The Battle for the Liberation of Mosul; Forces and Disparate Actors

Speculation about the start of the Mosul liberation operation has been ongoing for some time. Khalid al-Obeidi, the Iraqi Minister of Defense, announced in February 2015 that the battle for the liberation of this city would take place within six months, and Haider al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, has repeatedly named 2016 as the year of victory over ISIS. In recent weeks, high-ranking American military officials have implicitly discussed the commencement of the operation. In this context, General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that Iraqi forces would be ready for operations in October. Meanwhile, General Votel, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), believes that the recapture of Mosul will not be possible until late this year. Recently, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, who was in New York for the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly, explicitly stated that the operation would begin on October 19 (28 Mehr). However, the Baghdad government and the Kurdistan Regional Government have not confirmed this news. Regardless of the timing of the operation, the movements of forces stationed around Mosul continue, and several regional and extra-regional actors are concerned about the post-ISIS era in this city and are skeptical about the Baghdad government's ability to manage potential crises that may arise there. Each of these actors has plans for ensuring security in the city but is also worried about gaining advantages and potential benefits from other actors, viewing the issue from a 'zero-sum game' perspective (the gain of one side means the loss of the other, resulting in a zero-sum total). In any case, the battle to retake Mosul, which has long been anticipated, raises questions, including whether this operation, if successful, could put an end to Iraq's long-standing violence or merely open a new chapter in the country's enduring sectarian confrontations. The U.S. and Training Forces, Weakening ISIS Statements from some American officials indicate that the initial stages of the Mosul operation will begin with a pincer movement by Iraqi ground forces from the southeast and Kurdish Peshmerga from the northwest of the city. This attack, which has taken months of planning, organizing, equipping, and training for the participating units, as well as establishing political coordination among the U.S., the Baghdad government, and the Kurdistan Regional Government, is considered a turning point in the war against ISIS and the expulsion of this group from Iraq. Within the framework of its military operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, known as 'Operation Inherent Resolve,' the U.S. has played the most significant role in preparing military, security, and police units among coalition countries. According to General Sean MacFarland, who commanded U.S. joint forces for Operation Inherent Resolve until August 22 (the new commander is General Steven Townsend), American troops have trained over 4,000 Iraqi soldiers, 1,500 counter-terrorism operatives, 6,000 Peshmerga, 1,000 police, and 300 border guard personnel for the Mosul operation. This general emphasized that during his mission, over 5,000 joined the Iraqi police, and at least 20,000 fighters from tribal groups were also recruited by the Baghdad government. Aside from training, the U.S. conducted over 50,000 airstrikes against ISIS positions last year to further weaken the group and pave the way for the Mosul operation, liberating 25,000 square kilometers of territory from ISIS occupation during this period. In total, ISIS lost 50% and 20% of its occupied territories in Iraq and Syria, respectively. During this time, 200 airstrikes were carried out against ISIS-controlled oil and gas facilities, resulting in a 50% reduction in the group's revenue from oil sales. Additionally, U.S. units inflicted damage on ISIS's command and control systems and leadership cadre, targeting at least 25 cash storage and depot sites, destroying at least $500 million of its cash assets. Forces Arrangement Currently, a range of disparate forces are stationed around Mosul, including Iraqi army units, Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni tribal fighters, National Mobilization (Sunni militias), and U.S. special operations units. According to reports, to prepare for the Mosul liberation operation, a logistics base has been established at Qayyarah Air Base, located 60 kilometers south of Mosul, which was retaken from ISIS by Iraqi units in mid-July of this year. This base, which is ready to accommodate transport aircraft, will supply the logistical needs of the forces participating on the front lines, such as weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food supplies. According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 560 American military advisors will assist in the liberation operations from Qayyarah. Additionally, long-range artillery from the U.S. and France stationed in the area will support the advancing units in the initial stages of the operation. Qayyarah, as reported, is the gathering place for Iraqi army units, with 11 special brigades of Iraq (each brigade consisting of 2,000 personnel) ready for offensive operations. Furthermore, five units composed of police and predominantly Sunni tribes, numbering around 6,000, are prepared to execute operations. As mentioned earlier, the Kurdish Peshmerga will enter the field from the northwest of Mosul, while several police units composed of minorities such as Christians, Kakais, and Yazidis, organized by the Kurds, will assist in encircling the city from the northeast. Hashd al-Shaabi will enter the fray in later stages, and based on agreements made, this force will not engage in street and urban warfare and cleansing operations due to the sectarian sensitivities of the Sunni residents of Mosul, about 700,000 of whom still reside in the city out of its previous two million population. Regarding the National Mobilization, which is reported to have a strength of up to 6,000, Saudi Arabia and Turkey want this force to participate in the Mosul operation, but the Baghdad government opposes it. There is no precise estimate of the number of ISIS fighters, but it is estimated to be between 3,000 and 4,500. Operational Challenges, Hashd al-Shaabi, IRGC The participating forces in the Mosul liberation operation will face major challenges at various levels. One of the most significant challenges is the coordination among the military and paramilitary forces participating in this operation, which have not previously operated under a unified command. After the attack begins, a coalition of disparate forces, and in some cases opposing or rival forces, must confront ISIS along a front line stretching for dozens of kilometers to clear the way to reach Mosul. Given the tactics employed in the Iraqi forces' attacks on other cities, including Ramadi and Tikrit, these forces will initially cut off Mosul's communication routes with other cities and areas by besieging it. In light of ISIS's chemical attack with mustard gas against American forces on Tuesday, September 20, and other similar attacks by this group against Kurdish Peshmerga, there are concerns that ISIS may once again use chemical weapons against coalition forces in the upcoming operation. Last week, American aircraft bombed a factory near Mosul that was reportedly a site for the production of chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the chemical weapons used by ISIS have left limited remnants compared to other weapons in the group's arsenal. The Kurdish forces, which will play a significant role in this operation, will be under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government rather than the Abadi government. It appears that Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government have reached a preliminary understanding regarding the territories under their control after the liberation of Mosul. The Kurds insist on controlling certain areas, while the Baghdad government has reciprocal claims. The role of paramilitary forces such as Hashd al-Shaabi, composed of 50 groups, many of which are supported by Iran, is seemingly defined and in fact, they play a secondary role. Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of Hashd al-Shaabi and Secretary-General of the Badr Organization, stated, 'Despite the views of some opponents, Hashd al-Shaabi forces will participate in the battle for the liberation of Mosul because they are security and official forces linked to the Prime Minister [of Iraq], and active participation in the liberation of Mosul is their right.' Hashd al-Shaabi is ostensibly under the control of Haider al-Abadi, but several powerful and influential groups within it operate independently or are obedient to the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, most Sunni politicians in Iraq oppose the entry of Hashd al-Shaabi into Mosul. This force, formed with the approval of the Baghdad government and close cooperation and support from the IRGC and Quds Force to combat ISIS, has 100,000 militia members, and the most important proxy group close to Iran, the Badr Organization, has extensive presence and influence in Iraq's security and military organizations. According to some reports, the IRGC supports 80,000 Hashd al-Shaabi militia members to varying degrees. Nevertheless, Hashd al-Shaabi alone cannot defeat ISIS. Iraqi army units, Kurdish Peshmerga, and U.S. air support are also necessary for the successful execution of the Mosul operation. It is worth emphasizing that the recapture of Mosul does not equate to the end of ISIS, and the fight against it will continue in various degrees. This group, after the fall of the Islamic State, will likely continue its struggle through terrorist operations, bombings, and hit-and-run tactics, as evidenced by the experiences and functions of other similar extremist groups like al-Qaeda. Turkey, Goals, and Concerns Turkey is sensitive to the Mosul liberation operation and is trying to strengthen Kurdish Peshmerga, National Mobilization, and Turkmen in Iraq to pave the way for its influence and bargaining power in designing Mosul's future based on its political and strategic interests. One of the serious disagreements between Ankara and Baghdad is the presence of Turkish military personnel in northern Iraq, which has continued since ISIS's takeover of Mosul in 2014. The Kurdistan Regional Government welcomes this presence, unlike the Baghdad government. Nearly 2,000 Turkish soldiers are present in northern Iraq, with about 500 of them training the National Mobilization in the Zilkan base in Bashiqa, located 18 kilometers northeast of Mosul, which is estimated to have a strength of 6,000. The National Mobilization, referred to as the Sunni Liberation Army, is under the command of Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Nineveh. Additionally, Turkish forces have so far trained 2,700 Kurdish Peshmerga in their various bases. Recently, the Turkish parliament extended the presence of its military in Iraq for another year. In this context, Haider al-Abadi has repeatedly asked Ankara to withdraw its forces from Iraqi territory, and recently, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, responded to this objection in a condescending tone, telling the Iraqi Prime Minister, 'You better understand your position.' Haider al-Abadi opposes the participation of National Mobilization in the Mosul liberation operation, and the leaders of National Mobilization have also stated that Hashd al-Shaabi should not participate in the recapture of Mosul from ISIS. Kurdish Peshmerga have also prohibited Hashd al-Shaabi from entering Mosul and fighting against ISIS. Turkey seeks to put an end to the activities of the PKK in the city of Sinjar, near the Syrian border. This city is located 126 kilometers west of Mosul. The Turkish government is concerned that some of the financial and military aid to Shiite militias from Baghdad may be transferred to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), although some Turkish officials have mentioned the possibility of this happening. The PKK also wishes to participate in the Mosul liberation operation. Turkey supports the Turkmen of Tal Afar, located 77 kilometers west of Mosul, and wants them to return to this city from which they were displaced after ISIS occupied Mosul. The Turkmen make up the majority of the population of this city, with over 25% being Shiite. Overall, Turkmen are considered the third ethnic group in Iraq after Arabs and Kurds. Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government view Hashd al-Shaabi as a significant challenge for the future of Iraq and Kurdistan. Turkey does not want Tal Afar to become a Shiite stronghold. Evidence suggests that Hashd al-Shaabi is attempting to establish a foothold in western Mosul and create a communication route with Syria through Sinjar, thereby forming part of what is referred to as the Shiite crescent between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Beginning of Conflict Resolution or a New Phase of Civil War? It seems that the necessary preparations for the Mosul liberation operation are nearing their final stages. Some reports indicate heavy traffic between Erbil and Mosul, and coalition aircraft have been dropping leaflets over the people of Mosul, informing them of the imminent liberation of their city while urging them not to become human shields for ISIS during the operation. According to the saying 'late is better than never,' the military defeat of ISIS in Mosul is inevitable, but actors, especially regional ones, are contemplating the political and military struggles that may arise after the liberation operation and the emergence of factors and variables that are likely to occur, ultimately having fundamental impacts on Iraq's fate, including the fate of the Kurdistan region, the extent of Tehran's influence over Baghdad, and the continuation of the Shiite-Sunni conflict led by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Regarding the U.S., whose strategy has little impact on Iraq's domestic politics, the end of the Mosul liberation operation will coincide with the end of American military presence in Iraq, a country that must grapple with major crises, and the possibility of its fragmentation is not out of the question.