of the Assembly of Experts on schedule. Although it was predictable that strict measures would be taken and a fully competitive election would not be allowed, the Guardian Council acted more restrictively than expected, complicating the equation of disqualification and lack of qualification by rejecting some principlist figures and Friday prayer leaders. An analysis of the candidates who were not rejected by the Guardian Council shows that political considerations aimed at maintaining the existing composition of the Assembly of Experts and its advisory approach, distancing it from effective oversight of the leadership's performance, played a major role in the assessment of qualifications. However, the issue is not limited to this criterion. Some considerations of expediency and behind-the-scenes power disputes, as well as the Guardian Council's emphasis on the juristic ability based on the opinions of the jurists of this institution, have also been influential in determining the final fate of the candidates. From a certain perspective, it can be said that the engineering of the elections aims to keep the absolute majority of the Assembly in the hands of the forces of the Qom Seminary Teachers' Society and prevent parallel competitions from benefiting the rival. Additionally, these disqualifications could serve as a justification for not approving candidates affiliated with the reformist-moderate bloc. Based on this, the Guardian Council can claim a non-partisan approach in reviewing the qualifications of Assembly of Experts candidates. However, even if this analysis explains the reasons for the exclusion of some of the leadership's appointees and principlist forces from the Assembly elections, it still highlights that divergence within the power bloc has increased, and existing institutions among principlists and the prevailing mechanisms in the dominant power have lost their authority. Therefore, they are inevitably resorting to exclusion tools even against their own. It seems that the government's plan to avoid upsetting these forces is ideologically justified, as expressed in Kazem Sediqi's remarks during Friday prayers. He, whose qualification for participating in the Assembly elections was unexpectedly not confirmed, urged those disqualified to accept their exclusion from the electoral competition as divine will if they are believers. The requirement for the juristic expertise needed by some candidates through means other than participating in the juristic exam revealed a double standard in the Guardian Council's behavior. Thus, citing this reason for disqualifying individuals like Hassan Khomeini or Morteza Aqa Tehrani does not seem justified. The disqualifications were extensive both quantitatively and qualitatively. Only 21% of the candidates who registered to participate in the fifth round of the Assembly of Experts elections were granted permission to enter the electoral competition. Approximately 15% of registered candidates, according to the claims of the Guardian Council officials, withdrew. This statistic is not yet definitive; some of those disqualified may return to the elections during the complaint review period. However, monitoring the situation indicates that their number is small, and a significant change in the level and degree of competitiveness in the elections is unlikely. Those who have been disqualified or not qualified must appeal to the same authority that issued their exclusion order. No new developments are expected since the reference and mechanisms and information are the same. One of the prominent points of the flawed electoral structure of the Assembly of Experts is the singularity of the qualification review and appeal authority. However, from a qualitative perspective, those disqualified represent a diverse range. They can be categorized as follows: Reformists and Moderates Although the reformist and moderate bloc did not register widely to reduce sensitivity, and some of its prominent figures, such as Ali Mohammad Dashtgheib and Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha, did not participate, a small number of registered candidates from this bloc were still approved. Among those disqualified are: Hassan Khomeini, Hassan Mousavi Bejnordi, Rasoul Ghorviyan, Mojtaba Taheri Khorram Abadi, Mahmoud Amjad, Majid Ansari, Mohsen Mousavi Tabrizi, Abolfazl Shakouri, Soroush Mohalati, Somayeh Tahmasebi, Ashraf Boroujerdi, Zahra Shajai, Rahim Mohammadi Ilami, Rasoul Montajabnia, Mohammad Takandi, Mohammad Javad Hajati Kermani, Mohammad Reza Abasi Fard, Abolhassan Navab, Reza Barghai, Mohammad Ali Faiz Lahijani, Hossein Hashemian, Mohammad Mahdi Faqihi, Zia Mortazavi, and others. Independents A group of clerics and seminary teachers with no political background and no affiliation to the two main factions of the regime were almost entirely disqualified. Jafar Shabiri Zanjani is a notable figure among those disqualified from this group. Laypersons A number of non-clerical individuals, about twenty, registered for this round of the Assembly elections, but with the exception of Mohsen Esmaeili, a legal member of the Guardian Council, they were not approved. Mohammad Gharazi was one of the most prominent individuals in this group. Women Similar to previous rounds, none of the registered female candidates were approved. Among the women who did not receive permission to enter the electoral competition are: Azam Taleghani, Azar Mansouri, Esmat Savadi, Somayeh Tahmasebi, Zahra Shajai, Ashraf Boroujerdi, and Tuba Hosseini. Sunnis The Sunni community registered relatively more candidates than before in this round of the Assembly elections. About 30 individuals from the provinces of Kermanshah, Razavi Khorasan, West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Sistan and Baluchestan ran, but only 5 of them were approved in the provinces of Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan. It is rumored that some forces close to the Muslim Brotherhood also registered. Some of the disqualified include: Mamosta Abdulrahman Khalifeh Zadeh, Imam Juma of Boukan, Mamosta Abubakr Soleimani, Mamosta Amir Khalidi, Mamosta Ghader Kordi, Imam Juma of Nalos Oshnavieh, Mamosta Shirzadi, Imam Juma of Marivan, Mamosta Sajadi, Imam Juma of Sarvabad, Isa Rahimi, Mulla Ghader Ghaderi, Mohammad Ahmadi, Mamosta Abdolsalam Karimi, and Tuba Hosseini. Principlists A significant number of principlists also did not receive permission to enter the Assembly elections. Some belonged to the traditional and moderate principlists, while others were part of the extremist group known as Wilayat Madar. Among the disqualified 'Wilayat Madar' figures are: Kazem Sediqi, Morteza Aqa Tehrani, and Mehdi Taeb. However, among the traditional and moderate principlists, in addition to figures like Ali Akbar Rashad, Kazem Ghazizadeh, Morteza Mirkatuli, Mohammad Taqi Rahbar, Mohammad Ghoreyi, a member of the Qom Seminary Teachers' Society and head of the office of Ayatollah Safi Golpaygani, Mostafa Pour Mohammad, former Minister of Justice and security official, and some Friday prayer leaders also faced the 'no entry' sign from the Guardian Council. This disqualification creates a challenge for the internal legitimacy of these Friday prayer leaders. Some, like Abdolkarim Abedini, the Friday prayer leader of Qazvin, who has withdrawn, are rumored to have done so after learning of their disqualification. Some of their names include: Hosseini Hamadani, Imam Juma of Karaj, Mohammad Taqi Lotfi, Imam Juma of Ilam, Ali Khatami, Imam Juma of Zanjan, Shamsollah Siraj, temporary Imam Juma of Ilam, Mohammad Mousavi, Imam Juma of Salmas, Mehdi Ghorishi, Imam Juma of Urmia, Safar Youssefzadeh, Imam Juma of Chaldoran, Mohammad Mashakini, former Imam Juma of Bardaskan and Naein, Mohammadi, Imam Juma of Hamadan, Ali Akbar Imani, Imam Juma of Fardis County, Ali Rezaei, Imam Juma of Birjand, Hassan Torabi, Imam Juma of Borujerd, Ibrahim Tahmasebi, Imam Juma of Kuhdasht, and others. Current Members of the Assembly of Experts Among the members of the fourth term of the Assembly of Experts, four were also disqualified. Hassan Namazi, representative of West Azerbaijan, who had a verbal dispute with Ahmad Jannati in the last sessions, Mohammad Taqi Pour Mohammadi, representative of East Azerbaijan, Mohammad Taqi Vaez, representative of Zanjan province, and Imam Juma of Maragheh, and Mojtaba Taheri Khorram Abadi, representative of Ilam province. The status of Mohammad Ali Mohammadi Kermani, Imam Juma of Tehran and Secretary General of the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran, is also unclear. His name is not seen among the approved candidates, even though he registered to participate in the Assembly elections. Among the representatives of the fourth Assembly, 18 others are also not participating in the elections, thus at least 26% of the composition of the Assembly of Experts will change. Abolqasem Khazaeli (Tehran), Mohammad Ali Faker (Razavi Khorasan), Mokhtar Aminian (Gilan), Hassan Taheri Khorram Abadi (Lorestan), Saber Jabari (Mazandaran), Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani (Tehran), Mohammad Mohammadi Gilani (Tehran), Hosam al-Din Mojtahedi (Kurdistan), and Hossein Zarandi (Kermanshah) have passed away. Reza Ostadi (Tehran), Ali Asghar Masoumi (Razavi Khorasan), Hadi Barikbin (Qazvin), Mohsen Khrazi (Tehran), Abbas Mahfouzi (Gilan), Ali Mohammad Dashtgheib (Fars), Hassan Aqa Shariati Niasar (Isfahan), and Abbas Vaez Tabasi (Razavi Khorasan) did not register. Ibrahim Hatami (Ardabil) also withdrew. Competitive Range of the Elections The table below shows the arrangement of candidates based on political inclination by province. It should be noted that the information is based on the initial qualification results and minor changes may occur in the final stage of the competition. As seen in the table, in the provinces of Bushehr, Hormozgan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Semnan, and North Khorasan, competition is virtually zero, and candidates automatically enter the Assembly. The number of these representatives, all belonging to principlists, constitutes 11% of the total composition of the fifth Assembly of Experts. In the provinces of Alborz, Ilam, Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Qazvin, Qom, Kermanshah, Lorestan, Kurdistan, Hamadan, and Yazd, only principlist candidates exist, and internal competition determines the fate of the elected representatives from these regions. The percentage of representatives from the mentioned provinces is 26% of the total. Therefore, before the elections are held, if the final arrangement of candidates does not undergo significant changes, principlists will preemptively hold 37% of the fifth Assembly of Experts, exceeding one-third of the seats. In other provinces, there is limited and controlled competition. Reformists and moderates currently have a total of 9 approved candidates. However, it should be noted that these individuals predominantly have traditional and conservative inclinations and are not inclined to resist the unlawful behavior of the leadership. Their names include: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hassan Rouhani, Kazem Nour Mofidi, Seyyed Hashim Batahayi Golpaygani, Mahmoud Alavi, Ali Asghar Dashtgheib, Mohammad Sajadi, Hashem Hashemzadeh Harisi, and Mohammad Hadi Abd Khodai. Independents approximately constitute 32 candidates. These individuals do not have clear affiliations with either main faction and are a mix of unknown figures and professors from the seminary without specific political backgrounds. They may be attracted to principlists after their presence in the Assembly or show interest in the reformist-moderate bloc. Principlists have nearly 125 candidates, which exceeds the number of seats required for the Assembly of Experts, and inevitably some of them will fall out of the list of the Qom Seminary Teachers' Society and the Society of Combatant Clergy of Tehran. Some of them may not remain in the competition until the end and withdraw. Opportunities for Change If the final arrangement of candidates for the fifth round of the Assembly of Experts elections does not undergo meaningful changes, then the composition of the Assembly of Experts and the dominance of the Qom Seminary Teachers' Society over it will not change. In fact, even if all candidates affiliated with the coalition of reformists and moderates win, there is still no capacity to activate the oversight aspect of the Assembly of Experts, and they can at most organize a minority faction. However, there are limited openings that could weaken the leadership's hegemony over the Assembly of Experts, especially in the process of determining succession in the absence of a specific plan and program. These openings can be identified at two levels. The first is a negative aspect and a protest vote to prevent the presence of principlist generals like Ahmad Jannati (a symbol of supervisory oversight), Mohammad Yazdi (a symbol of religious despotism), Mohammad Reza Modarresi Yazdi (a symbol of supervisory oversight), and Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi (a symbol of promoting religious violence) in Tehran, Sadegh Larijani (a symbol of an unjust judiciary) in Mazandaran, and Ahmad Khatami (a symbol of extremism) in Kerman, in the fifth Assembly of Experts. The absence of principlist grandees makes managing the Assembly of Experts difficult for the dominant power section. Additionally, the alternative position of some, like Sadegh Rouhani, for assuming the leadership position in the future is weakened, and relatively moderate inclinations are strengthened. The second axis has a positive aspect, aiming to mobilize voters and persuade critical and dissenting forces to participate widely in the Assembly of Experts elections, allowing reformist-moderate candidates, independents, and second-tier principlist figures to win in areas where competition exists. In this case, given the relatively good relationships of some principlist candidates like Nasser Imam Kashani, Mohammad Hassan Haeri Shirazi, Bagheri Kani, Mohammad Ali Amin, Morteza Moqtadaei, Qorbani Ali Dary Najaf Abadi, Ibrahim Amini, Mohammad Mohammadi Riyashahri, Ali Akbar Qureshi, Ali Shafiei, Naeem Abadi, Vafi Yazdi, and others with Hashemi Rafsanjani and Rouhani, this group could potentially influence the determination of the future leader and change the balance of power in the Assembly of Experts. However, such a scenario is merely a possibility and does not have determinative power but can be considered a scenario for critical and opposing forces. Realistic expectations must be held that the success of this plan will not lead to a tangible change in the Assembly of Experts' approach as long as Khamenei's leadership continues. However, conditionally, it could be effective in the process of determining a successor. The success of this plan requires high organizational capacity for social mobilization. Additionally, from the perspective of democratic forces, a serious challenge surrounding this approach is preparing the groundwork to prevent the strengthening of the institution of Velayat-e-Faqih and balancing strategy and tactics.