The Beheading of the Eagle: An End for the Turkish Army?

In 2011, it was expected that Bilgin Balani, a four-star general in the Turkish Air Force, would be appointed as the head of the armed forces. However, he, along with hundreds of other generals, admirals, and senior officers, was arrested. The alleged crime was an attempt to overthrow the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party. Shortly thereafter, the number of arrested officers reached 700. Three years later, General Balani and hundreds of other officers were released. No substantial evidence was presented to confirm their involvement in any conspiracy. In early 2016, Turkey's highest court ruled that all accusations and indictments against these officers were based on false claims and that no 'conspiracy' against the government had taken place. Regardless of whether the claims against these officers were true or not, these arrests led to the purging of the elite of the Turkish Air Force, the second-largest air force in NATO, and the appointment of officers loyal to Fethullah Gülen, an influential cleric currently living in voluntary exile in the United States. Erdoğan, when he became prime minister in 2002, either supported or at least tolerated Gülen's clandestine movement. The armed forces and the judiciary were heavily influenced by secularists. The truth is that the Turkish armed forces were not fond of the Justice and Development Party government, and in 2008, the Constitutional Court considered depriving senior officials of this party of political activities. Several years after Erdoğan's premiership began, obtaining important government positions or lucrative economic contracts without the approval of Gülen's supporters became very difficult. They infiltrated the armed forces, security institutions, the judiciary, education, and the media in Turkey, gaining significant power. However, a few years after Erdoğan's premiership began, obtaining important government positions or lucrative economic contracts without the approval of Gülen's supporters became very difficult. They infiltrated the armed forces, security institutions, the judiciary, education, and the media in Turkey, gaining significant power. The control of the country's affairs had become dualistic, or in other words, a dual power structure had emerged in the country. Gülen supporters in the armed forces and judiciary, which had always been under secular control, had even infiltrated Erdoğan's own government. In such a situation, in 2011, Gülenist prosecutors organized a widespread attack against the leaders of the armed forces and the judiciary, claiming that they were 'conspiring' against Erdoğan's government. In reality, this action was an attempt to destroy the secular and pro-Western governmental structures in Turkey. General Balani stated during the 2011 trial, 'The aim of raising this dirty 'conspiracy' (the accusation against him for participating in a coup) is to behead the eagle.' This statement referred to the Turkish armed forces. After the coup attempt on July 15, General Balani said in an interview with Hurriyet newspaper, 'With this coup attempt, the eagle has now lost its wings and tail. The Turkish armed forces will need at least eight to ten years to regain power before 2011.' If losing 700 officers, including generals and admirals, in 2011 was the 'beheading' of the Turkish armed forces, the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and the subsequent events inflicted even deeper wounds on this institution, whose main duty is to protect the 'secular and democratic republic.' Five years ago, when the Gülenist movement first acted against the Turkish army, Erdoğan and his government watched from the sidelines. They feared the armed forces and were concerned that secularists intended to remove them from power. Therefore, they willingly stepped aside to let Gülen's supporters carry out this troublesome task. Five years ago, when the Gülenist movement first acted against the Turkish army, Erdoğan and his government watched from the sidelines. They feared the armed forces and were concerned that secularists intended to remove them from power. Therefore, they willingly stepped aside to let Gülen's supporters carry out this troublesome task. When asked about the widespread arrests in the military, Erdoğan and his supporters claimed that the judiciary in Turkey was 'impartial' and that no one should interfere. However, in 2013, the same Gülenist prosecutors and judges turned against Erdoğan himself, his family, and politicians close to him. They released audio tapes of Erdoğan and his sons, claiming they were involved in financial corruption and abuse of power and state resources. However, none of these claims and evidence were proven in court. This time, Erdoğan took countermeasures. Shortly after this incident, he began purging the armed forces, police, judiciary, media, and educational system of Gülen supporters. If it is correct to say that the perpetrators of the July 15, 2016 coup were Gülen supporters acting on his orders, it can be imagined that they acted out of fear of being eliminated by Erdoğan's government and the Justice and Development Party. The failed coup provided Erdoğan's government with the best excuse to cleanse all traces of Gülenist influence. The Turkish Interior Minister stated that after the coup's failure, about 76,000 employees of state institutions were suspended from their positions. All of them were accused of having connections with the Gülenist network. The Interior Minister added, 'About three thousand of the detainees were police officers, over seven thousand military personnel, more than two thousand judges and prosecutors, around 200 senior government officials, and over four thousand civilians.' The detainees included about 150 generals and admirals and more than half of the Turkish armed forces' fighter pilots. The long-term consequences of these arrests and purges for the Turkish armed forces will be severe. Achieving the rank of major in the armed forces takes at least twenty years. Training fighter pilots takes at least eight to ten years. All of this must be added to Erdoğan's recent actions to reduce centralization in the management and hierarchy of the military. The long-term consequences of these arrests and purges for the Turkish armed forces will be severe. Achieving the rank of major in the armed forces takes at least twenty years. Training fighter pilots takes at least eight to ten years. All of this must be added to Erdoğan's recent actions to reduce centralization in the management and hierarchy of the military. Erdoğan, using special presidential powers during the state of emergency, has ordered that from now on, all commanders of land, naval, and air forces, unlike before when they operated under the joint staff, will perform their duties under the relevant ministers in the government. The chief of the joint staff will now operate directly under Erdoğan. Some experts believe these actions could help democratize society. However, there are concerns that the Turkish armed forces will lose part of their professional quality under the influence of these changes, especially as their leadership is placed directly under the president and a few ministers loyal to him.