The Board of Governors Accepts Amano's Report

Although Amano's 'gray report' regarding Iran's nuclear activities suspected of having military dimensions has opened the door for the Board of Governors to investigate, it is expected that by mid-December, a new resolution at the Agency will pave the way for declaring the end of this phase of cooperation with Iran and facilitate the lifting of sanctions, provided that other commitments outlined in the 'JCPOA' are fulfilled. Before the unofficial release of Amano's report on the evening of December 2, the leaders of the Islamic Republic, likely having direct or indirect knowledge of the report's contents, issued threats indicating that the suspension of the 'JCPOA' would occur if the case regarding Iran's military-nuclear activities was not resolved. On Thursday, Abbas Araghchi, Iran's senior nuclear negotiator, raised this issue in a television interview, after which the Secretary-General of the Agency emphasized that his report to the Board of Governors would not be 'black and white.' Although the Board of Governors has not yet adjudicated Amano's report and the decision to close the so-called PMD case depends on the votes of the 35 members of the Board, it is expected that with favorable views from the U.S., the Agency will express its relative satisfaction regarding the lifting of sanctions while keeping the dialogue open on past ambiguities with Iran. In addition to the Security Council resolution, after the signing of the 'JCPOA,' to which Iran has committed, the Islamic Republic has so far signed two documents known as 'roadmaps' with the Agency and a document regarding the modification of the Arak reactor with representatives of the 1+5 group, which, if the implementation of the 'JCPOA' is halted, will effectively nullify the commitments outlined in both documents. Mr. Araghchi has advised the 1+5 countries to choose between the 'JCPOA' (the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran) and the 'PMD' (Iran's past nuclear activities suspected of having military dimensions). Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic, compared the 'JCPOA' and 'PMD' to 'dates and thorns' and emphasized that the 1+5 group cannot demand both simultaneously. Similarly, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reiterated this viewpoint, which seems to be a new policy of the Islamic Republic, during a meeting with his Greek counterpart, prior to the release of Amano's final report. It is surprising that senior nuclear negotiators and official Iranian authorities consider the 'JCPOA' separate from the 'PMD' and do not view the 'roadmap' (the signed document with the Agency regarding clarifying Iran's past nuclear activities) as a result of the 'JCPOA' and part of the accepted commitments in its implementation. In reality, it is Iran that must choose between benefiting from the results of implementing the 'JCPOA' and insisting on non-cooperation regarding its past suspicious nuclear activities, not the 1+5 group, which will not lose anything in practice. If Iran turns its back on the JCPOA, it will face not only extensive economic and financial losses, especially as the country's economy suffers from noticeable recession, but also accusations of disregarding international agreements, which could lead to political isolation as one of the potential outcomes. Undoubtedly, the current government in Tehran, despite recent statements from political and security officials of the Islamic Republic, is interested in implementing the 'JCPOA.' Non-implementation of the 'JCPOA' by Iran, including halting cooperation with the Agency, refusing to allow the exit of enriched uranium from the country, and not making the expected changes to the Arak heavy-water reactor, will undoubtedly lead to the cessation of the release of up to $100 billion of Iran's frozen assets and the continuation of unlimited sanctions against Iran. According to Iranian officials, in addition to frozen assets, other daily losses from the current situation are estimated at up to $150 million. In line with the Islamic Republic, the U.S., which has been the main party in nuclear negotiations with Iran, is also very interested in the implementation of the 'JCPOA' and the gradual lifting of sanctions against Iran while inspections by the Agency continue. In stark contrast to the desires and actions of the Iranian government, military and hardline elements of the Islamic Republic appear to be indifferent to the political, economic, and security costs of stopping the 'JCPOA' and maintaining the previous nuclear policy. Although the Secretary-General's 'gray report' confirms the positive actions of the Iranian government in implementing the 'JCPOA,' it also points to ongoing ambiguities regarding suspected military dimensions and the possibility of undeclared nuclear sites. The Board of Governors will have the authority to announce the end of the investigation into Iran's nuclear case by issuing a resolution by December 15, after reviewing its contents. If the Board refrains from declaring the complete closure of Iran's nuclear case and Iran retaliates by announcing the suspension of the 'JCPOA,' Iran's foreign relations will face a new crisis; a situation that seems very unlikely given the regional conditions and the internal situation in Iran.